

[H.A.S.C. No. 117-48]

HEARING  
ON  
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT  
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2022  
AND  
OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED  
PROGRAMS  
BEFORE THE  
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES  
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES  
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS  
FIRST SESSION

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FULL COMMITTEE HEARING  
ON  
**THE FISCAL YEAR 2022  
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION  
BUDGET REQUEST FROM THE  
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE**

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HEARING HELD  
JUNE 23, 2021



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**THE FISCAL YEAR 2022 NATIONAL DEFENSE  
AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUEST FROM  
THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE**

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HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,  
*Washington, DC, Wednesday, June 23, 2021.*

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9:59 a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Adam Smith (chairman of the committee) presiding.

**OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WASHINGTON, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES**

The CHAIRMAN. I call the meeting to order. Good morning.

We have our full committee hearing this morning on the fiscal year 2022 National Defense Authorization budget request from the Department of Defense.

We are honored to be joined by the Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley, and by Mike McCord, the Under Secretary of Defense, the Comptroller/Chief Financial Officer for DOD [Department of Defense], and we look forward your testimony.

We are back in the committee hearing room, which is great. We do still allow a hybrid option for members who wish to participate remotely and because of that, we have this set of rules that I must read before we begin. So I will do that before making my opening statement.

Members who are joining remotely must be visible on screen for the purposes of identity verification, establishing and maintaining a quorum, participating in the proceeding and voting.

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Members may use the software platform's chat feature to communicate with staff regarding technical or logistical support issues only.

And finally, I've designated a committee staff member to, if necessary, mute unrecognized members' microphones to cancel any inadvertent background noise that may disrupt the proceeding.

With that, the only other procedural thing is the Secretary has a hard stop at 2 o'clock. We will stop at 2 o'clock. I know we have a lot of members to ask questions.

We'll get through as many of them as fast as we possibly can. We will also be taking a break at 11:30 for the witnesses, a brief break, 5-ish minutes, and then get back going.

So I hope members will make note of that. Hard stop, 2 o'clock; break at 11:30. So plan accordingly.

With that, I want to thank our witnesses for being here and thank them also for their service to our country and their leadership at the Pentagon.

These are extraordinarily difficult times in a variety of different ways. Certainly, we have a very complex threat environment across the globe.

Russia, China, North Korea, Iran, transnational terrorist groups, all of those things are things that we need to worry about in order to maintain the security of this country. We are actively building on our partnerships across the globe to try and confront those threats, recognizing the need for a cooperative effort with our allies and partners. Appreciate that effort as well.

Much of the focus of this committee for the last couple of weeks has been on the top line for the defense budget, which is an area of some controversy. I, personally, you know, don't think it should be. I think the budget the President has submitted is more than adequate. It is a \$12 billion increase over last year's budget, and the budget before that was only a \$3 billion increase over the—over the previous budget.

Seven hundred and fifty three billion dollars is a lot of money. Even in the United States of America it's a lot of money, and we ought to be able to adequately defend our country for \$753 billion.

My concern, as many of you have heard before, goes more towards how we are spending that money. Number one, making sure that we are getting value out of it, that the programs that we're spending the money on are meeting their budget requirements and are meeting their requirement requirements, basically producing what we asked them for, and we have really struggled with that in the last couple of decades.

The members of this committee know better than anyone the list of programs that have either been cancelled or have wound up way over budget and under the performance expectations.

Now, I will say that in the last couple of years, I think that's gotten better. I think a succession of Secretaries of Defense and other members at the Pentagon have really buckled down and looked at that.

The most optimistic thing that has happened to me in this—in this regard, it was several weeks ago when I was briefed on the B-21 program, which is on time, under budget, and performing as expected.

We learned a lot of lessons from the disappointments of the F-35 and others, and I know there are other programs that are similarly progressing in a positive way. There are still some that aren't.

But number one, if we—I mean, think about all the money in the last 20 years that went to things that didn't produce. If we just had that money back, we wouldn't be having a conversation about what the top line budget is.

So going forward, let's make sure that we're efficient and effective in how we spend that money.

And then the second piece of it is something that has been a big focus of this committee for the last couple of years and that is understanding the changing nature of warfare, understanding how important information systems and survivability have become.

Simply massing a huge amount of firepower in one place isn't enough if you can't protect those systems and you can't get adequate information and if those systems are not survivable.

We have had two task forces in this committee. Last year, we had the Future of Defense Task Force that really focused on this issue. You know, what are the programs that we need going forward. I reject the whole legacy versus the future argument because maybe a legacy system actually fits what we need right now. It's not a matter of old or new. It's a matter of what is going to work for the environment that we face, and I think that task force produced some incredibly important information about how we do that.

We now have a task force focused on the supply chain, which is directly tied to that as well. How are we—how can we make sure that we get the crucial equipment and have the crucial manufacturing capabilities that we need to perform.

Lastly, we formed a new subcommittee focused specifically on emerging technologies, artificial intelligence being at the top of that list, but not the only one.

That's what's really going to be the key to our ability to defend ourselves. I know we have heard a lot about some of the war games that have been done specifically focused on what would happen if we got into a conflict with China, and for the better part of, I don't know, 7, 8 years while they were doing those war games it did not go particularly well.

But they did a new one, the Air Force did, just a few months back that introduced some new capabilities, and it totally flipped how that went. And it wasn't about the sheer volume of stuff that we had. It was about having a different set of capabilities, capabilities that could survive, capabilities that could get information to our warfighters reliably in crucial circumstances. That drives home that point. It isn't how much money we're spending. It's what we're spending it on and how it reflects the threats that we face today.

The last point that I'm anxious to hear from our witnesses about is we have had a fair amount of difficulty in terms of protecting our service members. Focus has been on sexual assault in the mili-

tary. We have not adequately dealt with that, and I think there is wide bipartisan support for the idea that we need to make some big changes to try to address that.

Now, this committee has passed a number of provisions to attempt to address this issue. We are not there yet. There is going to be a big change in that.

It is, however, not just sexual assault. I know that both of you gentlemen have looked closely at the report that came out at Fort Hood and some of the command structure problems that were down there that led to many problems with the force.

We need to figure out how do we recruit, train, and protect our service members and their families, because as you all know, that's what makes defense go. The systems are great, but it's the people that make it happen.

We are an all-volunteer military. We need to make sure that people still want to serve in the military, want to keep serving in the military, and feel, most importantly, that they and their families are safe when doing so, and I think we have got a lot of work to do in that area.

I thank you both for being here. I look forward to your testimony.

And with that, I will turn it over to Mr. Rogers for his opening statement.

**STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE ROGERS, A REPRESENTATIVE  
FROM ALABAMA, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON  
ARMED SERVICES**

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I really appreciate the witnesses being here. I know you all are busy, but this is very important to us and the Nation to be able to hear from you. So thank you for your preparation and your presence and your service to our country.

Last month, Admiral Davidson testified that, quote, "There is no guarantee the United States would win a future conflict with China," closed quote.

In fact, in almost every war game conducted by the Pentagon over the last decade, the United States lost to China. The Chinese Communist Party [CCP] now controls the largest navy in the world and the largest army in the world.

It has more troops, more ships, and more ground-based missiles than United States, and while we're still developing hypersonic missiles, the CCP is fielding them.

The facts couldn't be more clear. China is a very real threat to our national security.

Both Secretary Austin and General Milley have acknowledged that point. At his confirmation hearing, Secretary Austin said, quote, "China presents the most significant threat, going forward," closed quote.

General Milley testified before the Senate [that] "from a strictly military standpoint," China represented our greatest threat.

Here's the problem. The President apparently doesn't see things the same way. If he did, I don't understand why he'd send us a wholly inadequate defense budget.



This budget request doesn't keep pace with China. It doesn't even keep pace with inflation. The fact—in fact, it constitutes over a \$4 billion cut in real spending dollars.

This budget cuts the size of the Navy and starves the shipbuilding industry. It cuts procurement budgets across the board, delaying critical modernization efforts. Air Force procurements were slashed by 12 percent, missile defense by more than 15 percent.

There's a \$25 billion unfunded priorities list, much of which are critical capabilities our warfighters need to counter China. The budget accelerates divestment in important capabilities, including over 200 fighter and reconnaissance aircraft. It doesn't seem to matter that these are still needed on the battlefield.

And as the services struggle to meet recruiting goals, the budget cuts end strength. Ask the administration why they propose such an anemic budget and they struggle for excuses. They tell us that the savings they produce today are being reinvested in future capabilities, except that's not the case.

Slashing procurements and accelerating divestments produces nearly \$13 billion in so-called savings. But the research and development of new capabilities increases by only \$5 billion. Then they tell us the fact that defense spending is hemmed in is because of fiscal realities. That might make sense if the President wasn't proposing spending unprecedented amounts of money on a progressive wish list but not so on national security or defense.

The budget proposes massive increases in funding for the EPA [Environmental Protection Agency] and the Department of Education, HHS [U.S. Department of Health and Human Services], and Commerce. In all, defense nondiscretionary—in all, nondefense discretionary spending grows by an astonishing 16 percent, 10 times more than defense, and while it—and that doesn't count the \$1.9 trillion wasted on so-called COVID [coronavirus] stimulus. More than \$1.7 billion of that bill was spent on progressive priorities like stimulus checks to prisoners, illegal immigrants, and bailouts of union pension funds, but not a dime for defense.

Nor does it include the infrastructure bill they're talking about, which spends money on everything under the sun except defense. The cost of that fiasco could range anywhere from \$1 trillion to \$6 trillion of new mandatory spending.

The only reason the President is not spending more on defense is because the radical left is pushing him to cut it. They want to slash defense spending by 10 percent or more. To his credit, the President has not gone that far. But what he's proposing is far from what we need for a credible deterrent. The National Defense Strategy Commission recommends an annual increase of 3–5 percent above inflation to stay ahead of China.

Each one of the service chiefs and combatant commanders that I've talked with publicly has endorsed that level of spending. Deputy Secretary Hicks supported it when she was a commissioner on that very commission.

I suspect that the level of funding Secretary Austin and General Milley would like to see is that same amount as well.

Given the colossal amounts of money the President and the majority are throwing around these days, I outright reject the notion that we can't somehow find 3–5 percent for our national security.

If this budget was being driven by risk instead of politics, 3–5 percent is the level of growth we would see.

Unfortunately, that's not the case.

Mr. Secretary, I know you're doing the best you can with what you've been given, but it's wrong to put you in this position. This budget robs our warfighters of vital capabilities they need to carry out their mission and it fails to adequately support our defense industrial base.

Most regrettably, it gives China more than—more time to enhance their military advantage and undermine deterrence. I urge my colleagues to reject this budget and work in a bipartisan manner with our colleagues to address the urgent needs on national defense.

With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Secretary, you are recognized.

**STATEMENT OF HON. LLOYD J. AUSTIN, III, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE; ACCOMPANIED BY MICHAEL J. McCORD, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMPTROLLER)/CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE**

Secretary AUSTIN. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Rogers, and distinguished members of this committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today about the President's budget request for fiscal year 2022.

I'm pleased to appear alongside General Milley, whose counsel has been crucial to us as we developed our budget and as we continue to defend this Nation, which remains our top priority.

I'm also grateful to have our comptroller, Mike McCord, with us today, and let me say at the outset that I believe our budget requests will help us match our resources to strategy, and strategy to policy, and policy to the will of the American people.

This budget is informed by the President's interim national security guidance and by my own message to the force. We believe that it funds the right mix of capabilities that we need most to defend this Nation now and in the future.

It invests in hypersonic weapons, artificial intelligence, microelectronics, 5G technology, in space-based systems, shipbuilding, and nuclear modernization, to name a few.

In fact, this budget asks you to approve nearly \$28 billion to modernize our nuclear triad, and \$112 billion for research, development, testing, and evaluation, which is the largest R&D [research and development] request ever put forth by this Department.

Our request also gives us the flexibility to divest ourselves of systems and platforms that no longer meet our needs, including older ships, aircraft, ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] platforms that demand more maintenance, upkeep, and risk than we can afford.

The Department must be ready to keep pace with our competitors and, if necessary, to fight and win the next war and not the last one. And that's why we have commissioned the Global Posture Review and a new National Defense Strategy which will further inform and guide our resource decisions.

This budget reflects our focus on the pacing challenge that we clearly see from the People's Republic of China [PRC], and to include more than \$5 billion for the Pacific Deterrence Initiative.

Earlier this month, our—after our China Task Force completed its work, I issued an internal directive kicking off department-wide efforts that will, among other things, help bolster our deterrence against the PRC and revitalize our network of regional allies and partners, and accelerate the development of cutting-edge capabilities and new operational concepts.

However, China is not our only challenge. Our budget also invests \$617 million to counter the damaging effects of climate change and additional funds to prepare for future challenges like another pandemic.

It helps us to counter belligerence from Russia, especially in the cyber realm, and you'll see more than \$10 billion devoted to cybersecurity, cyberspace operations, and cyber research and development.

With this emphasis on space and missile defense and more sophisticated sensors, our budget will also help us counter the increasing ballistic missile capabilities of nations like North Korea and Iran.

It funds a troop presence and counterterrorism capabilities in the Middle East and South Asia to meet the threats posed not only by Iran but also by terrorist networks like ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria] and al-Qaida, and in Africa like those posed by al-Shabaab.

And it helps us maintain the integrated deterrent capability and global posture necessary to back up the hard work of our diplomats, allies, and partners.

Now, I know that Afghanistan remains at the top of all of our minds, and I can report that our withdrawal remains on pace. Last week in Brussels, we updated our NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] allies and I was encouraged by their continued support for the new direction that we're taking.

We have accomplished the mission for which our troops were sent—were sent to Afghanistan some 20 years ago, and I'm very proud of the brave men and women who made it possible and those who gave their lives for that mission.

And I'm also deeply grateful to the families of our service members who have endured so much as they sent their sons, daughters, husbands, and wives into battle.

We will now transition into a new bilateral relationship with our Afghan partners, one that helps them meet their responsibilities to their citizens but one that will not require a U.S. footprint larger than what's necessary to protect our diplomats.

And that's one reason why we're asking to move overseas contingency operations funding inside the budget. This will add greater transparency, accountability, and predictability to the budgeting process, and, frankly, it's overdue.

Now, this budget also takes care of our people. It increases funding to support in-home care and support, which has become increasingly important during this pandemic.

We also seek to improve military base pay and retention bonuses and other incentives that will help us attract and retain the best

talent. And we will be working hard to combat challenges that make service in the ranks more difficult for all the men and women of the Department, from getting a better handle on the extent to which we experience extremist behavior to combating sexual assault and harassment.

As you know, my first directive as Secretary of Defense issued on my first full day in the office was to service leadership about sexual assault. Yesterday, I received the final recommendations and complete report of the Independent Review Commission [IRC], and I want to thank Lynn Rosenthal for her exceptional leadership on this commission as well as the talented experts who worked so hard and so diligently to support her.

The result is a comprehensive assessment across four lines of effort: accountability, prevention, climate and culture, and victim care and support; and that assessment recommends creative and evidence-based options.

In the coming days, I'll present to President Biden my specific recommendations about the commission's finding, but I know enough at this point to say that I fully support removing the prosecution of sexual assaults and related crimes from the military chain of command.

We are prepared to work with Congress to amend the Uniform Code of Military Justice in this regard. The IRC also recommended the inclusion of other special victims crimes inside this independent prosecution system to include domestic violence, and I support this as well, given a strong correlation between these sorts of crimes and the prevalence of sexual assault.

As we move forward, I believe that it's important to make changes that are both scoped to the problem that we're trying to solve and properly resource. The Department will likely need new authorities to implement many of the IRC's recommendations and we will most assuredly require additional resources both in personnel and in funding.

And we look forward to having those discussions with this committee and we must treat this as the leadership issue that it is.

And Chairman Smith and members of the committee, we field the greatest military in human history made up of the finest men and women who have ever donned the cloth of this Nation. We also enjoy a civilian workforce deeply committed to every mission that we take on.

No adversary can match the quality of our people, and I am immensely proud and humbled to serve with them again and I can assure you that the President's budget request for fiscal year 2022 fulfills our obligations to them and to their families.

And I thank you for your steadfast support of the Department of Defense and for all that you do to ensure that we remain ready to defend this Nation, and I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Secretary Austin can be found in the Appendix on page 81.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.  
General Milley.

**STATEMENT OF GEN MARK A. MILLEY, USA, CHAIRMAN,  
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF**

General MILLEY. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Rogers, and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. It remains my distinct honor and privilege to represent the United States joint force, the most capable military in the world.

Our troops remain the best led, best equipped, and best trained force anywhere and that is largely due to the efforts of this Congress, and I want to personally thank Secretary Austin and his steady leadership and wise guidance.

Your joint force is standing watch, protecting American interests in all domains—air, sea, land, cyber, and space—around the globe 24/7. We're also fully engaged here at home in both defense support to civil authorities through COVID-19 medical support, as well as homeland defense to keep Americans safe.

We are conducting major exercises in Europe. We are monitoring the DMZ [demilitarized zone] in Korea. We are conducting freedom of navigation operations in the strategic waterways of the global commons. We are sustaining operations in space and cyberspace. We are supporting our allies and partners in Africa and Latin America. We are patrolling the skies of the Middle East.

And our joint force is currently conducting a safe, responsible, and deliberate strategic retrograde from Afghanistan in good order while ensuring the continued support of the Afghan National Security Force.

The purpose of the United States military is simple. It is to protect and defend the Constitution of the United States of America against all enemies, foreign and domestic, and with that comes two key tasks.

Task one is to prepare for war in order to deter our enemies, and key task two is to fight and win America's wars if deterrence fails. The United States military is a critical component of our overall national power; the combination of our diplomatic efforts, economic strength, and the overriding hope of the American message, and our military capability, will deter adversaries and preserve great power peace in this era of great power competition.

The current geostrategic landscape is witnessing rapid change, and the potential for threats to peace and stability in various regions, and indeed the world, is increasing, not decreasing.

States and nonstate actors are rapidly transforming technologically and we are bearing witness to a fundamental change in the character of war, as Chairman Smith pointed out.

In particular, China is increasing its military capability at a very serious and sustained rate, and we must ensure that we retain our competitive and technological edge against this pacing threat.

Readiness, modernization, and combat power are key to deter war and maintain the peace, and equally important are the combat multipliers of teamwork, cohesion, and well-led units. We must resolve the issue of sexual assault and I and all the chiefs are in alignment with what the Secretary of Defense just said.

And we must confront the issue of extremism. Both are corrosive and the very essence of what it means to be in the military is negatively impacted if we allow them to continue.

Additionally, we must continue to invest in leader development and talent management required for a future operating environment and, finally, we must continue to nurture and sustain a key strategic source of our strength, which is our network of many close allies and partners around the world.

The joint force appreciates the work that our elected representatives do to ensure that we have the resources needed to be ready. The days of the Budget Control Act are over, and repeated continuing resolutions, hopefully, are behind us for good.

The joint force will deliver modernization of our Armed Forces and security to the people of the United States at the fiscal year 2022 President's proposed budget request of \$715 billion. The American people have entrusted to us a significant commitment of treasure and we will work diligently to ensure it is spent prudently in the best interest of the Nation.

In alignment with the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, this budget makes hard choices. But it delivers a ready, agile, and capable joint force that will compete successfully. It will deter and it will win across all domains and which is postured for continued overmatch in the future.

This budget's focus is on the future and prioritizes nuclear modernization, long-range fires, hypersonic technology, artificial intelligence, shipbuilding, microelectronics, space, cyber, and 5G. These investments, in concert with our recently developed joint warfighting concept, will pave the way for the joint force of the future.

The President's budget for fiscal year 2022, this request increases the readiness and ensures our people are our number one priority. Consistent predictable budgets informed by the will of the people are critical to our Nation's defense, and the passage of this budget in a timely way is important.

The fiscal year 2022 Presidential budget strikes an appropriate balance between preserving present readiness and future modernization. It's a down payment on the investment of the future with a bias toward the future operating environment and the change in the character of war.

It is now that we must set ourselves on a path to modernize the joint force and this budget contributes to doing just that.

Many enemies, historically, have grossly underestimated the United States and our people. We are ready now and we will remain so in the future, and any adversary of the United States of America should not underestimate our military capability, our skill, and our combat power.

Our job as your joint force, our contract with the American people, is that we, the United States military, will be able to fight and win when called upon and we will support and defend the Constitution of the United States always and forever.

And I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of General Milley can be found in the Appendix on page 95.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you both.

The unfunded requirements is something that has always sort of struck me as odd. Every budget I've ever seen—I think there may be a couple of years where we didn't do them—no matter how large the budget, there's always this list of unfunded requirements, and

it strikes me as simply a way to try to—a forcing mechanism to no matter what force more money into the system, when as I said in my opening remarks what we really need to do is to force more effectiveness out of the money that we get.

But we have this \$25 billion list of unfunded requirements. Do you agree with that? Do you think that there are things in that \$25 billion list that we haven't done that are somehow going to make it impossible for you to do your job? And if not, please explain why not.

Secretary AUSTIN. Chairman, as I said in my opening remarks, I think that this budget provides us the flexibility to go after the capabilities that we need to support the operational concepts that will allow us to be not only competitive against any near peer, but actually dominant in that battlespace. And so I'm comfortable that this budget provides us what we need.

You've heard me say also that our pacing challenge is China. If you look at the types of things that we're investing in, 20—almost \$20.5 billion for missile defeat and defense, \$6.6 billion for long-range fires, \$52.4 billion for a lethal Air Force, \$34.6 billion for combat-effective naval forces, and \$12.3 billion for effective ground forces, not to mention the almost \$28 billion that we're invested in—investing in modernizing the nuclear triad.

So I believe that it gives us, you know, the right flexibility to go after the capabilities that we need to be successful, going forward.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't know, General Milley, if you want to dive in here. So how would you explain this, and I've argued that we should have gotten rid of the unfunded requirements list a long time ago.

But how do you explain the service chiefs submitting this list? You know, I agree with Secretary Austin. I think he's absolutely right about where the budget is at. But what are we doing with this list of things that to members up here makes us think that we're not meeting our needs?

General MILLEY. As a former service chief, [inaudible] Chief of Staff of the Army, the unfunded requirements list, and everyone probably looks at it slightly differently, but generally speaking, I would say that requirements always—I can't think of a budget where requirements do not exceed resources, and the whole purpose of a budget is to prioritize that which is most important down to that which is least important.

And the unfunded requirements list, given an amount of money to a given service, anything that goes beyond what the budget is that they're given goes onto an unfunded requirements list and these things are pages long, as you said, and billions of dollars.

The key question, though, is relative to your opponent. Everything's relative to someone. In this case, relative to the pacing threat of China, relative to Russia, terrorists, et cetera.

Are those unfunded requirements critical path capabilities that are required to succeed? And the answer is no, in my opinion—in my professional opinion. Others may have different opinions.

If they were critical, then they need to be higher on the priority list and in the base budget, and the chiefs—service chiefs and service secretaries all go through that drill. It's a hard drill. I had to

do it with several service secretaries, we had night courts and so on.

But the unfunded requirement lists are less important than that which is in the base budget. The reason they're submitted is to provide the committee and Congress, the representatives of the people, to determine if those unfunded requirement lists meet the needs, and you have to make some assessments and determine to take such and such out of the base budget and add something from the requirements.

So this is a flexibility option for the committee and it gets submitted every year. Try to minimize them to the amount possible because we really want the base budget is what needs to be passed.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. I think that's a good explanation. And again, I'll stand by the statement that, you know, over the last 15 years in particular, the amount of money that has gone to programs that haven't performed, I mean, I'd rather have the service chiefs go through and tell us how they're going to make sure that their programs are actually going to perform as intended and on budget and the mistakes that we've made with the money that has been wasted so we don't do that again.

And I have no doubt whatsoever if we did that we'd have more than enough money to meet the requirements as we do, and as I mentioned, again, I want to compliment this Department in the last couple of years, a series of Secretaries of Defense who have done the hard work to do that scrub, to go back in there and learn the lessons for what went wrong and try and fix it. And I think that is the most important thing we can do to meet our defense needs, going forward.

Mr. Rogers.

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Milley, as I noted in my opening statement, China already has a larger navy, more troops, more missiles, and more hypersonics than we do. Where are you most concerned that China has gained or may soon gain an advantage against us?

General MILLEY. I would—there's several areas. Yeah, if you roll the clock back to 1975 and the reforms of Deng Xiaoping, the Chinese economy has risen at a rate of about 10 percent down to 6 or 7 percent recently, and it's projected to reduce a little bit more.

But with that massive economy, with that massive amount of money, China has developed an extraordinarily capable military. They are not—to be clear, they are not currently superior to the United States military. But their aim, their object, is to be at least co-equal to if not superior, and that is possible.

If we stood still, that will be possible in a certain amount of years. And I think that the area of cyber and space, those are two critical areas, and subsurface, submarines, are a third area, all of which we need to watch. But there's also emerging technologies that are very concerning, things like hypersonics, a man-machine interface, changing the relationship of men or human beings to the machine, linking that to various—very high-powered computer systems. There's a wide variety of information technologies that they're working on. These are all concerning.

And then I would throw in robotics and most importantly is artificial intelligence. These are emerging technologies that are going



to hit in time and space in the next 10 to 15 to 20 years max and, we, the United States, need to be out in front in all of them. Otherwise, we're going to be setting up future generations for a very difficult situation relative to China.

Mr. ROGERS. That's a great answer, and I agree that the real threat is down the road. But that's the point. We can't put off—we can't keep deferring taking action on keeping pace with China, because it's going to get us in a bad situation.

So while this budget is, basically, level funding, just a little bit of a dip, it's irresponsible in the long term, and I'm not just going off on this President. The last President came to us with a budget that was inadequate, and we got him to a better place and I'm hoping we get this President to a better place.

And I frankly hate it for y'all because y'all are outstanding military leaders, and you know what we need and you're just doing your job trying to spin this thing up or shine it up. But it's not what we need for our long-term military growth.

General Milley, as the chairman just alluded to, we got a \$25 billion unfunded priority list that came to us, and included in that are priorities such as \$1.7 billion for a new destroyer, \$1.4 billion for F-15Xs, and \$300 million for the defense of Hawaii and Guam. You don't think those should be in this year's funding priorities?

General MILLEY. A couple of points. Hawaii and Guam—no one, China, Russia, or anyone else should think Hawaii and Guam are not defended. Because they're unfunded requirements doesn't mean Hawaii and Guam aren't defended.

We have a tiered capability in the Pacific arrayed explicitly to defend U.S. territory. The United States of America mainland and Hawaii, Guam, and our allies and partners are very well defended.

So I don't want anyone to misinterpret that. There are capabilities that we'd like to improve on. But they didn't meet the threshold of the base budget. Therefore, they're in an unfunded requirement list. For the destroyer, we're adding another destroyer next year. So it's going to be in the 2023 budget vice 2022.

Again, hard choices, prioritization. That's what budgets are all about. And that's what the services did, that's what the Secretary of Defense did, and I fully support it. And I think this budget, \$715 [billion], provides for the adequate defense of the United States of America for fiscal year 2022.

Mr. ROGERS. Again, I understand—I know this is the President's budget and you got to do your best, but the commander of INDO-PACOM [U.S. Indo-Pacific Command] says we need an Aegis destroyer on Guam and we need a new radar system on Hawaii. Granted, they're defended, not defended as well as they need to be, and we need to be taking action to protect them.

General Milley, you testified before the Senate and said that China and Russia combined are spending more money on defense than the United States. How much risk are we inviting by failing to keep pace with China when it comes to this kind of spending?

General MILLEY. I think—I think we are keeping pace and I think we're ahead of China, individually, as a country. When you combine China and Russia—and we would have to go into a classified session to show how we do this mathematically—but the combined budgets, when everything is taken into account and you nor-

malize for the cost of personnel, et cetera, then you will find that the combined budgets of China and Russia do exceed that of the U.S. Department of Defense budget.

In certain areas I'm concerned, like research, development, and some of the advanced modernization technologies. Those are areas which I'd rather go into a classified session. But in an open hearing and factually correct, we are keeping pace. In fact, we're exceeding China or Russia in the specific niche capabilities.

And I don't want anyone to walk away from any hearing—and we're talking to more people than just in this room right now—I don't want China or Russia to ever think that the United States military is not better than their military. We are; in all domains, every day, 24/7. And that's not just bragging. That's fact.

Mr. ROGERS. And I completely agree. Everything you just said is accurate, today. But you and I both know, as you alluded to earlier, if we don't step it up they are going to meet us or possibly surpass us in capability if we don't get on pace to make sure we never lose standing with them.

Now, listen, I know what y'all got to say to this, but I got to ask it. Every combatant commander and service chief that has been before this committee I've asked did they support the National Defense Strategy Commission's recommendation that we increase defense spending in the foreseeable future 3–5 percent over inflation.

Both of you have publicly stated before the President's budget came out that that is the way you felt as well. How do you feel today? Do you still believe that that should be what we are doing when it comes to defense spending?

Secretary Austin, you first.

Secretary AUSTIN. I support the President's budget and I—as I stated earlier, sir, I think that this budget gives us the ability to go after the things that we need to be very competitive going forward, and I absolutely agree with you that we are not only sighted on what we're doing today, but we must be sighted on what the requirements are and the capabilities will be in the future.

And so we're working hard to build those capabilities, to meet those requirements, and I think—I think this budget does that.

Mr. ROGERS. General Milley.

General MILLEY. I agree. I fully support this budget. I wouldn't have said it was adequate if I didn't. As far as the 3–5 percent, of course, 3–5 percent or 1 percent or 2 percent, we could spend it appropriately with the UFR [unfunded requirements] list, et cetera.

But the President is looking at a wider angle view for our Nation's strength, not just a military strength, and it's a combined strength of the Nation. It's critically important that we have an incredibly healthy economy. Otherwise, you'll never have a military. You have to have an educated workforce. You have to have all of these things in order to have a good military.

So if this President's budget requires other parts of the government to have increases for various reasons, fine. This budget is adequate to defend the United States of America, and if given more money, we would certainly spend it appropriately in a disciplined way in accordance with the priorities on the UFR list. But I fully support this budget. Absolutely.

Mr. ROGERS. Okay. Last question. Both the chairman and I have been very frustrated that we got this budget so late and I fear it's going to make it difficult for us to get an approps [appropriations] bill, defense approps, and NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act] passed in a reasonable amount of time. That may force a CR [continuing resolution]. Secretary Austin, could you tell me what the implications of another CR would be?

Secretary AUSTIN. So if we have a CR, Ranking Member Rogers, it will adversely affect readiness. It will slow down our ability to modernize. It will adversely—also adversely affect the industry, and so I think that's really important.

I think we need to do everything we can to prevent having a detrimental effect on our ability to man, train, and equip the force. And what—obviously, what the CR does is it prevents you from initiating new starts and that's a—that's a problem.

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, gentlemen.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Langevin is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank our witnesses for your testimony today and for your service to our Nation.

I want to pick up where we left just a few minutes ago, talking about preparing and investing for not only today, but for tomorrow, and because that revolves around research and development.

Mr. Secretary, the fiscal year 2022 budget is the largest request for research, development, testing, and evaluation [RDT&E] to date, and which I applaud. Yet, overall basic and applied research funding is down from fiscal year 2021. I think this is a mistake.

And given, just by way of example, that a COVID-19 vaccine was a result of basic defense research 5 to 10 years ago, which resulted in the mRNA vaccine being developed that was directly from a DARPA [Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency] project, that early and applied research, thank God that that research actually bore fruit and that it happened in the first place.

So I appreciate that in our conversation on Monday you said that you would look into it. My question is, will you commit to getting me a firm assessment of why we cut these vital budget lines by mid-July so that we can consider it during the NDAA?

Secretary AUSTIN. Let me just say, again, that this is the largest investment in RDT&E that this Department has ever made, which speaks to our commitment to ensure that we're investing in the right things to make sure that we're relevant in the future, and I absolutely agree with you on the importance of resourcing science and technology and other things.

And I would also say that the areas that you're concerned about, while if you look at our investment this year, for this budget for 2022, it's actually above what the forecasted investment was in 2021. Not what they were resourced for but actually what they asked for in the budget. You know, we've asked for more.

So, again, we'll work hard to make sure that we have, you know, the right monies in the right place to ensure that we maintain a robust capability in this realm. But—

Mr. LANGEVIN. Okay. If you could just give me, you know, a yes or no answer. If you'd look into that assessment. You said you'd

give—if we can get it before the timeframe so that we consider it in the NDAA I would appreciate that.

Secretary AUSTIN. Okay.

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you. Next, I'm really concerned with how the Department has addressed electromagnetic spectrum operations. Our adversaries are, clearly, investing in technologies to dominate the domain while we continue to consider it an afterthought, in some ways, from my perspective.

What—when can we expect the electromagnetic spectrum superiority strategy implementation plan, and what do you think is the first step to regaining our advantage?

Secretary AUSTIN. Well, the first step to making sure that we maintain an advantage is to make sure that we have a coordinated effort across the board to identify what the threats are and make sure that we have the right capabilities to be dominant in that space.

Our vice chairman is currently leading this effort on—you know, for our forces and, you know, I'm confident that as he works his way through this, along with our deputy secretary, he'll come back with some good recommendations and we'll implement those that are appropriate.

Mr. LANGEVIN. Secretary, the next—the Department of Defense officially recognizes five domains of warfare. I think we all agree that cybersecurity is the national security challenge of the 21st century.

The four—four of those domains—the senior civilian is a service secretary. Cyber has a deputy assistant secretary, which is four rungs lower than the other warfighting domains. Why does this make sense, especially when U.S. service members are in contact with engaging our adversaries in cyberspace daily?

Secretary AUSTIN. Well, cyber is, obviously, incredibly important to us. I think we're very effective in this domain and I think, currently, we have the right oversight for our cyber efforts.

Matter of fact, I was just out with General Nakasone here a couple of weeks ago reviewing what he's doing and looking at his programs, talking to his troops, and I'm very impressed by the capability that he continues to develop.

And we are investing in cyber. You know, \$10.4 billion in this budget focused on cyber, and so it's important to us and it will remain important to us.

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Wilson is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to thank our witnesses for your service. As a 31-year Army veteran myself, as the grateful dad of four sons who have served in Iraq, Egypt, and Afghanistan, I particularly appreciate your dedication and what you mean for our troops and military families.

And for each of you, the issue of pit production. I'm grateful that in the fiscal year 2022 Presidential budget request it fully funds the modernization of our nuclear triad. A credible nuclear deterrent is key to maintaining peace during great power competition. This requires modernized and robust nuclear weapons infrastructure, including the capability to produce plutonium pits.

Dr. Charlie Verdon, the Acting Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration [NNSA], Secretary of Energy Jennifer Granholm, NNSA nominee Jill Hruby, and Admiral Charles Richard are all on record supporting a two-site solution for pit production.

In addition, just yesterday, General John Hyten reinforced the importance of a two-site solution in a letter to Ranking Member Mike Turner.

I request unanimous consent to enter the letter into the record.

Mr. LANGEVIN [presiding]. Without objection, so ordered.

[The letter referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 109.]

Mr. WILSON. Secretary Austin and Chairman Milley, do you agree that limiting pit production to one site leaves us too little redundancy? What are the benefits of a two-site solution to the resiliency of our nuclear weapons infrastructure to establish peace through strength?

Secretary Austin.

Secretary AUSTIN. Well, thank you, first of all, thank you for your incredible service. Very, very impressive, and we're grateful.

On the issue of pit production, as you know, the Department of Energy is the lead element for that and oversees the efforts of NNSA. We work with the Department of Energy to ensure that we have, you know, the right approach. We want to make sure that we have, you know, adequate resources in terms of pits and other elements that go into supporting our triad there.

So we continue to do a review of our overall capabilities, and as we review those capabilities, we'll determine, you know, what the—what the appropriate amount of—appropriate number of sites ought to be.

Mr. WILSON. And in—hey, and in accordance with the President's budget, do you support two sites?

Secretary AUSTIN. I support the President's budget, yes.

Mr. WILSON. And with two sites. Thank you. Excuse me.

General Milley.

General MILLEY. Yes, I'm aligned with General Hyten's recommendation. Yes, we talked about it. The broader issue, of course, is the number one priority actually in the budget is the recapitalization of the nuclear enterprise and the Secretary has directed a Nuclear Posture Review that's ongoing.

We'll see what the results are. But, in general, as a general comment here, the entire nuclear enterprise needs to be recapitalized and that includes the pit production at two sites.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much, for each of you.

And Secretary Austin, Guam is a critical Western Pacific theater of operations, a logistical hub for our Navy and a priority target, sadly, for the Chinese Communist Party.

The patriotic American territory of Guam is appreciated for having the highest percentage of military service of any State or territory. The Missile Defense Agency's [MDA's] fiscal year 2022 request includes \$118.3 million to develop an architecture for the defense of Guam. Still, the MDA does not have a detailed plan exactly what it would be.

Given China's increasingly hostile posture and peacetime military buildup, the largest peacetime military buildup in the history of the world, what can we expect the status of a detailed overview of the system and its deployment timeline?

Secretary AUSTIN. Well, as the chairman mentioned earlier, Guam is part of the United States of America, and the United States of America—we will make sure that we have appropriate adequate defense mechanisms to protect our territory here.

And, you know, the \$118 million that we've allocated for missile defense is a start as we develop integrated capabilities. In terms of a specific timeline of when that—when our assessment and our work will be completed, I'll take that for the record, Congressman Wilson.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 119.]

Mr. WILSON. Thank you. And, finally, Israel has been subject to 4,500 Iranian rockets from Gaza by Hamas. But the Iron Dome has been successful. Mr. Secretary, will we be working more closely to promote Iron Dome?

Secretary AUSTIN. You've heard us say a number of times that, you know, we are committed to the defense of Israel and I, you know, met with—

The CHAIRMAN. And I do apologize. The gentleman's time has expired. So we will move on to Mr. Larsen. And if you want to take that one for the record, we can do that.

Mr. Larsen is recognized for 5 minutes.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 119.]

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Secretary Austin, for the last several months, media has reported on a number of damning substantial issues within the special operations forces [SOF] ranks. I want to know what DOD is doing to transparently identify, track, and respond to reports of misconduct in SOF.

Secretary AUSTIN. In terms of what the Department is doing to focus on that, we have not taken any additional actions. As you know, we have a—we have additional oversight over Special Operations Command now and that person reports directly to me. He's got a dual track reporting responsibility, one directly to me, one to our Policy so that we can make sure that special operations are integrated in Policy.

I've spoken with the commander of Special Operations Command. He is focused on these issues and he is—he's really digging in to make sure that he understands the nature of the issues and taking preventative measures to ensure that those types of things don't occur in the future.

Mr. LARSEN. It's a real serious issue, and I appreciate you taking it seriously.

And on that last point you've made, we have talked a lot about domains. But I want to—I want you to change your brain a little bit here, literally, because I want to talk about the cognitive domain that SOCOM [U.S. Special Operations Command] and SOF

says they want to focus on in terms of improving the cognitive domain of our—of our warfighters in SOF.

There's a \$10.2 million request, very small request, in the budget, but—for investment in cognitive domain, improving the impact of SOF training and improving the outcomes so that maybe we are getting a little more preventive.

Can you talk a little bit about what your plan is to spend this \$10.2 million? I know it's a tiny bit of the budget. It's not as big as some parts of the budget. But it's an important part we're tracking.

Secretary AUSTIN. SOCOM has led our forces in terms of developing ways to make our warriors more efficient and more effective on the battlefield, and this is one of those things that they've been looking at for some time.

In terms of specific plans to invest those monies into various pieces and parts, I'll take that for the record, because I don't have those facts at my fingertips.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 119.]

Mr. LARSEN. That's fine. I think it's more about resilience of the warfighter before they—before we put them into a situation so when they come out they're more resilient as well.

Just can you briefly then describe a little bit how are you working to implement Directive 5111.10? That's the ASD(SO/LIC) [Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict] directive that DEPSEC [Deputy Secretary] Hicks put out. How are you working to implement that directive?

Secretary AUSTIN. Well, as you know, our nominee to occupy that position has yet to be confirmed but—that is Chris Maier, and once he is confirmed, I have every confidence that he will do a great job in making sure that he keeps me informed of his needs in terms of service type needs and also what they're doing operationally.

He will sit in on regular meetings with me or report directly to me on all service issues—service type issues, and he will also integrate his activities in with our Policy branch who, of course, will make sure that, you know, those activities are synchronized with the rest of the force.

But to answer your question, we are moving out on this to realize Congress' intent here.

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you.

General Milley, I don't want to let you go here without a question and this one's about the—about the Arctic. There's a broader—you know, a broader coordination that needs to take place throughout the U.S. Government on Arctic policy, generally, but the Defense Department has a piece of this.

Can you articulate how the Department sees the Arctic from a national security—through a national security lens, and then what are you doing to coordinate among the services the disparate ideas they have for presence in that region? You've got 27 seconds.

General MILLEY. I'll give you a fulsome answer in writing. I'll take that for the record.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 119.]

General MILLEY. But, briefly, we recognize the importance and the increasingly growing importance of the Arctic. As climate change causes the Arctic ice to melt and resources become available, it's going to become an area of great power competition between the United States, China, and Russia, and perhaps other powers as well.

So I'll give you a more full written answer on disposition of force and what we have planned ahead.

One comment, though, if I could, real quick, and I know the chairman's going to cut me off.

The CHAIRMAN. Real quick.

General MILLEY. On the special operations forces, we have the most disciplined, vetted special operations forces out there. I'm aware of the reports. I've talked to Rich Clarke as well as the Secretary. We're getting after that very, very closely. But we have exceptionally disciplined and well-vetted special operations forces.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. The gentleman's time has expired.

Mr. Turner is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, as you know, we're undertaking our budgetary hearings, and as part of that testifying before us was Acting Navy Secretary Thomas Harker.

He and I had an exchange about a June 4th, 2021, memorandum that he wrote directing the Navy to defund the sea-launched cruise missile nuclear capable for budgetary year 2023. The budget that you have before us and that you're testifying before is 2022 and it fully funds this program.

Yesterday, I sent you a letter concerning my exchange with the acting secretary, and I'm not going to ask you for a decision today, but I do want to engage you about his testimony and the importance of what I have asked of you.

The acting secretary acknowledged that he requested that this be defunded. He testified that he did not consult with anyone in the Pentagon and, in fact, both of you, Secretary Austin and General Milley, have testified that you were not consulted.

Also, Admiral Richard, STRATCOM [U.S. Strategic Command], was not consulted and Admiral Richard testifies that this missile is a much-needed nonstrategic regional presence to provide assured response capability, that it provides additional diversity in platforms and survivability, that it provides limited U.S. response options, it is a more credible deterrent, and it allows us to not rely on the threat of large-scale nuclear responses.

Now, the acting secretary went on to tell us that he acknowledged that we're currently under analysis of alternatives with respect to this missile and, of course, the Nuclear Posture Review is ongoing.

And he indicated that he was not qualified to have an opinion in either of those with respect to this missile, and yet he felt that he was qualified to cancel it.

Now, it's always concerning when we have testimony, as we have from the both of you, concerning China's and Russia's modernization and when we have what is, basically, a bureaucratic intervention in what the important processes are in determining what our



capabilities are going to be in the future as we respond to our adversaries' capabilities.

Now, the acting secretary also affirmatively acknowledged that he understood that his memorandum was untimely and that the President [of the] United States was about ready to sit down with Vladimir Putin and that it undermined the President of the United States because as he's trying to engage Vladimir Putin in treaty negotiations for arms control, certainly Vladimir Putin doesn't care about arms control if we're going to unilaterally be giving up platforms. And the acting secretary on his own, as he says, without consulting anyone, signaled to Russia and our adversaries and our allies that what Admiral Richard says is an important component of our overall capabilities is not going to be pursued in 2023.

Now, I've sent you a letter asking you to rescind this because we have the testimony directly from the acting secretary saying he's not qualified to make this decision, that he understands it affects the United States standing and our arms control negotiations posture, that he understands that Admiral Richard says that it's an important capability that we have, going forward, in the future.

Now, I'm not going to ask you today to commit to rescinding this. But I do want to ask you, are you concerned about this process that an acting secretary could issue a memorandum canceling a very important nuclear weapons program without consulting anyone in the Pentagon?

He testified here that he had not consulted anyone. You both testified you were not consulted. Admiral Richard, who says it's essential for the future capabilities and references what China and Russia is doing for modernization, says he was not consulted.

And the acting secretary himself acknowledges that it undermines the President of the United States. Does that concern you?

Secretary AUSTIN. I'll make two points, very quickly. The first point is the nuclear triad is very important to us. I'm fully committed to this modernization.

The second point I would make is that we have—we have said a number of times that we're going to conduct a Nuclear Posture Review and in that review we're going to ensure that we have the right balance and mix of forces and capabilities.

I think that any announcements or decisions prior—about fiscal year 2023 prior to the termination of that review or completion of that review is premature.

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I really do appreciate it.

General Milley, I want to thank you for your service. I did on the phone yesterday. I think your credibility is incredibly important to both—for our allies and our adversaries. Do you believe Ukraine deserves lethal weapons support from the United States?

General MILLEY. I do, and we have provided lethal weapons in the past. But they're lethal weapons for defensive purposes only.

Mr. TURNER. I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Courtney is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you again to both witnesses.

And Secretary Austin, you know, I just wanted to follow up one point, which is—and I'm not going to ask you to comment on it, but the budget did come over later than normal.

But I think it's important to remember that the transition team had an unprecedented level of lack of cooperation in terms of getting into the building and sitting down and really using November and December and early January as an opportunity to get a head start on the budget process.

And to me, you know, just common sense tells us that that's one of the reasons why we're sort of a little late this year. But, again, this committee is going to work hard to make sure that our mark proceeds and we're going to do everything we can to get regular order.

Both of you have talked and the service chiefs in the last couple of weeks have stressed the importance of deterring pacing threats to our Nation, particularly China and Russia.

The fiscal year 2022 budget includes a very noticeable strong boost and investment in the Navy's undersea force, which General Milley alluded to briefly earlier here: attack subs, the *Columbia* ballistic sub program, and R&D for the follow-on to the *Virginia* program.

Can you, Mr. Secretary and General, just sort of talk about how that undersea priority aligns with the goal to match the pacing threat in the Indo-Pacific region as well as increased Russian submarine activity in the North Atlantic and the Arctic?

Secretary AUSTIN. Yeah, first of all, we have the most dominant naval force on the face of the planet, and a key piece of that is, you know, what our—a key piece of that capability is what our submarine force brings to the—to the table. It is absolutely relevant to the future fight. It is necessary. And so I think our investments here are well placed.

And I'll leave it at that.

General MILLEY. Congressman, I would say that relevant to a future fight a couple of things to consider. Survivability; small, small is better. Dispersal. And submarines by their nature are extraordinarily survivable. They are very lethal and they are one of the significant asymmetric advantages the United States has.

We have an incredible submarine force and it is probably the most lethal weapon on the battlefield in some future operating environment. So continued investment in subs is well worth it.

Mr. COURTNEY. Great. Well, thank you. And again, I've been on Seapower [Subcommittee] for 15 years. This year's budget there's—it's unmatched in terms of the proposed spending levels and I think it's worthy to, again, share that point.

The number one acquisition authority, which both Admiral Gilday and I think even General Milley and others over the years has said is the *Columbia* program, which is recapitalizing the sea-based leg of our triad. I was actually at EB [Electric Boat] on Monday and caught up with the program there. They are now at 85 percent design completion as construction begins.

That is an unprecedented level of design completion in a ship-building program, which is a way of debugging the program to get the design done and make sure then you just follow the requirements and stay within budget that's there.

In 2015, this committee enacted the National Sea-Based Deterrence Fund, which was recognizing the bow wave of spending that *Columbia* was going to bring with it, and it set up, again, sort of special authorities for multiyear production for materials, for different components of the program.

It has saved millions of dollars and CBO [Congressional Budget Office] has validated that. However, I would just note, and I think Mr. Wittman would agree on this, is that it really has been underutilized by the Pentagon, and we, in this year's mark, are going to continue to pursue other opportunities to get savings and efficiencies through the National Sea-Based Defense Fund.

I've talked to Under Secretary Hicks and Mr. Stefany about, you know, these opportunities that are there. But, again, there's no time to waste in terms of getting this program complete.

I know, General Milley, you took a rain check to come up and visit the South Yard where the production is. It's eye-watering when you come up and, hopefully, you'll join us soon to sort of see this very important program for our country.

General MILLEY. I will do that, Congressman.

Mr. COURTNEY. Great. And with that, I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Lamborn is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And Chairman Smith, I received a study by a retired commander of Air Force Space Command and NORAD [North American Aerospace Defense Command]/NORTHCOM [U.S. Northern Command] and another lieutenant general saying that the Air Force never fully considered keeping Space Command in its current location, and doing so would save over a billion dollars and save 7 years.

And I'd ask unanimous consent to place this into the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Hearing no objection, so ordered.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 110.]

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you.

Secretary Austin, this Monday, the Taliban seized control of a key district of Kunduz province in the north of Afghanistan, and it's the latest in a series of recent battlefield victories after peace talks have stalled.

Dozens of districts have been taken over by the Taliban since May 1st when NATO began withdrawing, and you've said that you, quote, "Were looking at the situation every day with a fresh set of eyes to see if, you know, the pace we are setting is the appropriate pace," unquote.

So given the accelerating pace of Taliban victories and control of key districts since we have been withdrawing since May 1st, how are things going?

I mean, is that an—is our withdrawal at an appropriate pace when they're picking up all these districts around the country?

Secretary AUSTIN. Well, thank you.

We are focused on and the task that we have been—that we have at hand is to conduct our retrograde in a safe, orderly, and responsible fashion. We have developed a very detailed plan to do that and we have accomplished the task according to plan thus far and really provided for the safety of not only our forces but our allies as well, and we'll remain focused on that.

Mr. LAMBORN. And as—well, as a follow-up on that. None of us want to see a bloodbath after we withdraw unless—you said there'll be a small presence guarding diplomatic personnel. But none of us want to see a bloodbath against women and children, in particular, or against former U.S. supporters like translators.

So how are we going to prevent that? I mean, how will the over-the-horizon process work, which I'm kind of skeptical about?

Secretary AUSTIN. So I would just point out to you on the over-the-horizon piece, we're doing over-the-horizon now. We don't have very much ISR on the ground in Afghanistan. It's coming from the Gulf countries, and our fighter support is also coming from either our platforms at sea or from the Gulf countries as well.

So we can do that. We have been doing it, and we're doing it very effectively. What we'd like to do, going forward, is shorten the legs that we're required to utilize by getting an agreement with one of the neighboring countries to base some of our ISR in one of those countries.

But, you know, we're doing that effectively now. So it is, it is not only possible, it is what we're doing.

In terms of taking care of women and girls in Afghanistan, let me also at the very top say I really appreciate the bipartisan support that we have seen for this, and I would also point to you that—and you've mentioned this—that our plan is to maintain an embassy there and through the embassy we'll continue to work programs that are focused on women and girls.

And I would defer to Secretary Blinken to really outline that. I don't want to speak for him.

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay, thank you. And we all do bipartisanly share that—those concerns. Is it at all possible to keep Bagram Air Force Base?

General MILLEY. Could I make a comment, Secretary.

So a couple quick comments here on Bagram. Bagram is not necessary tactically or operationally for what we're going to try to do here with Afghanistan. Consolidate on Kabul with—in support of their government.

To back up a little bit on the momentum of the Taliban, so to speak, there is 81 district centers that have—that are currently, we think, are underneath Taliban control. That's out of 419 district centers. There's no provincial capital that is underneath Taliban control and there's 34 of those.

It is true that the Taliban are sniping at and picking off outposts, et cetera, and they have seized some district centers. Sixty percent of the 81 were seized last year and the others since—in the last 2 months or so.

So yes, we're concerned. We're watching it. But there's a 300,000-plus-or-minus military force, Afghanistan army and police force, and it is their job to defend their country. We're going to continue to—we have a new relationship—

The CHAIRMAN. Again, I do apologize. The gentleman's time has expired.

General MILLEY. I will—I owe you a better answer. I'll get you one in writing, if that's okay.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 121.]

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay. Thank you. I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Garamendi is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary Austin, General, thank you very much for your service, for your testimony today. A couple of things I'd like to get into.

I think the U.S. is spending \$770 billion, more or less; China about \$250 billion; India \$73 billion; Russia \$61 billion. Just proportions here to keep in mind.

The question really is how are we spending it and are we spending it the most effective way possible.

General, you said the things—in answer to Mr. Rogers' question you said the things that concern you most are cyber, subs, new weapons such as hypersonic, space, and AI, artificial intelligence.

However, all of you want to maintain the triad, which will be a trillion-plus over the next 15 years or so, 20 years maybe. One element of that is the GBSD [Ground Based Strategic Deterrent], the replacement of the Minuteman III. The reality is the Minuteman III can be life-extended.

If we were to pause the GBSD for 12 to 15 years, during which time the Minuteman III could serve the same purpose and serve it well, can save somewhere north of \$37 billion in the next 10 years.

If you had \$37 billion, which one of those unfunded priorities would you spend it on? Cyber? Subs? New weapons? Hypersonic? Long-range fires? Space security? Artificial intelligence? What would you do with \$37 billion, which is available if we made a decision to pause the GBSD?

Secretary Austin.

Secretary AUSTIN. Yeah. So the evaluation of the GBSD is something that we will do as a part of or in the context of the Nuclear Posture Review, and we'll take a deliberate and earnest look at where we are and where we need to go in the future.

I think no matter what funds you have available, and I appreciate the question, it's always a question of kind of rank ordering the capabilities that we need in light of the threat that we're facing, and that would be deliberate work with the services to make sure that, you know, we are meeting the most pressing need.

General MILLEY. Congressman, thanks for the question.

I would not recommend taking that money away and putting it elsewhere. The recapitalization of the entire triad to include the GBSD is critical to our Nation's security, and delay of 12 to 15 years, you'll have a gap. You'll have a gap in the land-based leg, according to the reports and the studies I've seen.

I'll get with you offline and go through it from a technical standpoint and get the experts in, but what I've been briefed is in order to make sure there is no gap, we need to continue the investment in the GBSD without delay.

Mr. GARAMENDI. I'll take advantage of that offline/online, formal/informal, whichever way you want to do it. But I think the facts are not clear.

General MILLEY. Okay. Okay.

Mr. GARAMENDI. I think the facts are quite clear that we could pause the GBSD and be secure with the Minuteman III as it is life

extended over that period of time, and there's \$37 billion available there.

Could you describe the Pacific initiative? War games we have mentioned many times here. The question I want to raise is can we sustain the fight in the Pacific? Do we have the necessary transport?

General MILLEY. So from a military standpoint can we sustain the fight in the Pacific against China, and I think what we're talking about is a war against China. I think a war against China would be an enormously expensive undertaking in terms of all measures, and I would be concerned about the ability to sustain a long-term conflict. The idea, though, is to deter conflict and to keep great power competition at competition and not get it into conflict.

But if we had a war with China, sustaining a fight would be a significant challenge. There's no question about it.

Secretary AUSTIN. I would just add on there, sir, that we would look to prosecute that fight in a much different fashion, and I know that you worked your way through all of this, distributed, resilient capabilities, five domains. And so it's a different look.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman's time has expired.

Mrs. Hartzler is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen.

Secretary Austin, our aircraft carriers are in high demand and I understand that you're having to make difficult decisions about where to send them. Already this year, two carriers have undertaken double-pump deployments. That means the service lives on our tactical aviation aircraft are being drawn down even more rapidly than previously planned.

The Navy currently has a strike fighter shortfall of 49 aircraft. Despite this, the budget request has proposed to shift procurement dollars from building the new Block III Super Hornets into development of the next-generation replacement aircraft, which is not slated to have initial operating capability until the 2030s.

So taking into consideration the operations tempo of our carrier fleet demanded by our security environment, the strike fighter shortfall, possible attrition of aircraft, F-35C costs, and the likelihood of the next-generation air dominance schedule could continue to slip to the right, are you concerned about having sufficient tactical aviation fleet to deter and respond to China in the near term?

Secretary AUSTIN. The short answer is I believe that we'll have, if we stay on pace and invest in the things that we want to invest in, we'll have the right capabilities to match our strategy, going forward, and our—and support our operating concepts.

Again, I think that you have to make decisions to invest in future capabilities, as we discussed this morning, and we have worked with the services very closely and carefully to identify what those requirements are.

Mrs. HARTZLER. I think it provides too much operational risk in the near term and we need to reexamine that, and I'm going to be working to try to get some more F-18s in this year's budget because I believe there's too much a shortfall that we have right there.

But I want to change topics and just say how much I appreciate our men and women in uniform, and I believe that they are absolute heroes. They should be respected and encouraged in every way, and I'm very concerned about the recent order that you have conducted regarding looking at so-called extremism.

And I have sent you two letters, Mr. Secretary, asking for the definition of what the Department of Defense views as extremism and have not heard back from you yet.

And so could you just share with me, does the Department of Defense have a clear definition of extremism?

Secretary AUSTIN. A couple of comments on this—on this issue.

First of all, I think you've heard me say that—on a number of occasions that I believe that 99.9 percent of our troops are focused on the right things, embracing the right values each and every day.

Small numbers of people can in this—in this area can have outsized impact on our organization. And so we want to make sure that we're providing the right climate, the right environment for our troops to work and live in.

We are not—we are focused on extremist behavior, not what people think or political ideas or religious ideas, but extremist behavior.

Mrs. HARTZLER. So do you have a definition of what extremism is and what that behavior is?

Secretary AUSTIN. Again, we're focused on behavior.

Mrs. HARTZLER. Well, you had a stand-down, and you had a pause over the entire military for an entire day to do training to talk about this, and you don't have a definition yet of what the purpose was and what extremism is?

Secretary AUSTIN. The purpose was to help—to have a discussion with our troops and our leaders on the issue of extremism.

Mrs. HARTZLER. Okay.

Secretary AUSTIN. And that was very productive. And, again, we were focused on those behaviors that don't—that are not in congruence with our values in the military.

Mrs. HARTZLER. Okay. And you have ordered that there be this commission and have a review, and I guess I just want a little more information. We're going to—you're setting up and proposing a new screening capability, ongoing continuous vetting of our men and women in uniform, and you're going to develop a policy to expand user activity.

So what specifically would you be screening for? So as—if you set up this screening of our military members, what would be—what are you screening for?

Secretary AUSTIN. Our screening is focused on screening those applicants that are coming into the military. We want to make sure that we're bringing in the right—the right type of people, quality of people.

Mrs. HARTZLER. So if someone says that they're for President Trump, would that be viewed as extremism?

Secretary AUSTIN. As I said earlier, this is not about politics. I want our troops to participate in our political system.

Mrs. HARTZLER. Well, I'm just saying—

Secretary AUSTIN. That's what they're fighting to defend and but I will also say that we will continue to be a diverse—a diverse and

inclusive organization. That's what the United States military is all about.

Mrs. HARTZLER. So I would just encourage us not to infringe on our liberties.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentlelady's time has expired and—sorry, time has expired.

Ms. Speier is recognized for 5 minutes.

Ms. SPEIER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

To both of you, thank you so much for your outreach. I want to say to you, Secretary Austin, you—we talked some months ago. You're a man of your word. And, excuse me, I am deeply grateful for the statement you put out yesterday. You are creating a profound transformation in the military, as we address sexual assault and sexual harassment. So thank you.

I want to ask you, I am deeply concerned about the suicide rate in the military right now. There have been 10 suicides in Alaska already this year. There was a 30 percent increase in suicides last year over the year before, and I would like to recommend to you, much like you did with sexual assault and sexual harassment, is to stand up a commission to look at what we should be doing to address this, I think, frightening situation. But that won't be my question.

I want to ask you about the climate surveys. We spend a lot of time, a lot of money, on climate surveys, and what we found out in the Fort Hood Independent Review Committee was that they were not even looked at.

So what steps are you taking, moving forward, to make sure not only are the commanders on the ground there looking at these climate surveys each year, but that those above them, the senior leadership, is looking at them as well?

Secretary AUSTIN. First of all, let me thank you personally and thank the committee as well for all that you have done to remain focused on the issue of sexual assault, sexual harassment, and the resources that you continue to provide to make sure that we don't lose focus. We truly appreciate your support. The survivors appreciate your commitment and the troops and our ranks appreciate that as well.

And we will get this in the right place and it will require a lot of hard work, a lot of commitment and dedication, and it will require resources.

And so I would ask that you continue to support us as we take this on.

The—could you repeat the last part of the question there? I kind of lost—

Ms. SPEIER. Climate surveys.

Secretary AUSTIN. Climate surveys. Yeah.

So one of the things that the Independent Review Commission recommended to us is that we take a harder look at what we're doing with climate surveys, that they be current, that they—that the leadership pay attention to what's going on with them, and that we refine the surveys to make sure that we're asking the right questions in surveys.

And so we will remain sighted on this, and I would agree with you, they only work if you use the information that's in them.



General MILLEY. If I could make a comment, Congresswoman.

The climate surveys need to be reviewed by the commanders at least two levels up. Previously, years gone by, Fort Hood is an example, they weren't. There were reasons for that because we thought it was best to be used only by the commander. Give free help and feedback to the commander, and then they would take appropriate action. That didn't work. So now what we need to do is shift gears and make sure those climate surveys are personally reviewed by commanders at least two levels up on all their subordinates.

Ms. SPEIER. And you're going to do that at all installations?

General MILLEY. Everywhere. Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, Space Force, at all echelons.

Ms. SPEIER. So General, let me ask you about OPTEMPO [operating tempo].

We had a conversation just earlier this week about it. It appears that the OPTEMPO has really had a profound effect on our service members. I think it's starting to impact retention, and as I mentioned to you at the time, one of the spouses at one of our installations had said to me that she was concerned every night when she came home because she was afraid she was going to see her husband hanging in the shower.

What steps are we taking to make sure that the training we do is necessary and appropriate?

General Milley.

General MILLEY. The training of units is a commander's responsibility and, again, two levels up, commanders routinely develop their training plans, back-brief them, and get them approved, and they are tied directly to war plans to ensure that the training is focused on the readiness and the capability of the force to execute those tasks for which they're required in accordance with the various war plans.

So it's a very focused level of effort. Has been for years and they still are. The broader question is OPTEMPO, and OPTEMPO is directly related to the size of the force.

As the OPTEMPO came down from the peak of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, so did the size of the force. So the relative OPTEMPO in any given unit, especially special operations forces which was mentioned earlier, still remains high. It's a big concern. It impacts all kinds of things to include suicides. So that's the key metric is the OPTEMPO—

The CHAIRMAN. The gentlelady's time has expired. We will get one more in, and then we're going to take our break. So Mr. Scott is recognized, and when he is done we'll take a brief break.

Mr. Scott is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, I want you to know I support—coming out of Afghanistan one of the things that is on I think every member of this committee's mind is what's going to happen with special access visas for interpreters.

And while I don't expect you to necessarily speak in this setting about that, I do hope that there's progress in the right direction with regard to the special access visas, and I do hope that—that just needs—it's just got to be done.

And one other thing that I would mention is with regard to our troops, I do think that we should look at making internet service similar to water on bases for our troops, just make internet service a basic utility. It does not sound like that big of a deal.

But if we're able to save our troops \$50 or \$60 or \$70 a month, whatever they're having to pay for that internet access, it makes a big difference to—especially to our younger enlisted corps.

One other comment would be after spending time with some of your ODA [Operational Detachment Alpha] teams in Africa, this is not a DOD mission, but I do think it is a—would be a State Department mission or perhaps another State Department's mission, the French State Department, potentially. But when we bring these troops in and we have them for 24 months, and they come in with an eighth grade education, I do not think they should leave with an eighth grade education.

I think that while we're training them to fight and when we have got them 7 days a week, 24 hours a day, we need to have somebody trying to educate those troops, that we haven't simply trained them to fight and release them back on the street and potentially turn them into the foes of the future, if you will.

Those are just a couple of things I wanted to mention before I hit on a specific weapon system.

And Secretary Austin, General Brown and I have met at Robins Air Force Base. I know that you have called for the draw—the President has asked for the drawdown of four of the J-STAR [Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar] aircraft from the 116th.

I support this retirement, given the commitment at Robins Air Force Base in the ABMS [Advanced Battle Management System] mission. I do have concerns about the ground moving target indicator-indication [GMTI] capability.

And are you convinced that the Air Force can provide the GMTI capabilities with the existing fleet?

Secretary AUSTIN. I am convinced that the Air Force is—continues to upgrade and modernize its fleet of sensors to ensure that we have the capability that we'll need going forward. And I'm also, sir, very encouraged that—to know that General Brown has worked with you in terms of what the future is for that base and other capabilities in the fleet there.

Mr. SCOTT. Well, I would like to invite both of you to Robins Air Force Base to review the ABMS mission and the good work that's going on down there. A lot of good things—a lot of good things are happening.

General Milley, I mean, we have all talked about China a little bit. This spring, the SOUTHCOM [U.S. Southern Command] commander, Admiral Faller, told our committee that our interagency partners and the United States pointed out that Chinese money laundering is the number one underwriting source for transnational criminal organizations. This is in, obviously, Central and South America.

Our AFRICOM [U.S. Africa Command] commander, General Townsend, testified that illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing by the Chinese Communist Party is the primary contributor to a growing food crisis that will further drive instability in West Africa.

So my question is, how do we counter this ongoing malign activity from China around the world, and what are our partners that share our interests and our values doing to help us combat that malign activity?

General MILLEY. The issue of China, obviously, is not just a Western Pacific issue. It's a global issue. China is a massive economy. They're developing a first-rate military and they are expanding their ambitions and aspirations globally, not just regionally.

That includes South America, as Admiral Faller said, and Africa and elsewhere. And we are working closely with our allies and partners in all of those regions to counter any sort of great power competition that they have in mind in each of those regions.

So we're doing that, as we speak, with all of the countries that are our allies and partners.

That network of allies and partners around the world is one of the single most important things we can do as a nation is to maintain it, keep it robust, and that will help in this competition with respect to China.

Mr. SCOTT. Gentlemen, thank you for your time and your service. I'm extremely concerned that China is becoming much more aggressive, not just with regard to the military buildup, the treatment of the other people—

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman's time has expired.

And with that, we will take a brief recess. My goal is to reconvene at 11:45, and when we do, Mr. Norcross is up.

So we'll take a brief recess and we'll be back shortly.

[Recess.]

The CHAIRMAN. We will reconvene as soon as everyone can get back to their places here, which will take just a few seconds and we'll start back up again.

I will remind members at 2 o'clock the Secretary has a hard stop. We'll do our best to get as many people in between now and then. But we will stop at 2 o'clock.

All right. We will convene. And with that, I will get someone to shut that door. Then we will call on Mr. Norcross.

Mr. Norcross, you're recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. NORCROSS. Thank you, Chairman, and to Secretary Austin, General Milley, thank you for your service. Very much appreciate you coming by today.

A number of issues that have been illuminated over the past year, particularly with the pandemic, is our industrial base.

Certainly, to all of those who continue to work during the pandemic, incredibly helpful for us and our country to continue to move.

But one thing it has done is really illuminate some of the problems we're having with our industrial base and the supply chain. As the chairman mentioned, we have a task force on critical supply chain that had pointed out a number of issues, whether it's semiconductors, rare earth, propellants, explosives.

But one of the things that was somewhat of a surprise to the committee was the workforce, and that goes hand in glove with the industrial base. What is the Department doing or plan on doing for these supply chains to get more visibility so we don't get caught

shorthanded on some of the surprises that were put upon us during the pandemic.

Secretary AUSTIN. Well, thank you, sir. Let me say up front that I absolutely agree with you that, you know, making sure that we have sound and protected supply chains is critical.

Supply chain vulnerability winds up being a national security vulnerability. I certainly appreciate the President's leadership in this, as he has emphasized this over and over again.

In this budget, you'll see that we are investing \$341 million to partner with U.S. companies to make sure that we're doing our part to boost defense industrial base activity and onshore some of the—some of the supply chain activities that have been offshored in the past.

Mr. NORCROSS. Thank you for that, because, obviously, we have trusted partners that we care very much about. But I think we can move from 55 percent where we are, incrementally and predictably, so that supply chains become more secure.

And that brings me to my second question, in particular, about the Navy's long-term aircraft inventory plan. We have no, in this year's President's budget, the F/A-18E and F jets that have previously been focused on.

The loss of a critical supply chain in these F-18s is very much in question not only from what we need in terms of our tactical force but the minimum sustaining rates. Can you talk about the issue with the F-18, why we are dropping back on that and the problems it might cause?

Secretary AUSTIN. What I can say, sir, is that we continue to invest in those capabilities and technologies that we think will be relevant in the future and make sure that we have sufficient lifespan in those capabilities going forward.

So—and it calls for us to make tradeoffs. And so as we invest in one type of aircraft or capability, we'll have to either divest of some current capability or not reinvest in that capability.

Mr. NORCROSS. No, incredibly important. But it's also keeping that industrial base alive, which we all agree with that.

With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Dr. DesJarlais is recognized for 5 minutes.

Dr. DESJARLAIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, General Milley and Secretary Austin, for your service.

I'd like to start with General Milley. We know from Admiral Richard's testimony before the committee that the United Kingdom has reached out and expressed concerns about the United States adopting a no first use or sole purpose policy.

I personally heard the same from the Polish ambassador; the French, Japanese, South Koreans have also expressed similar concerns about the U.S. possibility of changing the declaratory policy to no first use [NFU] or sole purpose. Have you heard similar concerns from the allies that adopting a NFU or sole purpose policy would be destabilizing?

General MILLEY. I have frequently engaged with allies and partners of both Asia, Europe, all over the place, and that particular issue has not risen of a particular concern with respect to my counterparts that I've dealt with.

Dr. DESJARLAIS. Okay. In April, Admiral Richard further testified that U.S. adoption of a no first use policy would remove a level of ambiguity that has deterrence value and that such a move would have a negative effect on the extended deterrence and assurance to our allies. Would you agree with his assessment?

General MILLEY. Yeah, absolutely. I think the President of the United States should always have as many options as possible, and that's my position.

Dr. DESJARLAIS. He further told us that available evidence indicates that Russia and China will not view such a shift in U.S. policy as credible. Do you agree with Admiral Richard on that as well?

General MILLEY. I have not talked to Admiral Richard on that specific point. I would have to get with the intel community to determine if their assessment was what the view of Russia and China would be on a declaration. But, again, maximum options always available to the President is my position.

Dr. DESJARLAIS. Okay. So not to beat a dead horse. But in short, the U.S. declaring a sole purpose or NFU policy would be destabilizing, alienate allies, undermine our extended deterrence guarantees, and would have no impact on Russia or China's calculus.

So, General Milley, given all this, what's your best military advice as to whether the U.S. should adopt an NFU or sole purpose nuclear declaratory policy?

General MILLEY. My view—you're asking for my personal best military advice—is to maintain all options available to the President of the United States at all times. So I would not recommend making a declaration of no first use. It is a topic for which I think would take away an option for the President. Always maintain options for the President.

Dr. DESJARLAIS. Thank you, General Milley.

Secretary Austin, same question to you. Given the corrosive impact that such a change in policy would have on our alliances and extended deterrence guarantees as well as the minimal impact on Russia and China's nuclear calculus, what is your best military advice on changing nuclear declaration policy or—to no first use or sole purpose?

Secretary AUSTIN. You know, I absolutely agree with the Chairman that our goal is to provide as many credible options to the President as possible. And I would also say, though, that this is a policy issue and one that, you know, the administration will sort through, sort out, going forward as it does its strategic reviews in the future.

Dr. DESJARLAIS. Okay. And Secretary Austin, shifting topics, I would like you to provide—you can have the rest of my time to describe why it is so critical that Congress work to quickly reimburse the National Guard for the over \$500 million spent on its mission here at the Capitol earlier this year and what impact on readiness could result if these funds are not returned in a timely manner.

Secretary AUSTIN. So I'll just make a brief comment. The Chairman might want to comment on this as well. I think you've heard me say before that if we don't resource the Guard in—what will happen is it'll begin to erode readiness. It will disallow them to conduct their training in accordance with the schedules that they should be on.

And so this is very, very important to us and I would encourage you and ask for your help in providing those resources.

General MILLEY. And I would add to that, Congressman, I would ditto what the Secretary just said; \$500 million in the grand scheme of a \$715 billion budget may not seem like a lot, but to the National Guard that is a lot. So reimbursing them for their efforts, their great efforts. And this is also a year in which the Guard has been doing COVID, they're overseas.

There's a very high OPTEMPO in the Guard. So that \$500 million is very important. We'd like to see it reimbursed for the National Guard in order to maintain their training and their standards.

Dr. DESJARLAIS. Duly noted. Thanks to you both Chairman, I yield back.

Mr. GALLEG0 [presiding]. Thank you, Representative.

Secretary Austin, earlier this year, we discussed our shared interests for strong consistent civilian oversight of the Armed Forces. As chairman of the Intelligence and Special Operations Subcommittee, I appreciate your commitment to ensure civilian leadership of our special operation forces with the restructuring of the ASD(SO/LIC) to include resourcing and staffing the office consistent with its oversight responsibilities.

Can you please highlight the steps you, alongside Deputy Secretary Hicks, are taking to increase civilian oversight of the SOF community to ensure an agile and lethal force ready for strategic competition, particularly with regards to acquisition and diversity?

Secretary AUSTIN. Thank you. You may have heard me say earlier that there's a direct reporting chain now linked to me and, you know, that secretary will sit in on all of—all of my key leader meetings, report to me routinely on the—on the ongoing efforts in the Department, and we'll discuss what we cited on those service-like requirements and needs for the special operations community.

Mr. GALLEG0. Thank you, Secretary. More than 18 months ago, nine combatant commanders articulated an immediate need for the intelligence community to help combat the provocative actions of China and Russia in the public domain.

The Director of National Intelligence establishing a malign foreign influence response center that will lead to coordination and integration of intelligence related to foreign malign influence.

What changes are you directing within the Department to help address this urgent requirement?

Secretary AUSTIN. We have had—the Chairman and I have had—first of all, I do believe that it is an important issue. All of the combatant commanders have identified a need for resourcing to address this issue.

You know, as we have talked to the combatant commanders, we want to make sure that we're synchronizing our efforts and that we're putting the resources in the right place. So this is the thing that we're getting our arms around a little bit better.

But I would say up front that we will resource the combatant commanders based upon their requests. But we want to make sure that we're using those dollars to get best value, and I'm confident that we'll be able to.

Mr. GALLEG0. Thank you, Secretary.

For over 20 years, the SOF community has been focused on anti-terrorism operations in permissive environments. But the growing threat posed by China and Russia underscore the need to pivot our focus to the great power competition.

Can you expand on how this budget proposal addresses the need to refocus special operations to combat near-peer adversaries?

Secretary AUSTIN. Well, I think, you know, you've seen the special operations forces begin—first of all, they have incredible capability across a spectrum of activity. Whereas we have been focused on transnational terrorism to a greater extent in the past, they, you know, over the last several years have begun to lean into great power competition, develop capabilities and resources that will be a bit more relevant to that near-peer competition.

As you look at what we have invested in, you know, throughout the budget here in terms of the major items, you know, research, development, and technology, you know, long-range fires, lethal Air Force, that sort of stuff, all of that really kind of contributes to the overall effort there, and the special operations forces is a part of that, obviously.

But we're setting the stage to make sure that not only special ops but every other element on the battlefield can be—can be effective. And again, we're emphasizing that this is—this is competition across all domains, and not just—not just land, air, and sea.

General MILLEY. Can I just add something, Congressman Gallego, if I could?

Mr. GALLEGO. Go ahead, General.

General MILLEY. Training is the key here. SOCOM is reorienting the training of the special operations community for higher end fighting against China and all of the core fundamental tasks of unconventional wars, strategic reconnaissance, and the entire list of core tasks, and it's really got to do with training and getting them aligned with the various war plans against the pacing threat of China.

Mr. GALLEGO. Thank you.

Gentlemen, in the remaining time that we have, last year Congress appropriated \$169 million to the Baltic Security Initiative to increase military aid and cooperation with the Baltics.

Do you have an update on how the Department is spending this money? Chairman Milley or Secretary Austin.

General MILLEY. Yeah. With respect to the Baltics, we are doing exercises. We are doing, back to special operations forces, there's a lot of special operations things going on in there. There's train, advise, assist with them. And we are—as part of the European Defense Initiative, part of that is exercising in the Baltics.

So under the purview of EUCOM [U.S. European Command], all of that is happening. So that's where that money is going.

Secretary AUSTIN. The President just recently met with the three key senior leaders of the Baltics area in Brussels at the—in the margins of the summit, the NATO summit there. So—

Mr. GALLEGO. Thank you, Secretary. Thank you, General.

And I now recognize the ranking member to the ISO [Intelligence and Special Operations] Subcommittee, Representative Kelly.

Mr. KELLY. Thank you, Chairman.

First of all, I want to kind of double tap what I think Mr. DesJarlais said—Dr. DesJarlais.

It's important that we get those dollars back to the Guard and Reserve so that they don't miss drills.

You know, we have our 155 BCT [Brigade Combat Team] out of Mississippi that has done COVID response. We put shots in arms. We have done—we have been the logistical backbone for our entire State. They're at NTC [National Training Center] in a rotation right now.

And then those guys and girls are going to come back and we're going to tell them in August or September, we can't pay you for drills so stay home, and we're going to lose that readiness that we have been building.

So please help us get those dollars back to the Guard and Reserve.

Secretary AUSTIN. You have my commitment that we will advocate when and wherever possible. And just to dovetail on what you just said there, I am absolutely proud of what our Guard has done over the last year especially, and they have been a significant factor in our ability to begin to bend the curve with respect to COVID. And now we're entering the firefighting season and the hurricane season as well. They will continue to be——

Mr. KELLY. Absolutely. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

And now I want to talk a little bit about TRICARE and having been through this process myself, we have our Guard and Reserve which don't have TRICARE except when they're deployed or there's a cost associated with it, which is greater.

You have certain members, Federal technicians, which are not allowed to get TRICARE. It is very difficult going on and off of deployments, especially as much as we're being used, and not having continuity of health care.

You agree that the primary readiness issue for Guard and Reserve is having health issues, whether it's teeth issues, dental, or other. What are we doing at DOD to make sure that we have continuity of health care for our Guard and Reserve, whether traditional or full time?

Secretary AUSTIN. The healthy—the health, welfare, and safety of our force is of utmost important to me, and I thank you for the question. And I would welcome any initiative that enables us to provide better health care, more efficient health care, to all the components of our service.

The issue always is resources and so, you know, as you know, currently, we are only resourced to do a certain amount and I agree, the members of our—all the members of our Armed Forces are important.

And if we make a decision that we are going to expand services, certainly, we'll need to be resourced to do so——

Mr. KELLY. Thank you. I want to get on to the next one.

ISO, the intel, our special operations, the budget in fiscal year 2021 was cut \$495 million. The proposed cut this year—or, it was \$600 million cut from fiscal year 2020 and 2021, \$495 million this year.

They're having to do more with less. As we shift to China and Russia and our near-peer adversaries, we still have to do the work



that our special operators so often do, and many times they're the only people who can do that.

What are we doing to make sure that we have them ready to be in places like Africa, the Middle East, and those things with these budget cuts? We're resourcing them less, but in reality, we're asking them to do more with less.

Do you agree, Secretary Austin?

Secretary AUSTIN. Well, I think when we look at the entire picture, you know, we are—we are retrograding from Afghanistan, as we speak. And that will create some opportunities for us to shift some resources around.

But to your point, special operations forces, there is always high demand and there's a very low density of these elements, and we will need to make sure that they have the resources they need to be successful. So we'll continue to work that.

Mr. KELLY. And Secretary—I'm sorry, Chairman Milley, I'm sorry. I've been—I traveled recently to the Middle East and Africa, and in the Middle East specifically, and what—as we're coming out of Afghanistan, we still have CENTCOM [U.S. Central Command]. So I understand we will have less resources.

Many of our allies and partners in the region like our presence there. So can you tell me what are we doing to build the confidence in our allies and partners in the Middle East and Europe and Africa that we're still going to be there as a great partner, even though we're coming out of Afghanistan? Because we have got some work, I think, with our allies and partners to do there.

So Chairman Milley, if you can address that, please.

General MILLEY. Let me give you, in the interest of time, Congressman, let me give you an answer for the record with some details of what we're doing.

But, in general, for the CENTCOM AOR [area of responsibility], the Middle East is important to the United States. It's going to be important to us in the future. We are looking at, under the direction of Secretary Austin, an entire Global Posture Review. We have a lot of work left to do that, to back-brief the Secretary on that.

But exercises, forward presence, bases, all of those things and working closely with our allies and partners in all of the regions you just mentioned. And I owe you an answer in writing.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 120.]

Mr. KELLY. Absolutely. Thank you, and I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. Thank you. Mr. Moulton is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. MOULTON. Secretary Austin and Chairman Milley, thank you for your lifetimes of service and leadership to our country.

As we withdraw from Afghanistan, we have not seen an operational plan to save our brave Afghan partners and allies. Now, I recognize that the Trump administration left you with no plans and an even earlier withdrawal date, not to mention that Trump's policy of banning Muslim immigrants would probably have led him to abandon our allies in Afghanistan the same way he abandoned our allies in Syria.

Nonetheless, all of this now falls on this administration. We have 80 days until our formal withdrawal date. It takes 800 days or

more to process a Special Immigrant Visa. So it's too late for the Special Immigrant Visa process.

Secretary Austin, why have you not started an evacuation yet?

Secretary AUSTIN. Well, thanks for the question. And let me say up front that I know this is a topic that's near and dear to a number of people in this room who have served alongside some of the interpreters and people who have helped us in the past, and so this is—this is important to all of us.

We are working with the Department of State who has the lead on this along with DHS [Department of Homeland Security] to—as one part of a whole-of-government effort to address this issue.

We are encouraging to move as quickly as we can, and we stand ready to provide resources to accelerate this, if at all possible—if it's possible, and it is possible.

And in some cases, they've shortened the timeline for—from application to completion there. There's a number of people in the pipeline. I am confident that at some—we'll begin to evacuate some of those people soon.

But, again, I would defer to Secretary [of State] Blinken to really outline what the—

Mr. MOULTON. Mr. Secretary, I don't need to tell you this. But these brave Afghan partners, these Afghan and American heroes, people who we asked to risk their lives not just for Afghanistan but for America because we had their backs, their future is in your hands.

And this much is certain. The Taliban will kill them if they can, and they will rape and murder their wives and kids first, if they can.

Chairman Milley, if the service chiefs were ordered to evacuate our Afghan allies today, is there a plan in place to get that started immediately?

General MILLEY. We have the military capability to do whatever is directed by the President of the United States with respect to our allies and those that have worked with us. And I consider it a moral imperative to take care of those that have served along our side. We are prepared to execute whatever we are directed.

Mr. MOULTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Changing subjects. Secretary Austin, last week, General Brown highlighted the importance of suicide prevention in his opening statement and then committed to supporting the Brandon Act later in the hearing, a bill that I introduced last week to provide service members a mechanism to seek mental health support if they are contemplating suicide.

However, we have received pushback from other elements within DOD on the Brandon Act but no alternative suggestion for how we can tackle this epidemic.

Are you personally comfortable with how DOD is managing suicide prevention, given that we have lost more service members to suicide last year than we did in combat? And are you prepared to support efforts like the Brandon Act or present a better alternative to address this?

Secretary AUSTIN. I think this is a very important issue and I am prepared to do whatever it takes to improve in this area. This is

a—this is something that I have personally been swinging at for a long time as a part of a—one of the senior leaders of the military.

And try as we may, we have not made the progress that we need to make. There's a stigma associated with seeking help, seeking mental health care, and we got to do more to remove that stigma and we got to do more to provide adequate health care to our troops.

So the answer to your question is you have my commitment that I will continue to work this and I will tell you right now that our service chiefs are absolutely focused on this and will work with, you know, the greater community writ large to get best practices and lessons learned so that we can get better at this.

Mr. MOULTON. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Grateful for your leadership, and I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Gallagher is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you.

Chairman Milley, last week in front of this committee, both the CNO [Chief of Naval Operations] and the Commandant, General Berger, concurred with Admiral Davidson's assessment that we have a growing risk of a PLA [People's Liberation Army] invasion of Taiwan within the next 6 years, which is an alarming timeline.

My understanding is that you sort of publicly disagreed with that timeline. I'd be curious to get your alternative assessment and the justification for it. But, I mean, would you agree with just the basic idea that the PLA's capability is growing, that the unification of Taiwan with the mainland is a legacy issue for General Secretary Xi and that this creates problems for our deterrent posture in INDOPACOM?

General MILLEY. Yeah. So what Davidson and Aquilino and others have said is that Chinese capability to invade and seize the island of Taiwan is being accelerated to 2027, 6 years from now. I don't dismiss that at all.

What I said was near term—in my definition, that's 1 to 2 years—I don't see China, they have—they could—they could make decisions whatever they want to do. But I don't see it happening right out of the blue. There's no reason for it, and the cost to China far exceeds the benefit.

And President Xi and his military would do the calculation, and they know that an invasion in order to seize an island that big with that many people and the defensive capability the Taiwanese have would be extraordinarily complicated and costly.

And at this point in time, near term, next 12, 24 months, I don't—I'm not seeing indicators and warnings yet. Could it happen 6 years from now, 8 years from now, 10 years, 20? Sure. A lot of things can happen.

The Chinese are clearly building capability. There's no question about that. They've been doing it for quite a while and we're monitoring it very closely. And that gets back to this budget. We need to continue to get this budget through, get it done on time in order for us to keep pace with the Chinese to stay ahead of them.

We want overmatch in order to deter a great power war and stay at great power competition.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Recognizing our limitations to the format we're in right now, just given your position and the time you spent inter-

acting with your counterparts in the region, is your sense and understanding that there are—that to some extent, the intentions of Xi himself and the party in general are unknowable and a lot of things could change in the environment?

What is your basic sense of the priority that the CCP and the PLA put on Taiwan and to what extent, as I said before, it's bound up in Xi's personal legacy?

General MILLEY. I think both are true. I think the issue of Taiwan and the unification of Taiwan with Mainland China, I think that is a core—I said it before in previous testimony—C-O-R-E, a core national security interest of China. And it's also a core national security interest of the United States to ensure that whatever happens with respect to Taiwan happens peacefully, and we don't have a general conflict in the region or globally.

So we support, you know, the—with the Taiwan Relations Act, et cetera, for a peaceful resolution of the issue between Taiwan and China.

Mr. GALLAGHER. And I completely agree with the sentiment you just expressed about, and I think it's a shared goal on this committee, of deterring such a conflict as one of our core priorities because it would be messy, indeed, which is why earlier this year INDOPACOM submitted to Congress a detailed request for exercise funds, training ranges, military construction, munitions, defensive Guam systems. But the Pacific Deterrence Initiative [PDI], as requested by the Department in this budget consisted of non-INDOPACOM-specific list of procurement items including a destroyer, some jet fighters, a logistics ship.

What caused the difference between the two versions of PDI? Why were so many of the top needs identified in the Section 1251 report, that's INDOPACOM's report, mostly or completely unfunded in the budget request?

Secretary.

Secretary AUSTIN. Yes, our intent is to realize the intent of Congress and resource PDI in accordance with, you know, what's been laid out. I think there is some miscommunications in terms of how things were [inaudible]. We're working with the committees to try to—try to clarify that now and we'll continue to do so.

But the intent is to make sure that we follow along with Congress' intent with the PDI.

Mr. GALLAGHER. And that—I mean, in my remaining 25 seconds I'm tempted to ask Mr. McCord a question only because he's gotten off easy, I think.

But—and I don't have enough time for my Army end strength question for the Chairman. So instead, I will—I will yield back my 12 seconds and hope that somebody gets Mr. McCord on the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Carbajal is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. CARBAJAL. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Mr. McCord—I'm kidding. I want to thank you all for being here today. Let me start with Secretary Austin.

I want to start by asking you about the Department of Defense audit and financial accountability. Congress robustly funds the DOD in order to defend the Nation and detour conflict.

We also have a responsibility to our constituents to conduct oversight and ensure that the funds are obligated effectively and responsibly.

How important is the ongoing audit to your work as Secretary and how is the Department using the results of the audit to impact the budget process?

Secretary AUSTIN. It is not only important, it's critical and, you know, we're—we have made progress, a lot of progress since I was last affiliated with the Department. There's still work to be done, and we will move out on this as expeditiously as possible and deliberately as possible to ensure that we get a clean audit at some point, going forward, as quickly as we can.

Mr. CARBAJAL. Thank you.

Secretary Austin, in the previous administration one of my key concerns with the Department was the lack of transparency to Congress in decision-making processes.

For example, many here in this committee were left with more questions than answers when the Department announced its decision to select Redstone Arsenal in Alabama as the permanent headquarters for USSPACECOM [U.S. Space Command].

Looking forward, I hope you will commit to this committee that the Department will be transparent in its decision making so Congress and the public have full confidence that decisions are made objectively and in the best interest of our national security.

With that, I'm closely following the upcoming basing decision process for the Space Force's STARCOM [Space Training and Readiness Command] headquarters, as I believe Vandenberg Space Force Base will be an ideal location to be the future home for the Training and Readiness Command.

I know this process will be led by the Department of the Air Force, but I believe leadership starts at the top. And I urge you to work with the Air Force to ensure a transparent and fair process.

That was more so a statement than a question, but I'd love the reaction to that.

Secretary AUSTIN. So in the first instance, you know that that issue is under investigation by the IG [inspector general] and there's also a GAO [Government Accountability Office] look ongoing as well. So I won't have any comment on that for you.

I will say that my commitment to you is that we will remain as transparent as possible on this and other issues, going forward, and I will require that the services do the same.

Mr. CARBAJAL. Thank you. And just to conclude on that point, it was pretty much a bipartisan sentiment about the transparency and the need for more information about that. So I'm glad the investigation is ensuing.

Lastly, Secretary Austin and General Milley, this committee has been focused on addressing extremism in the ranks. I appreciate the tone and the direction that I have seen and heard from the service chiefs and civilian leaders.

But, clearly, more needs to be done to take that message at the top and ensure it is received throughout the ranks. How does this budget make necessary investments in initiatives that seek to address extremism and also promote diversity?

Secretary AUSTIN. There are provisions in the budget that resource us to continue our efforts there to make sure that we have the right staffing and that sort of business to provide oversight. But this is accounted for in our budget.

Mr. CARBAJAL. General Milley.

General MILLEY. I agree it's accounted for in the budget. Let me make a broader comment on extremism. The United States military is committed to the idea that's America, and it's embedded within our Constitution. And we are sworn at the risk of our life, our limb, separation from our family, to defend that Constitution no matter what. And there is no room in uniform for anyone who doesn't subscribe to the values of the United States of America.

And I know we're going through work groups, defining extremism, checking out our Department of Defense instructions, et cetera. But from private to general, there's no room for extremist behavior in the United States military.

Mr. CARBAJAL. Thank you, General. With that, I'll yield back.

Mr. McCord escaped again.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Gaetz is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. GAETZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, why was Lieutenant Colonel Matthew Lohmeyer relieved of his command?

Secretary AUSTIN. It was a decision made by his—by his chain of command and, typically, those decisions are made based upon either having confidence or a lack of confidence.

This issue is under investigation by the IG and so I won't comment any further on that.

Mr. GAETZ. In my previous discussions with service members and particularly officers, I would hear about complaints over parts not arriving on time, long deployments, and in my more recent discussions with those officers, the number one issue that they raised to me, with concern, often unable to speak publicly for fear of the type of retribution that Lieutenant Colonel Lohmeyer faced, they say that your stand-down regarding extremism did not help our military and hurt the military.

And I want to share with you that perspective that it caused service members to other-ize one another. It impaired group cohesion, and interesting to me is that I've heard those sentiments most frequently from units that are majority minority that this was not particularly helpful.

So I wanted to give you the opportunity to maybe share with us more specificity regarding the definitions that seem to be a challenge when Mrs. Hartzler was asking questions.

How should the Department of Defense think about critical race theory?

General MILLEY. Could I make a comment, Secretary?

Mr. GAETZ. I'm very limited on my time, General Milley.

General MILLEY. Well, I just want to make a comment that the—

Mr. GAETZ. I know, but I've asked the question to Secretary Austin.

Secretary AUSTIN. I don't know what the issue of critical race theory is and what the relevance here and with the Department. We do not teach critical race theory. We don't—we don't embrace

critical race theory, and I think—I think that’s a spurious conversation. And so we are focused on extremist behaviors and not ideology, not people’s thoughts, not people’s political orientation. Behaviors is what we’re focused on.

But one final point, and thanks for your anecdotal input, but I would say that I have gotten 10 times that amount of input, 50 times that amount of input, on the other side that have said, hey, we’re glad to have had the ability to have a conversation with ourselves and with our leadership. And that’s what we need to make sure—

Mr. GAETZ. Again, reclaiming my time, Mr. Secretary.

It may be that you’re receiving that input in the ratios you describe, because it was your directive. It may be that people are concerned about criticizing your decision because Lieutenant Colonel Lohmeyer was not relieved of his command for his actions. He was not relieved of his command because of poor performance regarding his duties. He was relieved of his command precisely because of his thoughts and because of his critique of critical race theory.

It is particularly helpful that you have said that the Department of Defense does not embrace critical race theory and that you think the discussion is not appropriate. I would suggest that it is the ideology that is not appropriate, and it is particularly concerning to me that you have hired a critical race theorist to give you advice on personnel matters, and that person is Bishop Garrison.

And I would particularly observe that on July 27th, 2019, Bishop Garrison tweeted regarding former President Trump, “He’s dragging a lot of bad actors out into the sunlight, normalizing their actions.” And here’s the relevant part. “If you support the President, you support that there is no room for nuance in this. There is no more. But I’m not like that talk.” And then he replies to his own tweet with what seems to be a very ethnonationalist hashtag, #Black44.

Could you enlighten us as to what advice Mr. Garrison has given you and are you concerned that while you testify publicly to our committee that the Department doesn’t embrace critical race theory, you have hired someone who is precisely a critical race theorist?

Secretary AUSTIN. This is the first I’ve ever heard Mr. Garrison be described as a critical race theorist. So this is new, and I’m sure that he would—

Mr. GAETZ. Did you—did you review his tweets before you hired him, personally?

Secretary AUSTIN. Pardon me?

Mr. GAETZ. Did you review his tweets before you hired him?

Secretary AUSTIN. I did not personally review his tweets.

Mr. GAETZ. I would just ask that maybe that would be helpful. Is there anything you can share in just these final seconds regarding any advice he’s given you?

Secretary AUSTIN. Let me—let me just share one other thing that you brought up, Congressman, about the input that comes to me.

You know, I trust my leadership, from top to bottom, that they will give me fair and balanced and unvarnished input, and for you to say that people are telling me what they want to—what I want to hear, I get it, but I’m smart enough—

Mr. GAETZ. That does happen.

Secretary AUSTIN. Yeah. You know, maybe they're telling you what you want to hear.

Mr. GAETZ. Well, I don't know that they even know what I want to hear.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman's time has expired.

Mr. Brown is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. BROWN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have only 5 minutes and two questions. So at the midway mark, I may interrupt the response to the first question.

Mr. Secretary, 2 years after President Truman desegregated the Armed Forces, a commission—it was the Fahy Commission—found, and I quote, that a “policy of equality of treatment and opportunity will make for a better Army, Navy, and Air Force. It is right and just. It will strengthen the Nation,” end of quote.

Today, while 19 percent of Active Duty service members are Black, only two four-star generals and admirals are Black, and there's a significant underrepresentation by race and gender, I should add, in those career fields that experience higher promotion rates to senior ranks.

To address this problem, last year bipartisan, this Congress, required the Secretary, and today that's you, to establish a mentor and career counseling program. I recently requested information from the Under Secretary for Personnel and Readiness on the program status. I found the response wanting.

So the question is how are you implementing the provisions of that program, and why are diversity and inclusion initiatives such as those important to the Department?

Secretary AUSTIN. Just one comment up front on the importance of diversity, equity, and inclusion.

I would point out to you, Congressman, something that you already know and that the United States military is the most diverse organization in this country.

It represents citizens from all walks of life, all ethnicities, and it is truly a diverse organization. I would absolutely agree with you that the senior leadership should look like those people that are—those troops that are in the ranks, and a troop ought to be able to look up and say, I can be a senior person. I can be that man or that woman at the top of the totem pole or top of the pecking order at some point in time.

It has provided the, you know, some of the best opportunities for our young citizens of any organization in America. In terms of mentorship, your specific question, I absolutely believe in the power of mentorship and embrace that, and we need to do better, and you have my commitment that we will do better.

And so we stand ready to work with you and answer any additional questions that you have.

Mr. BROWN. I appreciate that, Mr. Secretary, so we'll follow up. But I do want to get to the second question. The Fahy Commission talked about treatment, not just opportunities. So I'm very concerned about the disparate racial treatment that minority service members experience under the Uniform Code of Military Justice.

A May 2019 GAO study that this Congress directed found that Black service members across all services more than one and a half



times likely to be tried by court martial for the same conduct as white service members. It's clear there is a general failure on the part of commanders in exercising their broad discretion to refer cases to court martial.

My questions are why are the commanders woefully failing our Black service members who enlist at higher rates than any other demographic group in our country, and how do we fix the system so that there is truly equal justice under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, which does not exist today? That's my question. Thank you.

Secretary AUSTIN. Congressman, thanks for flagging a question there. This is an important issue and I think one that requires more and detailed study. I would just say that the point that I made earlier in terms of making sure that we have the right representation in senior ranks is very, very important and contributes to making this issue better or improving this issue.

Mr. BROWN. And I'm going to follow up and sort of make a comment and pick up on that point. There is a correlation, I believe, between the lack of diversity in senior leadership and command positions and the disproportionately high rate of court martial of Black and brown service members.

Racial bias exists not only in the criminal justice system, as we have experienced and seen for decades and brought to greater public attention after the murder of George Floyd, but that same racial bias exists in the military justice system.

So these are two related questions. We need to focus on diversity, but we need to immediately get after the disparate treatment under the UCMJ [Uniform Code of Military Justice]. That we can fix now. That we can fix now.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Bacon is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. BACON. Thank you, Chairman, and I appreciate our Chairman and our Secretary. I appreciate your leadership and I appreciate the journey that you've taken to get here. Also, Mr. McCord, thanks for being here.

I do got a couple of comments for the record, just criticisms of the administration and I want to talk about the Air Force budget. But first, all this talk about China being a pacing threat, a rising superpower, a navy matching ours and, you know, an imminent timeframe.

Then you look at the actual budget. After inflation, it's a reduction. Our words do not match our actions here, and I think China sees it. I think the world sees it. I would have at least expected a budget that was even with inflation and but yet we're seeing a reduction.

Secondly, I personally oppose taking the prosecution authority away from the commander. I was a five-time commander myself in the Air Force. I think the change will now create two chains of command at the unit level, undermines the principle that we cherish, which is unity of command, and I just—I think this is going to open up frictions and tensions within the unit and who's actually in charge.

A third point of criticism, as we have had several months now where the administration should have come up with an evacuation plan for interpreters. We have 18,000, roughly, and there is no concrete plan that I know of. It's unconscionable. We have had time to work through this. Talking about it is not a plan.

And so I know this is a—falls on the Secretary of State or the State Department. But so it's criticism for the administration versus you two, but our country owes better to these 18,000, and they will be targeted.

So my first question, though, gets to the Air Force budget. You know, I think it's important that our defense budgets are accurate and transparent. But that's not really the case of the Air Force budget.

The Air Force budget submitted by the administration is \$212 billion. But \$39 billion of it, or 18 percent, doesn't actually go to the Air Force. It gets, you know, passed through to other organizations. When you factor it in, the Air Force budget is really only \$173 billion and the other services have about 1 percent pass-through, by the way, versus 18 percent for the Air Force.

I just think it's misleading. Most people in Congress and most people are citizens, think it's about a third/third/third for the services. So last NDAA, we tasked the Department to come up with a better way.

Could you give us an update on your thinking on this and what we can do? Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary AUSTIN. Yeah, I'll take this for the record because I—we do owe you an answer in terms of, you know, the progress that we have made or, you know, how we approach this.

But I just want to say that I would absolutely agree with you that while we can't be fully transparent on some—on some of these issues, we need to make sure that the Air Force budget is represented in the appropriate way.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 120.]

Mr. BACON. Thank you. I appreciate your sentiments there.

My second question is with the electronic magnetic spectrum operations. In the 2019 NDAA, we directed the Department to update its strategy here and provide a detailed implementation plan. So in 2020 the Department did come out with a strategy, but we have not yet seen an implementation plan.

Could you give us an update on where we're at with that?

Secretary AUSTIN. You may have heard me say before, Congressman, that our vice chairman is leading the effort, along with the deputy secretary, to make sure that we lay out an implementation plan and that we supervise the implementation of the plan.

This is very important. It becomes increasingly important as we enter—as we look towards a competition with a great power. We can expect much more contested airspace and much—you know, a greater pressure on the electromagnetic spectrum.

We saw, and you know this because you've been there, we experienced some significant issues early on in Iraq and Afghanistan trying to manage that spectrum and make sure that each service had the capabilities they need. It will be increasingly difficult, going forward. But the vice chairman is essential in this.

Mr. BACON. And I think the vice chair is doing a great job and I applaud the effort. I do hope, though, in the end, we have somebody at the one-star or two-star level that owns this in the future because, as you know, at the four-star level they're doing a hundred different things. So I just put that in for your consideration.

Finally, to the Chairman—I only have about 30 seconds left—what are some tangible things we can do to strengthen deterrence for Taiwan? Like, what kind of weapons can they—can we sell them or provide them? Thank you.

General MILLEY. Again, I'll take that one for the record. But, briefly, you're talking about air power, counter air power, so that they can have some dominance or air superiority over their own airspace. Ballistic missile defense would be key. And then their ability to defend on the ground and conduct combined arms maneuver against an invading force. Those would be things that would be in Taiwan's interest. I'll give you a more complete answer on that.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 120.]

Mr. BACON. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman's time is expired.

Mr. Keating is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

As someone who was a district attorney for over a decade before I came to Congress, I realize the challenges and complexities of sexual assault cases firsthand. And, in fact, I had separate units in the civil side, separate units within my office specializing in prosecution of sexual assaults and with special units for sexual assault on victims' witness advocacy.

So I was really pleased to hear the news that you shared this morning with us regarding what's coming forth from the commission in terms of removing these cases from the military chain of command.

Recommendations are one thing, but hearing from both the Secretary of Defense and the Chair of the Joint Chiefs that you support that effort too is so important.

So a couple of quick questions in that regard. Number one, what is—what do you mean by removing it from the military chain of command? Number two, General Milley mentioned two changes in the domestic violence areas, the way they're going to be reviewed. I had a separate unit for that, too. So could you tell us what's in store for us on those very important things that were a priority of myself and this committee?

Secretary AUSTIN. So for those—first of all, I would—I would point to the issue this will require resources and it will require making sure that we outline a path to get to where we need to be so that we're doing this the right way. We are focused on sexual assault, sexual harassment, and related crimes. And you mentioned domestic violence and a couple of other things that are directly related to that.

But we would set up a special victims prosecutor—excuse me, a special prosecutor to assess and refer these cases forward. And so the cases would be—would be referred and prosecuted outside of the chain of command.

Mr. KEATING. Mr. Secretary, would they be investigated outside as well with the civil investigator working with that prosecutor?

Secretary AUSTIN. They would be investigated by competent authorities and the investigator would work with a prosecutor, yes.

Mr. KEATING. Yeah, I would hope those authorities included someone on the civil side, too, and someone that would work as a domestic violence advocate or a sexual assault witness victim advocate.

Now, in terms of domestic violence, it is discreet many, many times from sexual assault. So is there anything to share with us this morning on that issue as well?

General MILLEY. Yeah. So what we're saying—we're recommending—well, we have already made our recommendation to the Secretary—is to stay narrowly focused on the issue of sexual assault and directly related crimes such as domestic violence.

Mr. KEATING. Sometimes they are, sometimes they're not.

General MILLEY. Well, sometimes they are and sometimes not. But the data shows that there's a strong correlation. So you bend some of these other crimes in it.

As far as all other felonies go, we're recommending not to do that, but to stay focused on the sexual assault and immediate related crimes. Take that out of the commander's hands for referral and preferral of charges, investigation as well, and put that in the hand—and why are we doing that?

Because the data shows that we haven't moved the needle to solve that problem. It's a very significant problem for cohesion of the force, and we have lost the trust and confidence of the lower ranking troops in it.

So but it's very limited, though, to that set of crimes because the UCMJ is fundamental to the good order and discipline of the force, and the commander must have that authority because this entire system is built in order to fight in combat. And that's important to remember as—

Mr. KEATING. I would like to suggest, too, that you look more specifically at domestic violence as well.

General MILLEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEATING. And I'm here and I'm joined by many members of this committee to provide the resources and assist you along those lines. I thank you for the news, but we want to see if we can be helpful, moving forward.

Secondly, we all share the belief and, certainly, you two share it more than any Americans, to protect families that are giving you their most precious resources, their children, their parents or spouses, to defend our country.

And a BU [Boston University] study just recently out showed that 30,177 either Active Duty or veterans post-9/11 committed suicide, lost their lives. That's over four times the number of similarly situated people lost in war operations, lost their lives in war operations.

And this committee, through the NDAA—

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman's time has expired.

Mr. KEATING [continuing]. Through the GAO study, which I will follow up with a question. I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thanks. And I would like to let members know, if I could take a moment of personal privilege here, on the sexual assault issue there is wide bipartisan support and support at DOD and within the administration for the idea that we need to take the prosecution of sexual assault crimes out of the chain of command.

Now, that is a recent development. We have been talking about this for 10 years in a variety of different forums. It has been resisted in a variety of different quarters up to this point.

But at this point, there is wide—there is still some who oppose, but there are a lot of co-sponsors. But the details are different, and I think that is being lost in this debate. There are some bills that take all nonmilitary felonies out. Then there is the proposal that has come from the commission. There was also a bill, and I know Representative Speier has introduced a new bill this week.

But a month or so ago there was a bill that she had introduced that was focused just on sex crimes. Another way to slice this is felonies and misdemeanors. If you go the all-felony route, which was a bill that was introduced this morning in the House and one that was introduced in the Senate, you do miss some sex crimes that are misdemeanors, and you certainly miss a lot of domestic violence that is also misdemeanors.

And then there is the subject that Mr. Keating brought up and that is, well, what about the people investigating it in the first place? Are they still under the chain of command?

We need to make this change. I think it is really important that we take a moment to do it right, that we have a conversation with a bunch of different people. I'm not presuming who's right and who's wrong. But this is no longer a question for the overwhelming majority of Members in the House and the Senate whether or not this needs to be taken out of the chain of command. It is now a question of how to do that, and that is a debate and discussion that I think this committee needs to take a leadership role in doing.

Mr. Rogers.

Mr. ROGERS. I'd like to completely associate myself with the chairman's remarks.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Waltz is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. WALTZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I'd like to introduce into the record a letter to myself from the Superintendent of West Point, Lieutenant General Williams, that was sent to me in response to my letter regarding the teaching of critical race theory at West Point.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection? Hearing none, so ordered.

[The letter referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 115.]

Mr. WALTZ. Mr. Secretary, I found it very interesting your exchange with Mr. Gaetz on no teachings of critical race theory in the United States military. I want to quote to you a letter I received from the Superintendent at West Point.

Says "With regards to critical race theory, there is one course that has this theory as part of the syllabus. There are two lessons on critical race theory. There is a book on critical race theory titled "Critical Race Theory: An Introduction."

On and on and on about the teaching of critical race theory in West Point. I just want to emphasize something. This isn't something that we're raising. This is—this came to me from cadets, from families, from soldiers with their alarm and their concern at how divisive this type of teaching is that is rooted in Marxism, that classifies people along class lines, an entire race of people as oppressor and oppressed.

I cannot think of anything more divisive and more destructive to unit morale. I want to be very clear. The military needs to be open to all Americans, absolutely. That is the strength of the United States military.

But once we're in, we bleed green and our skin color is camouflage. We're worried about that American flag on our shoulder. That's the only thing our enemies are worried about. I think we can agree there.

But the other thing that they raise to me was a seminar that over a hundred cadets attended titled "Understanding Whiteness and White Rage" taught by a woman who described the Republican Party platform as a platform of white supremacy.

This is going on at West Point, as we speak, to our future military leaders. And, sir, I would encourage you—I would demand that you get to the bottom of what is going on in the force and, further, for what it means for civilian oversight of the military when our future military leaders are being taught that the Constitution and the fundamental civilian institutions of this country are endemically racist, misogynist, and colonialist and, therefore, it is their duty to resist them.

What does that mean for a future cadet who one day will be sitting where you are? And so do you agree that—will you work with us to—do you agree that critical race theory should or should not be taught in our military academies?

Secretary AUSTIN. As I said earlier—thanks, Congressman, for the question and thanks for your continued support. Thanks for your service.

Mr. WALTZ. Thank you.

Secretary AUSTIN. This is not something that the United States military is embracing and pushing and causing people to subscribe to, and whether or not this was some sort of critical examination of different theories, I don't know. But—

Mr. WALTZ. We need to understand our past. I want to be very clear. But can you agree at least that understanding whiteness and white rage presented in Ike Hall to over a hundred cadets probably is something that we shouldn't be teaching our future leaders of the United States Army?

Secretary AUSTIN. As you have described it, it certainly sounds like that's something that should not occur. Again, I would like to know the specifics of the—

Mr. WALTZ. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Just switching topics to shipyards and our infrastructure, our shipyards are old. They're small. They can't handle the fleet of today, much less the fleet of tomorrow.

We currently have 4 public and less than 20 commercial. The Chinese are approaching 1,000 shipyards. One dry dock that can handle the *Ford* class, not enough for the *Virginia* class. The Navy

has its \$21 billion dollar investment plan, but it's over 20 years over the next two decades.

Would you welcome additional funding as part of—as part of our shipyard modernization? I think it's absolutely critical.

Secretary AUSTIN. I agree that it's critical and, you know, we not only have to have the right mix of capabilities, we have to be able to sustain and maintain as well. And in this budget, you'll see that we have invested some \$830 million in recapitalizing—

Mr. WALTZ. I think that is woefully, woefully—Chinese are at 1,000. We're at less than 20. And what I'm so disturbed by is we're debating a \$1.9 trillion infrastructure plan. Navy has its shipyard infrastructure improvement plan, so they clearly define shipyards and infrastructure. No mention. Not one. Were you consulted by the interagency group that submitted the infrastructure plan to be—whether it is grids, ports, and especially shipyards, was the Defense Department consulted for its priorities as part of the administration's plan?

Secretary AUSTIN. Well, certainly, I support the administration's plan and—

The CHAIRMAN. That will have to be taken for the record. The gentleman's time has expired.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 120.]

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Houlahan is recognized for 5 minutes.

Ms. HOULAHAN. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you, gentlemen, for joining us today. I know my time is very precious. But I would like to yield some of my time to General Milley because I know that he had some comments that he wanted to make when Representative Gaetz was talking as well as Mr. Waltz about a similar subject of the stand-down and race theory.

Would you like a minute or so to comment on that? Do you remember what we were—or your line of questioning or your thought was there?

General MILLEY. Sure. First of all, on the issue of critical race theory, et cetera, a lot of us have to get much smarter on whatever the theory is. But I do think it's important, actually, for those of us in uniform to be open-minded and be widely read, and the United States Military Academy is a university. And it is important that we train and we understand, and I want to understand white rage, and I'm white and I want to understand it.

So what is it that caused thousands of people to assault this building and try to overturn the Constitution of the United States of America? What caused that? I want to find that out.

I want to maintain an open mind here and I do want to analyze it. It's important that we understand that because our soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines, and guardians, they come from the American people. So it's important that the leaders now and in the future do understand it.

I've read Mao Zedong. I've read Karl Marx. I've read Lenin. That doesn't make me a communist. So what is wrong with understanding, having some situational understanding about the country for which we are here to defend?

And I personally find it offensive that we are accusing the United States military, our general officers, our commissioned and non-

commissioned officers, of being, quote, “woke” or something else because we’re studying some theories that are out there. That was started at Harvard Law School years ago and it proposed that there were laws in the United States, antebellum laws prior to the Civil War, that led to a power differential with African Americans that were three-quarters of a human being when this country was formed. And then we had a civil war and an Emancipation Proclamation to change it and we brought it up to the Civil Rights Act of 1964. It took another 100 years to change that.

So look, I do want to know and I respect your service, and you and I are both Green Berets. But I want to know, and it matters to our military and the discipline and cohesion of this military.

And I thank you for the opportunity to make a comment on that.

Ms. HOULAHAN. Thank you, General.

Changing the subject right now to our people, which I think is really important, you mentioned that people are our number one priority.

In May of this year, I introduced the Military Moms Matter Act, which, among other initiatives, would propose extending paid family leave to 12 weeks for service members, which would be in line with the NDAA 2020 proposal for all Federal employees, and that became law last year.

One of the big topics of debate in this bill is for primary versus secondary caregivers. As the policy is currently written, a secondary caregiver is able to use very little leave.

We want to make sure that we understand that, and General and Secretary, would you mind expounding on your thoughts on secondary leave for service members? Should that be eliminated or that designation be altered so that everybody could have equal access to paternity and maternity leave?

Secretary AUSTIN. Well, it’s a thing that needs—deserves further discussion and examination. But you asked for my personal opinion and I absolutely support primary and secondary, yes, ma’am.

Ms. HOULAHAN. Thank you, sir. In what’s left of my time, I’d like to talk about childcare, what happens after you have the leave. I’m grateful to see that a \$168 million increase was included in the budget for family issues, including childcare, including in-home childcare.

But I was really devastated to hear a story of a young woman at Fort Hood, who explained to me—a single mother—that she had to drop her child off at 5:30 in the morning, off-base childcare, had to drive at 80 miles an hour to try to get on line fast enough to get to PT [physical training] at 6:00 in the morning.

And this is not okay. So my question is how can we make sure that we provide better support mechanisms in the childcare area for those people like her?

Secretary AUSTIN. Well, I think, first of all, that the pandemic has kind of amplified some of the existing concerns with childcare and other issues. We have provisions in this budget to address home care support and I think we need to continue to look at this hard.

And I would say in addition to that, there are some \$8.6 billion that are focused on military family support programs. And so this



is very important to us. We'll continue to work it. But I could not agree more with you on the importance of this issue.

Ms. HOULAHAN. Thank you. And with that, I yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you, gentlemen.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Johnson is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary Austin, General Milley, thank you for being here today. Many of my colleagues have expressed concern with the top line amount for this year's budget request and I just want to echo those concerns.

And we recognize, of course, that you're operating under certain constraints. But it's alarming to many of us that the President is spending with reckless abandon in virtually every area except our national defense, and our current era of strategic competition makes it all the more important that the U.S. recommit the long-standing principle of peace through strength, especially as our key adversaries continue to take meaningful steps to close the gap between us and them.

Secretary Austin, brings me to a question for you. In your confirmation hearing when asked to commit to the current schedule for nuclear modernization efforts, you told Senator Fischer you'd like to look under the hood first and get a better feel for what we're dealing with our nuclear forces.

I know this has been covered a bit today. Some of us are in and out for other hearings. But just to be sure, you've been on the job now 6 months. Can you commit now to nuclear modernization being a top priority for DOD?

Secretary AUSTIN. I think you may have heard me say a number of times, sir, that modernization of our triad is absolutely important to us. What I meant by looking under the hood, though, is making sure that we go through a new posture review to ensure that we have the right balance and mix of forces.

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, staying on that subject, our next generation ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile], the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent, was a system approved by President Obama in 2015. It was fully funded by President Trump. It was funded in President Biden's fiscal year 2022 budget request at \$2.6 billion.

And since you were confirmed as Secretary of Defense, we have learned that the GBSD will be almost \$38 billion cheaper than any Minuteman III life extension. It will also be a much more capable system, able to better penetrate Russian and Chinese defense systems.

Do you fully support President Biden's fiscal year 2020—fiscal year 2022 budget request for the GBSD and agree it is the future of the land leg of the triad?

Secretary AUSTIN. I fully support the President's budget. I would further say that, you know, GBSD is one of those things that we'll continue to evaluate along with the posture reviews that we have ongoing—a new posture review. So—

Mr. JOHNSON. And am I correct in stating that the GBSD is on track, on schedule, on budget for the first flight test in 2023?

Secretary AUSTIN. You are.

Mr. JOHNSON. Another item we were pleased to see in the budget is the request to construct a weapons generation facility [WGF] at Barksdale Air Force Base and that facility allows—or that construction will allow our B-52s that are stationed there to carry out their nuclear mission without having to fly first from Louisiana to North Dakota in order to be loaded with nuclear ordnance.

So, Secretary Austin or General Milley, can you comment on the strategic flexibility the Barksdale WGF will provide in making sure the air leg of the triad is capable of fully executing its mission?

General MILLEY. Yeah, I think, again, the triad and recapitalization of the triad is critically important. It's been in effect, really, for, I guess, going on seven decades since the end of World War II, and it is—you can never prove a negative but it is, clearly, one of the fundamental reasons why World War III didn't break out was because of the nuclear capabilities of the United States. It is time now to recapitalize the entire thing, all three parts of it plus the command and control piece.

That is really critical to defend this Nation for the next seven decades and the time is now to invest in it. It'll be a one-time thing for a period of years until we can get the system replaced. But it's really, really important in all legs to include that at Barksdale with the B-52s and soon to be the B-21s, et cetera. Really critically important to do that.

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, and those efficiencies, I think, will help in those overall goals.

The last thing I'll touch on is the noticeable reduction in Army accounts in the budget request. I understand that's a reflection of the Afghanistan drawdown, but as we transition our focus to other parts of the world, I do think it's important that we not allow Army readiness to decline. I know you all agree with that.

We still need to execute rotations through our training centers and to that end I appreciate the budget requesting a new joint operation center at Fort Polk. The current JOC is decades overdue for an upgrade and a new facility will make sure our soldiers are equipped with the best possible training and experience so they're at the ready if and when they're called upon.

But just in the 40 seconds I have remaining, would one of you comment on the importance of that, Army readiness, where we stand on that?

General MILLEY. We're both deeply indebted to the Army for where we are in life. But I would say as a former Chief Staff of the Army, the readiness of the Army is critical. It takes a full joint force, a synergy of our air, land, sea, space, and cyber to prevail in combat, and wars are often started from afar, from long-range weapon systems, but they're always ended somewhere on the ground, and the last bullet of a war is usually fired by a Marine or Army infantryman. So it's really critical to maintain the readiness of the United States Army.

Mr. JOHNSON. Hopefully, we can host you at Fort Polk sometime soon. I'd love to see you there.

Secretary AUSTIN. We have been also there quite a bit, both of us—

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, indeed.

Secretary AUSTIN [continuing]. There, Mr. Johnson, and I—or Congressman Johnson, and I would say that it's a pretty valuable capability.

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you. I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Crow is recognized.

Mr. CROW. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to associate myself with the concerns by some of my colleagues on the other side of the dais about back pay for National Guard, and also point out that the H.R. 3237, the Emergency Security Supplemental, which passed the House by one vote, actually created a back pay of \$500 million to help shore up the pay for the National Guard.

So I would encourage my colleagues to support that and to continue to push the Senate to support that as well because if we actually passed that bill, we would resolve that issue and make sure that our men and women in uniform do get paid.

I do want to change to Afghanistan for a minute and just start by saying I understand that it's not your decision to make to conduct an evacuation of civic society leaders, SIV [Special Immigration Visa] applicants, or anybody. That's not for you to decide. That's not for Secretary Blinken to decide.

That's a decision that only resides at the White House. I get that, and I appreciate the fact that you all have conducted contingency planning to be prepared to do that, and, General Milley, your comment earlier about the military capability that exists and that you will conduct whatever is necessary.

My concern is about time, because where we sit right now, that capability and the dangers and risks of doing it are not going to be static. That risk is not lessening. Is it true, Secretary Austin, that the Taliban continue to make territorial gains, that provincial capitals continue to fall, and that freedom of navigation in the Outer Ring Road continues to deteriorate?

Secretary AUSTIN. The Taliban have made gains—incremental gains throughout and those gains have increased most recently. In terms of provincial capitals, I think you heard General Milley's assessment early on that actually none of the provincial capitals have fallen. They have made some gains where they surrounded some of the provincial capitals.

Mr. CROW. And part of that, General Milley, is it true that we don't yet have an agreement with Turkey or any other ally, NATO ally, with regard to the security of the Kabul airport?

General MILLEY. Written agreement, no. We're having a meeting this week. I think we're pretty much at the final piece. I don't want to speak for Turkey and I don't want to preempt the outcome of a final agreement. But I feel very comfortable that security at the Kabul airport will be maintained and that the Turks should be a part of that.

Mr. CROW. And is it—is it true that we're turning over control of Bagram to the Afghans?

General MILLEY. That is the plan. That's correct.

Mr. CROW. Okay. So understanding that situation, the deteriorating security situation, the assessments about the lack of navigation and the fact that these SIV applicants would actually need to make it to Kabul or a population center to be evacuated and they

also need to do in-person vetting in Kabul to qualify—is it fair to say that as time continues to progress, that it becomes harder and more risky to conduct an evacuation?

Secretary AUSTIN. I think that's a fair statement, Congressman.

Mr. CROW. Okay. Relatedly, I'm concerned about the ability of the Afghan air force to conduct air operations and to maintain an air CAP [combat air patrol] with our withdrawal. The A-29 fleet continues to degrade; we know that. We have submitted a request for three additional A-29s.

But maintenance—with the removal of all the maintenance personnel, do we yet have any fidelity on where that maintenance will occur once our contractors withdraw who are currently conducting that maintenance?

Secretary AUSTIN. Some of the maintenance is taking place in the—in one of the Gulf countries, one of our partners, and so we would fly—for the higher level of maintenance, we would fly that—and have flown some of that gear out to that location to be—to be serviced. And you got different levels of maintenance, as you well know.

But the organizational maintenance, you know, the operator level maintenance we can do and are doing some of that by virtual mentorship as—on a day-to-day basis, and we may be able to contract other types of capabilities, going forward.

That's still a work in progress. Ideally, we'd like to see if I could have the ability to conduct maintenance in one of the neighboring countries for some of the higher level maintenance. But again, a work in progress. Not yet solidified.

Mr. CROW. Okay. I appreciate that. And with my remaining 10 seconds, I just wanted to express my appreciation, Chairman Milley, for your leadership and your courage in how you continue to speak out on behalf of what is a diverse—an increasingly diverse force of men and women in uniform—

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman's time has expired.

Mr. CROW. Thank you. I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Green is recognized for 5 minutes.

Dr. GREEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Rogers, for holding the hearing, and I want to thank our witnesses for being here today.

I deeply respect and appreciate your combined service to this country. As the war on terror has continued, the United States military has taken risks to maintain readiness during budget decreases of the last last years of the Obama administration, including installation management, research and development for future systems. The last administration set us on the right path helping to rebuild peace through strength.

Those 4 years of increased budgets helped but they could not make up for nearly 20 years of war and 7 years of cuts. Today's force is still challenged with decreasing overmatch due to those previous cuts and the risk decisions that were made to maintain readiness.

When we send America's sons and daughters, and I believe each of you would agree with me on this, it should never be a fair fight when they go to war. It looks like the real dollar cuts in spending

of \$4 billion in this budget proposal we're once again potentially sacrificing the future fight for readiness today.

In the case of the Navy's budget, it looks like they're pinning their risk in a 3- to 5-year range in hopes that beyond that they can find new technologies that will create overmatch.

The question, of course, is how do we maintain overmatch with pacing threats such as China when they're increasing their budget 6.8 percent and we're effectively decreasing ours.

My first question gets very granular and it goes on what Mr. Johnson was talking about, the CTCs [combat training centers]. I noticed recently—if I'm understanding the budget for the Army correctly, we're cutting CTC rotations by a third in this budget. If that's correct, can you tell me why?

General MILLEY. I don't—yeah, I don't think that's correct. I'll go back to the Chief of Staff of the Army. There's 10 rotations a year to each of the CTCs. If they're cutting them by a third, I'd be very surprised. I'll find out.

Dr. GREEN. Would you do me a favor and get back—

General MILLEY. I'll get back to you.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 121.]

Dr. GREEN. Thank you, Chairman, I really appreciate that. I noticed on aviation we were looking at a cut of around 15.6 percent and this is across all the services for aviation. Can you guys kind of give me a description on what we're doing to make up for those cuts?

Is there some technology we don't know about? Is there some future system that's going to—going to address the decrease in readiness or capability in the future with a 15.6 percent cut in aviation?

Secretary AUSTIN. Well, we want to make sure we—we want to make sure we're investing in the right capabilities and we want to be able to network those capabilities in new and effective ways that we have not been able to do in the past. And that requires investing in the right kinds of technology to be able to do that. If you take ISR, for example, and you say—and you look at the fact that the Air Force is taking down a couple of lines of ISR, what they're really doing is not decreasing the number of tails.

They're taking down some lines so that they can have the ability to upgrade some capability and network their birds together in ways that we haven't done before. And that applies to each of the services. We have to invest in those things that are going to allow us to have resilient forces operate in a distributed manner and be absolutely lethal in the next fight.

Dr. GREEN. I understand. I just want to make sure that capability isn't decreasing 15.6 percent. I guess that's really my big question. We're going to have the same capability or better capability, even though we're cutting aviation 15 percent.

Secretary AUSTIN. Our goal is to have better capability, and with those investments that we make in the future we want to make sure that the platforms that we invest in are able to accomplish some of the things that I just described.

Dr. GREEN. One of the—one of the open source journals, the Computing Research Association, reported concerning, quote, "the Army, Navy and Air Force's University Research Initiative. Sub ac-

counts are cut 31.1 percent, 18.9 percent, and 17.5 percent, respectively.” Considering cybers—these recent cyberattacks, is that really a wise decision?

I’m not an engineer. I’m not a computer scientist. I’m a physician. But it seems that cuts in those particular areas, those areas that research our ability to fight cyber, seems misplaced, considering the recent attacks. Could you comment on that or perhaps I can get something in writing back?

Secretary AUSTIN. We can do both, sir.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 121.]

Dr. GREEN. Okay. Thanks, Secretary.

Secretary AUSTIN. First, I’ll remind you that for RDT&E overall, we’re investing \$112 billion, and specifically for cyber it is a 10 point—almost \$10.5 billion investment in cyber and that includes cyberspace operations and a number of other things. So we think cyber is pretty important. We are part of a whole-of-government effort to defend our networks here in the country. Our focus is, you know, further out towards the source of malign activity and we—

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman’s time has expired. I apologize.

Ms. Slotkin is recognized for 5 minutes.

Ms. SLOTKIN. Thank you, gentlemen, for being here. I know it’s a long hearing. I just—you know, I want to address this constant conversation we have been having about the top line because it feels like very 2005 to me. All the hearings that we have had in front of—in the last 2 years that I’ve been here have talked about not just the amount of dollars we’re spending but how we’re spending them, and I think we need to be intellectually honest as Members of Congress that we are a part of the problem.

We make you budget on 1-year cycles instead of the whole FYDP [Future Years Defense Program]. Every year you come to us with about \$2 billion worth of legacy programs you’d like to cut, and we up here don’t let you cut them. And then let’s be frank. If we’re talking about budgets, the nearly \$10 billion that was taken out of DOD and put towards the border wall should be factored in, for anyone who’s concerned about the top line.

So that’s what we have responsibility for. But I am worried because there is bipartisan agreement that China is gaining on us. I’m also worried that our big lumbering bureaucratic system is an inhibitor to us being competitive with China, particularly on acquisition and getting the best American technology into the Pentagon.

Mr.—Secretary Austin, can you talk about what we’re going to do to acquire faster and better technology?

Secretary AUSTIN. Well, that’s a focus for us. You know, we are far from being as agile as we need to be in order to capture or take advantage of the emerging technologies. And so you’ve given us some authorities in the past that we have not fully used or employed, and we need to push to, number one, take advantage of what you’ve already given us.

But number two, encourage our force to be—to be more agile. And we need to take advantage of emerging technologies that may be available in smaller companies that have capability that they can’t get across the “valley of death” to, you know, to provide capability at scale.

So the deputy secretary and I are absolutely focused on this and she's launched some initiatives to be able to address this.

Ms. SLOTKIN. Thank you. Your personal attention to that, I think, is going to be really important for the future fight.

Switching gears to the authorization of military force, last week in a bipartisan way we called for the repeal here in the House of the 2002 AUMF [Authorization for Use of Military Force]. It's now being discussed and debated over in the Senate.

But there seem to be some confusion here in the House and maybe in the Senate as well on whether the Pentagon is currently relying on the 2002 AUMF for any operations. Can you confirm where you stand on the 2002 AUMF?

General MILLEY. Well, just right now on 2002 AUMF, that is under review and it looks like it's going to go away. The 2001 one is the one that gives us all the authorities. That's the one we need to hang on to is that first one that gives us the authority to conduct operations.

Ms. SLOTKIN. So if we repeal the 2002, will that affect current operations in any way?

General MILLEY. No. My assessment—my military assessment is no, it won't. It won't have any negative effect on current operations. It's the 2001 AUMF that's the critical one for us to continue operations.

Ms. SLOTKIN. Thanks. Thanks for clarifying that.

And, you know, one of the things that myself and Representative Gallagher are doing, we run a bipartisan task force on supply chains, and the deputy secretary was really gracious with her time and came last week.

I have become possessed with this issue because of COVID and having to negotiate with Chinese middlemen in the middle of the night for a 78-cent mask, and I stood yesterday in front of my second GM [General Motors] plant in my area that has to go to a temporary shutdown because we can't get a 14-cent microchip. Can you tell me just your commitment that you will take this issue seriously?

It was stunning for some of us the amount of vulnerabilities that we have even at the Pentagon for things like ammunition propellant and for pharmaceuticals on other countries, particularly sole source from other countries. Can you just commit that you'll help with some transparency on our supply chains?

Secretary AUSTIN. You have our commitment. You heard me mention earlier the \$341 million investment to help boost our support of American industry and some of that includes microelectronics and that sort of business.

So but we are absolutely focused on this. We think that supply chain vulnerability is a national security issue, and that was kind of laid bare for us, to your point, over the last year.

Ms. SLOTKIN. Thank you, and I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Mrs. Bice is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mrs. BICE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Rogers. Secretary Austin, General Milley, thank you for joining us today.

I first want to maybe echo my colleague, Representative Slotkin, on supply chain task force. I was honored to be put on that as well and it has illuminated a lot of the challenges that we see because

of COVID or even just supply chain in general. So I appreciate your commitment to making sure that we continue to look at how we can shore up those supply chain challenges.

I'd like to start by focusing on an issue that has been of concern in my State of Oklahoma and on military bases across the Nation: improving the quality of privatized base housing on military installations.

Since being sworn into office, I've engaged military housing stakeholders in my district and across the State of Oklahoma, including at Tinker Air Force Base and Fort Sill. While I'm cautiously optimistic that things are moving in the right direction, there is still work to do. Ensuring safe and high-quality housing for our Nation's service members is one of my priorities. Despite the recent reforms, evidence from earlier this year suggests military families are being charged thousands of dollars in out-of-pocket expenses by private military housing contractors for reasonable and needed ADA [Americans with Disabilities Act] upgrades to their on-base housing units.

In response, I've introduced legislation with Representative Sara Jacobs to clarify the military families cannot be charged amounts in addition to rent for needed ADA upgrades.

Secretary Austin, can you tell me what actions DOD is taking to ensure that service members do not face financial hardships in obtaining on-base accommodations for a disabled member of their family?

Secretary AUSTIN. Thank you for your—the work that you're doing in this area. It is absolutely critical. There's nothing more important than, you know, the welfare of our military families. And as we have seen in the past, this has not—this has not gone the way that it should have gone in terms of contracted housing or privatized housing.

You've seen us increase the supervision in this area and we're working with the services to really ensure that we have the requisite oversight and emphasis to hold contractors accountable for, you know, providing quality service to our—to our family members. And this will remain a priority for us, going forward. It directly affects the morale of not only our family members but the services altogether. So you have my commitment that we will remain sighted on this.

Mrs. BICE. Thank you, Secretary. Appreciate that.

It's clear to me that in my short time here in Congress that one of the biggest threats is the current space race threat. China has become incredibly competitive, landing a rover on Mars, putting up geosynchronous satellites.

Do you believe this budget provides the dedicated resources in research, technology, exploration, that we need to ensure that we are not outpaced?

Secretary AUSTIN. Right. Again, \$112 billion for RDT&E. That's a—that's a pretty hefty investment. But I would go one step further and say that we have invested or we plan to invest \$20.6 billion or so for—to resource our efforts in space.

Mrs. BICE. Thank you. I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Brief announcement before I call on Ms. Sherrill. So votes are supposed to be called at 1:30. It is my intent to keep



going through them. If—well, it's a little bit complicated. Votes are, like, 25 minutes to a half hour.

But if there are members who wish to ask questions, if you could go and vote, like, right at 1:30 and then come back so we can sort of cycle through that way. I don't want to waste any time and take advantage of all the time that we have. You can sort of process that. So if you're—if you're coming up and you want to go vote and come back, that'll give you an opportunity to ask a question. Mr. Rogers and I will figure out our own deal one way or the other.

Ms. Sherrill is recognized for 5 minutes.

Ms. SHERRILL. Thank you. Thank you so much.

General Milley, I want to talk about the long-range precision fires. As you know, Picatinny Arsenal in my district is a key center of innovation for this modernization priority.

I know that General McConville is committed to the value that long-range precision fires bring to force employment for the joint force. So can you speak to the value of the multiple dilemmas that ground-based precision fires can provide for deterrence and force employment?

General MILLEY. Sure. The—first of all, all of the services have capabilities and are developing capabilities for long-range precision fires, and it's important when you're facing any adversary to present them with multiple dilemmas simultaneously so that it's very difficult for them to solve.

Land-based long-range precision fires will give us a significant advantage relative to the pacing threat of China so that they can be operated off of, basically, unsinkable aircraft carriers.

So our allies and partners—if we work out through the diplomatic arrangements to have units stationed there with long-range precision fire capabilities, we can do significant damage—damage against the People's Liberation Army Navy.

So we're experimenting that with the Army forces and Marine forces in the Pacific right now, in the South China Seas, for example, through exercises and other things. In addition to that, we're doing some long-range precision fire developmental testing that is being done at the various ranges and these are quite extended ranges that will cover the South China Sea.

So the conceptual idea would be that we could handle the Chinese surface fleet with land-based long-range precision fires in combination with air and naval fires.

Ms. SHERRILL. Thank you, General. I appreciate that. Moving on and sort of talking again about the supply chain, we have all become critically concerned. You know, as we talk about single source materials, as we talk about rare earth materials, I encourage you, General Austin, to continue to look into how that impacts some of our smaller defense manufacturers from entering into competition when they have to trace the supply chain.

That is something they have a lot of trouble doing and haven't done well at. I also encourage a discussion about rare earth materials and if there are alternatives. You know, the research and development we might make into alternatives.

That's something that's been brought up, but I don't think we have a good understanding of how—what we could do with respect

to alternatives to rare earth materials, especially single source rare earth materials from our adversaries.

I'd also just like to bring up that in conversations with former senior defense officials, currently serving service members, and leaders in defense innovation, I've heard time and again that the military just isn't innovating the way we need to.

So to make better use of private sector innovation by a more nimble acquisition system and to improve access to talent through better STEM [science, technology, engineering, and math] recruiting, and to ensure that the research and development within the DOD is better supported in risk-taking to, as many of our military members say, fail fast and then learn—what is the best way forward to make these changes and how can Congress best support those changes?

Secretary AUSTIN. Well, I think you have to establish programs that are—and mechanisms that encourage innovation, and while you want to reward success and support small companies in their efforts to get their products—innovative products, you know, on board, you also want to condition the force to be able to accept a— an element or a measure of risk and we're not really good at that. And I think, in order to be agile, we got to become better.

And so you'll see the deputy secretary begin to employ a couple of initiatives that encourage that innovation, and that—and that would help us begin to pull some things forward and support some things, going forward, that we haven't been able to do in the past. And, again, we'll keep pushing on this and pulling on this until we become more agile.

I do think we need to do better in taking advantage of what you've already given us to help us with that agility.

Ms. SHERRILL. Thank you, and I echo Ms. Slotkin in our gratitude in having you involved in this process. I think it is very important.

And then, finally, before my time is up, I simply want to say to you, General Milley, that I deeply and sincerely appreciate your comments to Ms. Houlahan.

Thank you. Yield back.

Mr. KEATING [presiding]. The chair recognizes Representative Jackson for 5 minutes.

Dr. JACKSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Rogers, for holding the hearing today. I also want to thank Secretary Austin and General Milley for being here today. Thank you both.

Mr. Secretary, the first time we met and the first event I've ever attended in the House Armed Services Committee here was a discussion we held when you came before the committee in January.

As you know, I voted in favor of the waiver required for your appointment and I did so because I thought we should take advantage of the opportunity to have somebody in there that really understood the impact that policymakers have on the troops. So thank you, and it's good to see you here again today, sir.

General Milley, I've really appreciated your leadership and the continuity that you're able to bring to the Department during the most recent transition in administrations.

I know both of you very clearly understand the urgent threats that we face. I imagine you both must share my frustration with the budget cut that President—or with the budget cut that President Biden has sent over.

I agree that we need to be more efficient with how we spend our money, if possible. But now is not the time to cut our defense spending like President Biden has proposed.

My first question, the National Defense Strategy [NDS] clearly calls for 3–5 percent real growth in defense spending each year. President Biden has somewhat ignored the NDS and has put you both in a very tough spot, in my mind, by proposing that we cut defense spending this year with a request that does not keep pace with inflation.

I've heard alternate proposals circulated around Congress that might come before this committee of a top line 10 percent cut for defense spending. If the 3–5 percent number is based on the NDS, I'm not really sure where the proposed 10 percent number comes from.

For both of you, if the 10 percent cut is just a random number, should we really be comparing that as an alternative policy recommendation to what is called for in the NDS, and would either of you consider a 10 percent cut to be a serious policy recommendation? This might be a short answer.

Secretary AUSTIN. When it comes to structuring the budget, Congressman—and by the way, thank you for your service—I think randomness is never a good idea. And so we endeavor, as you well know, to link our resources to our strategy, strategy to policy, policy to the—to the will of the American people.

This particular budget was based upon the interim strategic guidance given to us by the President early on and my guidance to the force. And so those were the things that provided us, you know, the—really, the structure to be able to—to build the budget on. But to answer your question, I do not think randomness is a good idea when it comes to budget.

General MILLEY. And I would echo those comments. And I'm not aware of a proposal of a 10 percent cut per se. That's not what this budget does. This budget, essentially, is flat. I mean, depending on how you do the calculations, some will tell you it's \$11 billion more than the 2021 enacted. Others will tell you a few billion less if you measure it against constant dollars. And then, of course, you've got the factor of inflation.

The bottom line is it's all relative to a threat and I think this budget at \$715 billion it's a lot of taxpayer dollars and I think it adequately defends the United States for fiscal year 2022. And I would urge a rapid passing of it and rapid enactment of it.

Dr. JACKSON. Yes, sir. Thank you. I brought up the 10 percent because I think that's being circulated around here and I assume that's going to come later on in the form of an amendment or something. Thank you for that.

I'm concerned that this is only the beginning of the defense budget cuts over the next few years for the reason I've just described. Given that President Biden relies on your expertise, I would urge you both to advise him on how disastrous that would be, the 10 percent cut, for our national security if that comes up.

Last week, we discussed how we can implement the goals of the National Defense Strategy despite a budget cut. Something that General Berger said before this committee stuck out to me.

He said, "We have a perfect record of guessing where the next conflict is going to happen and we got it wrong every time." We know there will be another threat. That's just a fact.

So I don't see why President Biden is forcing us into a budget cut when we are actually losing to China right now and have other rising threats around the globe—around the globe.

Secretary Austin, assuming we are able to keep up with the counter and the threat from China, where do you see the next threat coming from? Also, how harmful are the proposed budget cuts as you prepare the military for whatever future conflict we might have?

Secretary AUSTIN. Yeah. Thank you, Congressman. Again, China is the most challenging competitor that we will face and so we have to prepare for the most challenging competitor. As we do that, it also prepares us well for other things. We'll see threats from Russia, Iran, North Korea, and we'll continue to see a threat from transnational terrorism.

And I agree with General Berger that there's always something that we weren't really sighted on necessarily but we were prepared to address because we prepared for the most challenging threat.

Dr. JACKSON. Thank you both. My time is up. I yield back.

Mr. KEATING. The chair recognizes Representative Golden for 5 minutes.

Mr. GOLDEN. Thank you.

Secretary Austin, in recent testimony you provided before the Senate both Senator Collins and Senator King asked if you'd work with them in Congress to restore the proposed cut to the DDG 51 [guided-missile destroyer] Flight III program, and in both cases you said the plan was to resource that ship in 2023.

General Milley, I believe you testified something similar earlier today. I'd like to understand that more clearly. The most recent figures the Navy has provided Congress was in December and it anticipated the procurement of two Flight III ships in fiscal year 2022 and two in fiscal year 2023 for a total of four ships.

In light of this, Mr. Secretary, am I to understand that you're committing to procure three DDG Flight III ships in fiscal year 2023?

Secretary AUSTIN. We'll certainly work out the balance of our investments in the next budget, and I don't want to predict where that's going to land. But we're going to go after that DDG that we didn't resource in this budget in the next fiscal year.

Mr. GOLDEN. Thank you. You know, if you just look at all of last year, the Navy was saying that they needed the Flight III from capabilities perspective but also they were projecting two ships, whether that was last winter in February, again, putting out some figures in the fall, and then in December. It was always two ships each time and then suddenly we received this budget request to go down to one.

But, you know, if it's not a commitment to actually go back up to three, then I think, you know, it's not resourcing the ship that the two Senators and I are asking about and it would, in fact, rep-

resent a broken contract. You did talk to Senator Collins about wanting to have the right mix of capabilities in place, and I agree with what Senator Collins said about quantity having a quality of its own.

But I'd like to focus on the capabilities piece. The Navy says that the Flight III is key to sea denial and sea control missions. It's also expressed urgency to the committee about getting the AMDR [Air and Missile Defense Radar] SPY-6 radar and those capabilities that will be brought to the Navy into the fleet.

The Navy is looking to decommission cruisers as well. Therefore, the Flight III is slated to house and perform the role of air defense for our carrier strike groups.

But this was going to take several years to fully field that new capability. Last week, the committee received testimony that the benefits of an AMDR are undeniable and it was stressed that the Navy has to have that radar.

I'm curious, in light of the kind of change from two ships, two ships, two ships all through 2020 to just one now and given this testimony that we have received from the Navy about the importance of the capability, what's the driving force behind the reduction?

Secretary AUSTIN. You have to make tough choices in any budget and, again, in this budget we're investing in a DDG, two submarines, and a frigate, which I think is a pretty substantial investment. And again, you know, we have said before that, you know, the 355-ship Navy is a good goal to shoot at. You have to look at the progress over time. You also have to consider, you know, the numbers of hulls that we're putting in the water between now and the end of fiscal year 2022, and when you do that, you'll get a better picture of the full capabilities.

But we—I agree that it is important to make sure that, you know, we invest in that DDG, going forward. But, again, in any budget, you have to make some tough choices.

And we also need to make sure we have the capacity to build the ship that we invest in.

General MILLEY. Could I just add that it's important—in terms of capability, the destroyers are the workhorse of the Navy for sure and the surface fleet, but the most important investment in naval capabilities are the submarines and so the priority went to the submarines.

Mr. GOLDEN. Yeah, certainly. I mean, it sounds like you're talking about tradeoffs—hard tradeoffs.

General MILLEY. Sure. Absolutely.

Mr. GOLDEN. So this is—this is a top line budget challenge discussion rather than, you know, delivering what the combatant commanders are saying that they need out in the fleet in the next 5 years.

I know that they're excited to get that Flight III out there. But someone could argue that the—you know, the eight ships requested maybe, you know, three of them might not be as critical as the destroyer. But we don't have to talk about that right now.

I would just say it is also concerning that in some ways, breaking a multiyear procurement like this is unprecedented and it does undermine trust, you know, that the Navy is going to be able to follow

through on future commitments or contracts. Concerning to the industrial base and that capability, in my opinion. But I do see that the Navy is expressing interest in a future multiyear procurement for fiscal years 2023 through 2027 for the Flight III, and look forward to working with you on that.

I know we're out of time. So if you have any comment, we'll take it for the record. Thank you, gentlemen.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 120.]

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. Thank you. Before recognizing Mr. Carl, votes have been called, and again, votes are going, roughly, a half hour. So if someone wants to go over and vote now and come back, we're going to go till 2:00 here and we'll do that.

So Mr. Carl is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. CARL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Rogers.

Gentlemen, thank you all so much for coming and spending time. Secretary Austin, I want to point out something, that two Alabama colleagues here are wearing orange and blue in support of your Auburn Tigers, and that's tough coming—being a big Alabama fan. I'm just going to let you know.

Real quick—real quick, the fiscal year 2022 shipbuilding budget has been a hot topic today, obviously, during recent hearings in the committees that we have been—we have held here. The report the Navy submitted to Congress last week on long-range shipbuilding highlights the importance of steady acquisition profiles to maintain our industrial base.

However, just a few pages later in the report, the report has 398 to 512 ships in the Navy long-range plan, and the difference is 114 ships. Do you—do you think there might be a little question there on how we won or lost 114 ships? That's not my question there. But, Secretary Austin, the shipyard that I've spent the last 10 years recruiting young people to work in is being threatened to be shut down now because of this budget.

So with that said, the shipyard will be facing layoffs workforce in the coming year because of this fiscal year 2022 budget, its uncertainty. Why did this administration not follow the law and submit a true 30-year shipbuilding plan?

Secretary AUSTIN. Again, the shipbuilding plan, you know, will come with the fiscal year 2023 submission. But that's on the horizon there. So, we presented a 1-year budget this year, and the next year we'll present the budget for the FYDP or the outlook for the FYDP.

Mr. CARL. Okay.

General MILLEY. And as you recall, Congressman, there was a submission by the previous administration very late and the current administration just hasn't had an opportunity to fully review that. That's in the works. So there will be a 30-year shipbuilding plan here shortly.

Mr. CARL. Shift gears here real quick, KC-46. The Air Force has accepted delivery of the KC-46 aircraft that is not fully operational, and still has—still having—quite having some difficulties even being used.

First—the first operation is not—the first operational one is not expected until 2024, 7 years after the original date. Do you think any of this makes sense? The taxpayers are paying for aircraft that are not—that are not fully operational and the first is currently projected to be fully operational 7 years after the contracted date.

So, Secretary Austin, along with all the issues that KC-46A is facing, now it cannot even correctly hold fuel. Is it time to recommit and look at contracting these aircraft out to other companies?

Secretary AUSTIN. We'll work with the Air Force to ensure that we're providing the right amount of oversight and drill down into choices, going forward, and an assessment suggesting that we—that we move to an alternative plan has not yet been presented to me. But this is something that we absolutely have to remain focused on.

Mr. CARL. Well, we have Airbus planes that are flying in Europe that we're refueling behind. So we know we have got—we have got capabilities of other aircraft other than just what's being built and delivered.

General, one quick one for you, sir. Every time they say that China or Russia is a better military force, I see you bow up a little bit, and I love it. Thank you. Thank you for your service—

General MILLEY. Yeah.

Mr. CARL [continuing]. Your patriotism.

General MILLEY. Thank you. And just to be clear, and I'll reiterate it, neither China nor Russia, militarily, nor any other country on the face of the earth is a better military than the United States military.

Mr. CARL. Thank you, sir.

General MILLEY. On the KC-46, I had an opportunity to go out and see them. There's some glitches in the software. They are operational. We're flying them. We're flying them and doing tanking operations in training exercises around the world.

When we say they're not—we're not using them operationally in combat zones. That's where we're not using them. But they are being used in training. There are some software things yet to be worked out, and I have confidence in the KC-46 as a program.

Mr. CARL. Thank you, sir.

General MILLEY. Thank you.

Mr. CARL. And I yield my time back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mrs. Luria is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mrs. LURIA. Well, thank you.

And, General Milley, over the last year I've been reviewing the Goldwater-Nichols Act to look at things both positive and negative on the current organization within our service.

A couple questions I had. 10 U.S. Code 163 states that the President may direct that communications between the President or Secretary of Defense and the commanders of the unified and specified combatant commands be transmitted through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Has the President or Secretary of Defense given direction to you that communications through the combatant commanders should go through you?

General MILLEY. It's a routine—the word is routine communications and it's in the UCP [Unified Command Plan]. And yes, it is currently in effect. So routine communications, normal communications. The chain of command, though, is clear and it's unambiguous. The chain of command is the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the combatant commanders, and then the President, the Secretary of Defense and the service secretaries for the departments.

I am an advisor and I advise on the advantages, disadvantages, and puts and takes, costs and risks and benefits, et cetera. But the chain of command is clear. But routine communication typically goes through me in order for me to do my job as an advisor.

Mrs. LURIA. Okay. Well, thank you. And another portion 10 U.S. Code 16 says that subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff serves as the spokesman for the commanders of the combatant commands, especially on operational requirements of their commands.

Do you serve as the spokesman for the combatant commanders on the operational requirements for their commands?

General MILLEY. I do, and I—and when I say I, the Joint Staff who helps me—

Mrs. LURIA. I was just looking—I'm sorry—for a yes, no—

General MILLEY. Sure, and the answer is yes.

Mrs. LURIA. Okay. Well, thank you.

And so you recently said that there's a low probability that China would take over Taiwan militarily in the near term, and this seems to be in direct conflict to the statements made earlier this year by Admiral Davidson, Admiral Aquilino, last week by the CNO and the Commandant of the Marine Corps—

General MILLEY. Yeah.

Mrs. LURIA [continuing]. That they believe that China could act militarily against Taiwan in the next 6 years. If their window is 6 years but you disagree with that, what is your window?

General MILLEY. I didn't say I disagreed with them—their assessment of 6 years. Their assessment is based off a speech by President Xi that challenged the People's Liberation Army to accelerate their modernization programs, to develop capabilities to seize Taiwan, and move it from 2035 to 2027 hence 6 years. It's a capability. It's not an intent to attack or seize.

My assessment is an operational assessment. Do they have the intent to attack or seize in the near term defined as the next year or two? My assessment and based on what I've seeing right now is no. That can always change. Intent is something that can change quickly.

Mrs. LURIA. But, you know, from the statements and how many Members of Congress has interpreted that over the series of hearings, you know, we heard Admiral Davidson and Aquilino clearly state that they thought there was an intent. You're saying there's a capability. So there's a difference.

General MILLEY. No, I looked at their—I looked at their testimony, their words, and very explicitly, and I can go back and look at it again.



If Admiral Aquilino and Admiral Davidson said that China had an intent, has made a decision and they intend to invade and seize Taiwan, then I do disagree with that. I've seen no evidence of that actual intent or decision making. What I'm talking about is capability.

Mrs. LURIA. Okay.

General MILLEY. What they were talking about is capability, and the Chinese leadership, President Xi, challenged them to accelerate their capability development, which is two different things.

Mrs. LURIA. Thank you. I understand that you're making a nuance there. I'll say that Members of the House, I think, interpreted the admirals' earlier testimony differently.

But just, you know, kind of taking that capability as capability as well. So whether they have intent right now or they may in the future between now and 2027 when you think they will have that capability, just looking at this budget, which really is a divest-to-invest strategy and I would say that, you know, with the—without the sense of urgency that that could happen in the next 6 years, you know, it's not really palpable to think that we could divest to invest.

For instance, decommission more ships before we have the replacement, thus reducing the fleet size. Retiring bombers at a faster rate than we're replacing their inventory, and the Air Force has just said recently in a hearing that the bare minimum of maintaining 45. And last week we had several hearings that expressed us about the Navy's budget, its divest-to-invest strategy, and Mr. Gallagher, you know, referred to Admiral Davidson's comments as the Davidson window.

So, you know, I just wanted to—and we have very little time left—get after the question of between the combatant commanders and yourself acting as a role as an advisor to the President.

General MILLEY. Sure.

Mrs. LURIA. You know, who should we be listening to. I feel like the combatant commanders—

General MILLEY. Okay. So—

Mrs. LURIA [continuing]. Their message is very different than what we're getting in a message in this budget, because the budget does not convey a sense of urgency when we see it as a shrinking fleet rather than a growing fleet to counter the threats that we see from China in the Pacific. And I have very little time left so—

General MILLEY. There's one second left so I'll give you an answer on the record.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 121.]

The CHAIRMAN. Take it for the record.

Ms. Cheney is recognized for 5 minutes.

Ms. CHENEY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, General Milley and Secretary Austin, for being here.

Secretary Austin, I wanted to ask you about GBSD. We have had consistent testimony, as I'm sure you know, in front of this committee this year and in prior years at the extent to which GBSD will save the taxpayer money. Moving forward with it, it is \$38 billion in cost savings over life extension of the Minuteman and, obviously, it also has significantly increased capabilities over the Min-

uteman. I've listened to you today. It sounds like there may be some question about whether or not you agree with those assessments or whether or not a change will be made as you look at the posture review.

Could you elaborate what factors might lead you down the path of not going with the less expensive, more effective, and capable GBSD system?

Secretary AUSTIN. If I conveyed that I'd already made some sort of decision, Congresswoman, that's absolutely not the case. I think the right thing to do if we're going to conduct a Nuclear Posture Review, which we are going to do that, is to make sure that we have the right pieces in place, the right balance, and to make sure that we continue to evaluate the GBSD in the context of that Nuclear Posture Review.

But again, my intent was not to convey a preference or a decision. You know, that's not where I am.

Ms. CHENEY. Thank you. I appreciate that. And, again, just looking at the cost that we have seen, the consistent testimony and the effectiveness, it would be some concern, obviously, if we moved towards trying to do life extension at this point.

General Milley, I wanted to ask you about Afghanistan. You know, it does seem that we have now seen the Taliban taking 50 to 60 more districts. I know the government moves its district centers at some point. But it does seem that we're withdrawing from the battlefield as our enemy advances.

So could you talk about both what the actual specifics are? We haven't really heard anything in terms of over-the-horizon basing, and whether or not you think this is good policy to withdraw as our enemy is advancing.

General MILLEY. Congresswoman, the—in terms of the district centers in the provinces—and, as mentioned earlier there's 419 district centers—81 of them are so are in the hands of the Taliban. About 50 were done previously and about 30 or 40 in the last X amount of months.

In addition to that, no provinces have fallen to the Taliban yet. There's a 300,000-plus-or-minus security force consisting of the army and the police forces for the Afghans. We have not done train, advise, assist in quite some time down at the tactical level. So they have been out there shouldering the burden of that fight for well over a year.

And in terms of what we are doing, what we are doing is a deliberate responsible drawdown retrograde to bring out U.S. military forces, and we're going to keep a small number of forces there to maintain the embassy open and to keep capabilities there and keep the money going for the NSF [National Security Forces] and the government.

Now, what happens in the future? There's a wide variety of possibilities. Worst case, civil war, breakdown, fracturing of the government, fracturing of the army. That's very possible and that would be a very bad outcome. There's also a possibility, not high in the probability list, but a negotiated settlement between the government and the Taliban. That's possible. And then the alternative is an outright takeover of the Taliban, which I also think that is unlikely but possible.

So there's a variety of outcomes here that could happen. We are executing the orders that were given in a very professional way, and thus far things are relatively stable on our end.

Ms. CHENEY. Thank you, General Milley. I think it's obviously just a significant concern as we do watch the Taliban advance, and we know we have got a counterterrorism mission we have to conduct and we don't have any basing agreement secured for over the horizon.

But I want to just end with the continuation of this topic that's been discussed. A couple of my colleagues suggested that there were service members who were being somehow persecuted because of their political beliefs or their ideological beliefs.

And I want to, first of all, thank you for noting that the attack on the Capitol on January 6th was an attack on the Constitution. We do need to understand what happened. It was an attack provoked by the Commander in Chief. He could have immediately intervened to stop it and he didn't. I think it's very important for us to recognize and understand who was in the Capitol that day and why, and we have to protect the First Amendment rights of our service people, no doubt.

But it's also critically important that we remind everybody that the UCMJ makes it a crime to engage in sedition or mutiny or to seek the violent overthrow of the United States Government.

So I would urge, as you are focused on getting to the bottom of what happened, we need to do the same here. But we really need to focus on that piece of this as well.

With that, I yield back.

Mr. KHANNA [presiding]. Thank you.

I recognize Representative Jacobs.

Ms. JACOBS. Well, thank you so much for joining us. I wanted to follow on a question from my colleague, Ms. Cheney, about the GBSD. I know you said a final decision will only come after the Nuclear Posture Review.

But it seems from the budget that this decision has already been made with the claim that the price to build and operate the new GBSD would be less than the cost to maintain the current Minuteman III.

So it seems this conclusion is based by comparing the total life-cycle cost of the two options through 2075 at a deployed level of 400 ICBMs.

Is that true? If so, where did those numbers, 400 in 2075, come as the baseline requirement? Who made that decision and is that still going to be revisited down the road, as you said?

Secretary AUSTIN. Well, certainly, as I indicated a couple minutes ago, you know, I've not made any decisions on this. I think it deserves, you know, the right amount of effort and attention, and we'll make the best choices.

But these choices need to be informed by the—by the posture review and make—to make sure we have the right balance here.

Ms. JACOBS. Well, thank you. You know, I think it's important that we do the process necessary and not invest in a very expensive nuclear platform as, for instance, our President is in active negotiations to decrease our reliance on nuclear weapons.

And my next question is, you know, I represent San Diego and almost all of the people in uniform I speak to, they're struggling to find childcare. I'm happy to see that the President's budget increases base pay, but it seems like there's just so much more we need to do. And I was a little surprised that in this budget request it only requests funding of a single construction of a new childcare development center, one 200-space center at Sheppard Air Force Base in Texas. I know you said to my colleague earlier that you were working on investments in home care support and others. So I just wanted to know what more you're planning on doing to address childcare beyond this single one space that is being constructed.

Secretary AUSTIN. Thanks for the question and for your continued focus on what I believe is a very important issue. We'll continue to work with the services as they work with their installation commanders and they identify what their needs are and make sure that those needs are reflected in military construction plans, going forward.

But I personally believe that—and I know all the secretaries and the chiefs believe—that this is a—this is an important issue and one we need to continue to invest in.

So more need—more work needs to be done to the point that you're making.

Ms. JACOBS. Thank you. Yes, I really want to emphasize that I think what's in the budget is not sufficient, and I can tell you for my constituents in San Diego, you know, of our subsidized childcare waiting list spots, more than half of them are military families. And so it's a really critical need and I hope that you would continue to emphasize it and I appreciate your comments there.

If Ms. Escobar is here, I'm happy to give the remainder of my time to her.

Mr. KHANNA. [Audio malfunction.]

Ms. JACOBS. All right. Well, then, Mr. Chair, I'll yield back.

Mr. KHANNA. The chair recognizes Representative McClain.

Mrs. MCCLAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I want to thank you for being here in front of this committee today, and it's a pleasure to meet you in person.

I want to speak today what—in regards to what a lot of my colleagues have already spoken on, which is China, and I think we all agree is China seems to be our most challenging adversary or national threat.

We're fortunate enough to have thousands of businesses across our country that have contracts with your Department. My question is, do you believe it would be in the best interest of our national security to ensure that the CCP does not have access to our military intellectual property?

Secretary AUSTIN. I absolutely believe that and I think we need to—it's important to me to make sure that, number one, the DOD networks are properly protected, but we need to advocate or ensure that all those people—all those companies that are supporting us in supply chains are doing the right things to meet the standards to reduce vulnerabilities in a supply chain.

Mrs. MCCLAIN. Extremely critical. Finally, do you fear that when the United States conducts a foreign military sale to a nation that

also has accepted Belt and Road funding that our military equipment might fall into the hands of the CCP?

If not, can you explain how do we ensure that this doesn't happen and what do we do to make this better and to protect America and to protect our intellectual property? What action steps can we take?

Secretary AUSTIN. Well, we—before we enter into the agreements there, we certainly do assessments to make sure that the people that we're selling the gear to do have the capability to protect our property, our intellectual property, and they agree to do what's necessary to do that.

Mrs. MCCLAIN. So to make sure I understand—I didn't mean to interrupt—is when we engage in a sale, we put mechanisms in place to make sure that our intellectual property is protected and secure?

Secretary AUSTIN. To the best of our abilities, yes. We take appropriate and responsible actions and, of course, the State Department is involved in deciding whether or not the sales will be—will be consummated. I mean, they get to approve that.

Mrs. MCCLAIN. What do you think we can—what measures, if any, can we take to make sure that we ensure this process is even safer to a greater—to a greater ability? I mean, you hear or, at least, I hear, the American public hears, on a constant basis China is stealing our intellectual property and it's coming from a lot of our business dealings.

Secretary AUSTIN. You know, I think we can—we need to continue to engage our partners and allies and emphasize the importance of this. We need to make sure that as we—as we convey equipment that we are confident that the people that we're conveying it to can protect the intellectual property.

Mrs. MCCLAIN. Thank you, sir. I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. Thank you.

We are at that magic hour. I know the Secretary has a hard stop at 2:00 o'clock. So Mr. Kahele—I'm sorry, I never pronounce that correctly. I'll learn by the end of the session, I promise. You are recognized for 5 minutes and that you will be the last questioner that we have before we close at 2:00.

Mr. KAHELE. Mahalo, Mr. Chair, and aloha, Secretary Austin and General Milley.

Mr. McCord, thank you for your service, all of you for your testimony today.

I want to focus my questions on the Pacific Deterrence Initiative, the importance of those U.S. relationships with our allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region, and the changing nature of the future conflicts.

Secretary Austin, I applaud you for showcasing America's commitment to the Indo-Pacific region by making your first overseas visit with your trip to Japan and South Korea and India, and a brief stop in the Hawaiian Islands. I'm sorry I missed you.

But as we are now discussing the fiscal year 2022 defense budget, which I appreciate the President's budget and the investment in the PDI, I also think as China becomes more aggressive in the region the United States needs to be more aggressive regarding our critical investments in the PDI, and there are things that are not

in that budget, in the unfunded—like the Guam defense system, the Homeland Radar-Hawaii, the TACMOR [Tactical Mobile Over the Horizon Radar] in Palau—that I think we need to take a look at, and so that we can fully fund that PDI and fully meet the objectives that we discussed today, which is one of those national instruments of power, which is our military deterrence and the strength of that deterrence in the Indo-Pacific region.

So as a member of the Pacific Islands Caucus, I want to continue to call attention to Oceania and the Pacific Islands region. China regularly provides military training in the Pacific Islands region. They have been broadening their reach throughout the Pacific. They actively cultivate those relationships with senior defense officials.

You know, we know what the investments that they've been doing in Guam for a number of—excuse me, in Western Samoa for a number of decades, and as those defense officials from China go to the different Pacific Island regions, they get full military honors, such as in Papua New Guinea under their defense force—chief of defense visit in 2016. Under President Xi, senior PLA officials have held bilateral meetings with their counterparts in Papua New Guinea and Tonga and Fiji.

And so my first question to you, sir, is given the increasing military-to-military engagements in the Pacific Islands region, especially Papua New Guinea, Fiji, and Tonga, many of those small islands listed on the unfunded section 1251, will the DOD plan similar high-level engagements to strengthen those relationships with our counterparts in those small island nations in Oceania to deter China from extending their reach throughout the Western Pacific and into the Eastern Pacific?

Secretary AUSTIN. As you pointed out, Congressman, the Indo-Pacific is important to us and my very first trip was out to the region. And I would just say that China is engaging a number of different countries and with economic—

Mr. KAHELE. Carrots.

Secretary AUSTIN. Yeah. But we have something that China doesn't have. We have allies and we have partners. And if you consider the Australias, the Japans, you know, the Koreas of the world, you know, there is tremendous capacity in our allies and partners.

I think the Pacific Islands are absolutely important, and you'll see us continue to engage various countries in the region there and to make sure that where we can, we're increasing our capacity and accessibility and strengthening the relationships.

But we far and away exceed any capability that China would have in terms of partner or ally capability, and we're going to continue to strengthen what we have.

Mr. KAHELE. What are your thoughts then on expanding those relationships that we currently have or previously had? For an example, in the Philippines we had robust bases at Clark. Of course, we have a presence in Subic and Singapore. We have Changi, you know, and we have U-Tapao in Thailand. What are your thoughts on expanding those relationships, specifically, the Philippines?

Secretary AUSTIN. Absolutely the right thing to do and, you know, I've talked with the minister of defense in the Philippines a

couple of times. Certainly, we would look to expand our footprint and strengthen our relationship, as we go forward. I'll continue to work on that personally. I think it's really, really important.

Mr. KAHELE. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and I will yield back the remainder of my time. Mahalo.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you very much. And I want to thank both of you—well, all three of you. Mr. McCord, alas, did not get a question. I'm sure you were profoundly disappointed.

But I do want to thank the Secretary and the Chairman. And I think it is really important, as we have had these discussions, you know, we focused on some areas of disagreement. But there was overwhelming agreement on this committee in a bipartisan way about the priorities and needs within our Department of Defense and how to meet those.

And I hope we'll stay focused on those and not get too obsessed with the areas where we disagree because there's a lot of good in what you're doing at the Pentagon. A lot of work to be done, obviously, and I think this committee and this Congress will contribute to that with useful and productive and helpful ideas over the course of the next several months as we work through the defense bill and the appropriations bill.

But I, you know, want to congratulate Secretary Austin. This is his first—not the first appearance before this committee, the first appearance, I believe, as the Secretary and we very much appreciate your leadership. And I think you are absolutely the right person for the job at this moment. Glad you are there. Look forward to continuing to work with you.

Mr. Rogers, do you have anything for the good of the order?

Mr. ROGERS. Just to say I envy Mr. McCord. I mean, this is—this is my kind of hearing for you, buddy.

[Laughter.]

Mr. ROGERS. And I have the highest respect for the Secretary and the general, and thank you for your service and being here. And I concur with the chairman's observation about this committee's focus on what we need, and we will continue in a bipartisan fashion.

So thank you very much, and I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. With that, we are adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 2:02 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]





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# **A P P E N D I X**

JUNE 23, 2021

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**PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD**

JUNE 23, 2021

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**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE LLOYD J. AUSTIN III**  
**PREPARED REMARKS BEFORE THE**  
**HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE**  
**JUNE 23, 2021**

**Introduction**

Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Rogers, distinguished members of the committee: thank you for the opportunity to testify in support of the President's budget request for Fiscal Year (FY) 2022.

On behalf of myself, Deputy Secretary Hicks, the leadership of the Department of Defense, and the men and women of our Department and their families, let me also thank you for your continued support and partnership as we work to address the threats facing the United States of America today, and build the force that can address the challenges of tomorrow. I also want to thank the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Mark Milley, who is testifying alongside me and is a critical partner in realizing the Department's priorities. I am also pleased to be joined by our Comptroller and Chief Financial Officer, Mr. Mike McCord.

The President's \$715 billion defense budget request for FY 2022 provides us with the capabilities we need most and drives investment in efforts that will help us advance our three key priorities: defending the nation, taking care of our people, and succeeding through teamwork.

Today, the Department of Defense stands ready to deter conflict in any domain and, if necessary, to fight and win against any challenger. Since becoming Secretary of Defense, I have met with many of our service members and commanders in the field and have seen first-hand the dedication of the men and women of our Department. I can assure you that we continue to have the best joint fighting force on Earth and a civilian workforce fully dedicated to the many critical missions we face.

We must maintain and improve this advantage on land, at sea, in the air, and in emerging domains, including space and cyberspace. I am confident that the President's budget request helps us do that. The request is driven by our recognition that our competitors—especially China—continue to advance their capabilities. We must outpace those advances to remain a credible deterrent to conflict around the world.

The President's budget request represents my commitment to matching resources to strategy, strategy to policies, and policies to the will of the American people. This budget also reflects difficult funding decisions necessary to ensure that we have the right mix of capabilities that we need most. We have proposed cuts to systems and capabilities that no longer meet the challenges and requirements of the Department, making room for more advanced programs that do. In making these decisions, we were guided by the President's Interim National Security Strategic Guidance and informed by a set of program reviews conducted by the Department early in this Administration.

We are also undertaking a series of strategic reviews in the Department to ensure that our global force posture, and our nuclear and missile defense capabilities, are matched with the challenges that we face and aligned with the priorities of the President. The Global Posture Review will help inform my advice to the Commander-in-Chief about how best to allocate our forces around the world to advance our

national interests, and our nuclear and missile defense reviews will consider how we maintain our deterrent and defensive capabilities, within and across domains.

I take very seriously the importance of being good stewards of taxpayer dollars and ensuring that we are transparent and honest with the American people about how their money is spent. This year, the President's budget consolidates the Overseas Contingency Operations funding and the base budget, raising transparency of direct war costs to a level not seen in several years.

We are also working to address our audit responsibilities as quickly and effectively as possible and move forward on reform to our business operations. This is not just about finding and reapplying savings to higher priorities, it is about improving organizational performance and efficiency. The best advocates for reform are those closest to the issues, so we will hold leaders appropriately accountable for a management improvement agenda within their respective components. Reform also requires a holistic approach—including concepts of operation, organizations, personnel, training, and modern systems—and must have a seat at the table in our deliberations over Department programs and priorities.

The FY 2022 budget also reflects the President's decision to retrograde in Afghanistan, following 20 years of war in that theater. We are profoundly grateful to our uniformed service members and their families, and to our civilian workforce, who have served and sacrificed so much through combat deployments in the defense of our nation since the attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001. We are now engaged in a deliberate, safe, and orderly withdrawal from Afghanistan following the President's decision.

Moving forward, we must continue to engage in a concerted effort to recruit, retain, and develop the finest talent available for the uniformed and civilian workforce, providing quality opportunities for personal and professional growth, advancement, and leadership to those in our charge.

We owe it to them to build an environment that is safe, welcoming, and free of fear, harassment, or violence. That is why I have focused some of my earliest efforts on addressing sexual assault and harassment in the Department, identifying and addressing extremist behavior in the ranks, and ensuring that everyone is given a fair and equitable opportunity to serve this country.

But we cannot do this work alone. Whether it is defending the nation, building a force of the future, growing our talent, or building an environment welcoming to all, we rely on teamwork that starts at the senior-most levels of the Department, filters down into our workforce, and extends across departments to our relationships with interagency colleagues, Congress, and our allies and partners.

When called upon to protect and defend our nation, the Department of Defense will always answer, but diplomacy must be our first national security tool of choice. That is why the President's FY 2022 budget helps fund a Department of Defense able to credibly back up the hard work of our diplomats through our deterrent capabilities and our force posture.

As we look outward to our global security interests, we are focused on strengthening our relationships with our allies and partners. The investments in this budget demonstrate that the United States will continue to be a key guarantor of the peace, security, and the rules-based world order that we have helped foster for the past seven decades.

The FY 2022 budget request ensures that we will remain the best-trained and best-equipped military in the world and will have the resources to defend the nation, with the confidence to advance our priorities and build and sustain the force we need now and in the years ahead.

#### **Defending the Nation**

As the President has noted, the country finds itself at an inflection point. The rapid pace of development of capabilities by our competitors, and the changing character of conflict that comes with it, mean that we can no longer do things the way we always have and sustain our military edge.

China has invested heavily in new technologies, with a stated intent to complete the modernization of its forces by 2035 and to field a “world-class military” by 2049. Russia has shown that it is not afraid to target the United States in contested domains like cyberspace and still shows a continued interest in regional hegemony. Iran continues to advance its nuclear and ballistic missile programs and to support destabilizing proxy groups in the Middle East in an effort to threaten its regional neighbors. We also face challenges from North Korea, a country with the ambition to be capable of striking the U.S. homeland.

We will continue to address violent extremist and transnational criminal organizations active in several theaters and to face unexpected but challenging tests of our resolve like the deadly spread of COVID-19. Climate change is a growing challenge, the effects of which are driving regional conflicts and instability, even as extreme weather caused by a changing planet threatens installations and readiness.

As the character of conflict and competition changes and accelerates, our strategic competitors have watched our efforts in warzones over the last two decades, seeking to understand not only our capabilities but also our will to defend our interests abroad. They are watching us and learning from us.

I have asked the Department to think through our capabilities and operational concepts and how we use cyber, space, and nuclear capabilities to create a more credible and resilient deterrent against our competitors, including China. What I have in mind are ways we can better use the capabilities we already have, including by integrating across domains, and determining the capabilities we need to address potential future conflict.

This means investing in cutting edge technologies like artificial intelligence and quantum computing. It also means ensuring that if an adversary attacks one system or domain—in cyberspace or Global Positioning System (GPS) satellites, for example—we are able and ready to respond through appropriate and separate means in other domains, as necessary.

This is going to take a culture shift in the Department because it requires working across Military Services, domains, and regions in a way that we have not done before. It also requires deeper integration with our allies and partners, ensuring that their capabilities add value in deterrence and in conflict.

The FY 2022 budget request will help us achieve this new vision of 21st-century deterrence, and we look forward to your support and partnership to help get it right.

### **Regional Challenges**

In the Indo-Pacific region, we are facing an increasingly assertive People's Republic of China (PRC). Beijing's regional ambitions have grown, as has its footprint around the world, drawing on significant economic influence to encourage and, in some cases, coerce countries into a deepening relationship with the PRC.

But China's ambitions are not only economic. It seeks to use its influence to shift rules and norms in the region, erode democratic values and human rights, and challenge a free and open Indo-Pacific region. The President's Interim National Security Strategic Guidance identifies China as the only global competitor capable of combining its economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to mount a sustained challenge to the international order.

As the Department of Defense, our responsibility is to protect and defend our interests in the Indo-Pacific region and to assure our allies and partners of our commitment to our shared goals. That requires keeping pace with the rapid military modernization of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and remaining sighted on the PLA's advancements in the South and East China Seas, the Second Island Chain, and beyond.

That is why I established the China Task Force early in my tenure. The Task Force's mandate was to conduct a baseline assessment of Department policies, programs, and processes on China-related matters so that we might better meet the challenge posed by the PRC. The Task Force has now completed its work. Based on its recommendations, yesterday I issued internal guidance initiating major Department-wide efforts to address China as the United States' number one pacing challenge.

Even as we address China's growing military capability, we will remain focused on North Korea. Pyongyang continues to develop its nuclear and ballistic missile programs, posing an increasing threat to regional allies and partners and with ambitions to be able to strike the U.S. homeland. Leading with diplomacy, the United States will continue to work to mitigate North Korea's destabilizing and provocative behavior and maintain peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula.

In Europe, I am focused on strengthening our relationships with our allies and partners, bilaterally and in NATO. The Department will ensure that we are postured to deter aggression from Russia or any other power that seeks to challenge us in the region. Our alliance with NATO remains ironclad, and our allies remain a force multiplier for U.S. security around the world. We are encouraged that NATO defense spending has increased for the seventh straight year, demonstrating their commitment to the strength of the alliance. The FY 2022 budget supports efforts to grow the capability and capacity of our allies.

Over the past 20 years, much of our effort as a Department has been focused on the threat posed by violent extremist organizations operating out of parts of the Middle East and South Asia. We remain committed to ensuring that no one launches an attack on the U.S. homeland, and we will maintain the capability to protect the United States and our interests in the region. That includes countering the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, al-Qa'ida, and associated terrorist networks that pose ongoing threats to the United States.



Meanwhile, Iran remains a destabilizing force as it seeks to advance its nuclear and ballistic missile programs, threaten freedom of navigation, and support proxy terrorist and militia groups. We will continue to maintain the capability to deter Iran in the Middle East. We will also continue to support our partners in the region, including by helping to ensure that Israel has the capability to defend itself effectively and maintain its qualitative military edge.

In Afghanistan, the Department is working to conduct a deliberate, orderly, and safe withdrawal, as directed by the President. This is an important step in responsibly ending this two-decade-long conflict, and it offers us an opportunity to redirect our resources toward strategic competition.

In Africa, the Department is focused on sustaining and improving the capabilities of our partners, particularly as we deter and disrupt terrorist attacks by al-Shabaab. The group remains an active threat to Somalis, their neighbors, our interests in Africa, and those of our allies and partners. Our partner-centric strategy has always been at the core of our counterterrorism mission, and we will continue to help regional partners strengthen their capabilities to counter shared threats. This is critical to stability and the opportunity for political and economic development in East Africa.

To the north, the Department remains committed to preserving a free and open Arctic region, which is why we undertake annual Arctic exercises and operations, including with allies and partners, such as ARCTIC EDGE, ICEX, and NORTHERN EDGE. These exercises provide valuable experience and offer important lessons learned for conducting multi-domain operations in the High North.

In the western hemisphere, our competitors seek to gain a foothold through economic and security investment and cooperation. We remain focused on building partner capacity and capability to ensure that the United States remains the partner of choice and to address transnational criminal and terrorist networks active in the region.

Additionally, the Department supports interagency efforts to address the migration crisis. Although other departments and agencies appropriately lead efforts to respond to this challenge, DoD supports partner nations in addressing the security-related aspects of the root causes of migration. This includes providing limited humanitarian and medical assistance and participating in engagements to strengthen the professionalism of Central American militaries and defense institutions.

Here in the United States, our men and women in uniform have supported our critical domestic missions. National Guard personnel provide support to our fellow Americans, including at Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) mass vaccination sites. National Guard personnel have also helped secure our national Capitol at various times over the past year, and thousands more have helped secure State capitals across the United States at the direction of State officials. We also continue to support law enforcement operations on our southern border by providing limited enabling capabilities. At the request of the Department of Health and Human Services, we are supporting its mission to shelter unaccompanied migrant children arriving at the border.

#### **COVID-19**

Tackling COVID-19 has been one of my highest and most urgent priorities. Since I became Secretary of Defense, the Department has received almost 500 FEMA mission assignments and 67 requests for

assistance from other Federal departments and agencies. As of June 21, more than 4,700 active-duty service members have deployed to 40 community vaccination centers in 29 States and territories. Additionally, more than 32,000 National Guard personnel have deployed, carrying out FEMA mission assignments issued to DoD to assist their local communities.

In total, the Department has administered over 17 million vaccine doses to the American people, with over 4.9 million delivered by active-duty personnel and 12.2 million supported by the National Guard. Within the Department, we have executed one of the most complex vaccination programs in the world, vaccinating millions of service members, beneficiaries, and Department personnel in 42 countries, including multiple combat zones. Internally, the Department has protected its force and families by administering over 3.6 million vaccinations.

We are also making investments in the Defense Health Agency to ensure that we have the resources needed for public-health surveillance and force protection. We continue to review and update our force health protection policies, and even as vaccinations increase, we remain committed to testing, which will expand our genomic sequencing efforts so that we can track variants and declining immunity.

I am tremendously proud of our men and women in uniform who stepped up to join our whole-of-nation response. But this will not be the last time our nation and our world will face such a challenge. That is why our budget request also funds programs that support biological threat reduction, in cooperation with our global partners, emerging infectious-disease surveillance, biosafety and biosecurity, and medical countermeasure research and development.

#### **Climate Change**

We face a grave and growing climate crisis that is threatening our missions, plans, and capabilities. From increasing competition in the Arctic to mass migration in Africa and Central America, climate change is contributing to instability and driving us to new missions.

At the same time, increasingly frequent extreme weather events degrade force readiness and drain resources. Recent DoD budgets have been forced to absorb recovery costs at battered bases such as Naval Air Station Pensacola, among others. Our military installations, and the mission-critical capabilities they support, must be made resilient to climate-induced extreme weather.

Our mission objectives are aligned with our climate goals. The Department is investing in projects and capabilities that mitigate the impacts of climate change while improving the resilience of our facilities and operations to a range of threats. Our budget request also invests in initiatives to reduce operational energy demand to enhance capability, improve freedom of action in contested logistical environments, and reduce costs. Those investments are good for the climate, and they are critical for the mission.

Additionally, this budget invests in power and energy research and development to improve installation and platform energy performance and optimize military capability. The Department can help lead by leveraging its buying power to deploy technologies such as energy storage and microgrids that support the mission while protecting the climate.

The Climate Working Group is coordinating the Department's work implementing the President's Executive Order on this crisis and building up climate expertise within DoD. It will also track the implementation of climate- and energy-related actions and progress toward future goals.

#### **Modernization and Innovation**

One of our chief priorities is to drive innovation across the Department and modernize our culture, people, systems, and processes to meet our future needs. It is critical to nearly everything we do. Even as we develop new capabilities, we will always adhere to our international humanitarian law obligations in the use of new weapons of war, as well as ensure the protection of civilians in all missions.

This budget supports our efforts to:

- Modernize the nuclear Triad to maintain a strong and effective strategic deterrent;
- Make critical investments in advanced technologies such as microelectronics, fifth-generation network (5G), and artificial intelligence (AI);
- Ensure access to precursors and key inputs by shoring up our critical supply chains;
- Accelerate investments in cutting-edge capabilities that will define the future fight, such as hypersonics and long-range fires; and
- Advance our joint warfighting concepts and commit to rapid experimentation and the fielding of emergent capabilities across warfighting domains.

The nuclear Triad remains the bedrock of our national defense and strategic deterrence, ensuring that no adversary believes it can employ nuclear weapons against the United States or our allies without risking devastating consequences.

But we must modernize our aging capabilities to ensure a credible deterrent for the future. As we do, we will review ongoing programs to assess their performance, schedule, risks, and projected costs. The FY 2022 budget invests in nuclear modernization efforts, and the Department will always seek to balance the best capability with the most cost-effective solution. We are also launching a nuclear posture review to ensure that we have the right capabilities matched with the national nuclear strategy.

Microelectronics enable many of today's capabilities, such as GPS, radar, command and control, and communications. Advanced microelectronics are key to nearly all of the Department's modernization efforts, from AI and hypersonic weapons systems to 5G wireless networks. The Department will continue to invest in programs to secure U.S. microelectronics interests; reverse the erosion of domestic innovation and supply; and establish a strong foundation for the next generation of microelectronics technology for DoD applications, while also sustaining current systems.

The U.S. military must also utilize the connectivity provided by 5G to operate with the speed, precision, and efficiency required in the future. Countries that master advanced communications technologies and connectivity will have long-term military advantages; for example, tomorrow's warfighters will be able to use local and expeditionary 5G networks to move considerable amounts of data to connect distant sensors and weapons into a dense, resilient battlefield network.

Similarly, the power of AI will help us modernize not only our warfighting decisions but also our business processes. We must be able to ingest, make sense of, and act on the vast amounts of information available to our warfighters on the battlefield and our decision-makers leading our Department. As I have said, we must understand faster, decide faster, and act faster. And we must do it all responsibly and at scale.

To support many of these efforts, we recently launched the Innovation Steering Group. This entity, chaired by the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, will advise me on science, technology, and technological transition. It will also empower efforts to make the changes to incentives, processes, and structures needed to truly innovate.

However, our efforts are not just focused on buying the capabilities of the future. We must fundamentally shift the way we think and the way we do business. We have not yet made full use of our most agile acquisition authorities, and we remain too risk-averse as a Department to move decisively beyond the capabilities of today and prepare for the future.

We also remain too reliant on critical minerals produced in or by China. To shore up our critical supply chains, we must focus on building our domestic production capabilities and growing our defense industrial base. That is why I am establishing the Supply Chain Risk Management Group, which will complement the work of the Industrial Base Council, both of which are chaired by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment.

Tomorrow's conflicts will be contests of speed within and across domains of conflict. The President's budget request invests in the development and testing of hypersonic strike capabilities, while enhancing existing long-range strike weapons to bolster deterrence and improve survivability and response timelines. Long-range fires provide key offensive capabilities that are cost-effective and improve deterrence. By enabling power projection from standoff ranges, the risk to critical U.S. assets decreases while the defensive burden imposed on the enemy increases.

The Department is also focused on developing enhanced joint warfighting concepts; expanding experimentation and fielding; shifting our budget and investment priorities to incentivize innovation; and improving acquisition systems while making use of more flexible ones to identify and deliver new capabilities at scale. These efforts will help build a force that is more resilient and integrated and that ensures decision advantage across all domains.

#### **Domain Challenges**

On land, the Army continues to invest in its six modernization priorities: long-range precision fires, future vertical lift, next-generation combat vehicle, air and missile defense, the network, and soldier lethality. To sustain the required funding levels for the development and procurement of next-generation capabilities, the Army reduced resources for several platforms as well as missiles, munitions, and conventional ammunition.

At sea, delivering all-domain naval power that can defend the homeland, deter adversaries, control the seas, and project power ashore in a conflict requires the Navy to balance current operational demands with the need for modernization. Maintaining naval power is critical to reassuring allies and signaling

U.S. resolve to potential adversaries. The budget request proposes responsible investments in the Navy fleet. It also continues the recapitalization of our strategic ballistic-missile submarine fleet and invests in remotely-operated and autonomous systems and the next-generation attack submarine program.

We also seek to divest of some platforms that do not contribute effectively to power-projection needs. The FY 2022 request reflects a strong commitment to continued U.S. naval dominance, including a properly sized and well-positioned defense industrial base. The health of the defense industrial base continues to be fundamental to achieving and sustaining our future fleet. Our shipbuilding and supporting vendor base constitute a national security imperative that must be steadily supported and grown to maintain a skilled workforce.

In the air domain, the Air Force will shift away from certain platforms in favor of key weapons systems such as the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, the F-15EX Eagle II, and the Next Generation Air Dominance aircraft to bolster the Air Force's ability to provide air superiority. Meanwhile, we will drive down sustainment costs, the fleet's average age, and inherent risk. At all times, we will work to ensure rigorous oversight of maintenance costs of the F-35.

Additionally, Air Force investments in hypersonics, the Long-Range Standoff Weapon, the B-21 Raider, and the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent will allow the Department to conduct global strike operations with precise conventional and unconventional capabilities, delivered from both standoff capabilities and penetrating platforms. Meanwhile, the Navy is developing the "Air Wing of the Future" to deliver game-changing lethality and survivability. These efforts include transforming Carrier Air Wings with the addition of the F-35C, E-2D, and CMV-22B aircraft and rapidly developing the MQ-25 Stingray.

Unfettered access to space and the freedom to maneuver there enhances every aspect of American power and underwrites the design of the joint force. Competitors including China and Russia are seeking to challenge the United States' advantage in space by developing weapons to deny or destroy U.S. space capabilities in conflict. The FY 2022 budget request strengthens our ability to deliver flexible capabilities and strategic options swiftly to outpace emerging threats in space.

Priority areas in this budget include investment in a resilient architecture of capabilities for missile warning and missile tracking; modernization of all segments of GPS to ensure precision and availability; development of cyber-resilient space command-and-control capabilities that can integrate with Joint All-Domain Command and Control; and investment in a broader base of domestic launch providers to further ensure our access to space.

In cyberspace, the United States is facing increasingly aggressive activity, including strategic campaigns by competitors, other nation-states, and proxies seeking to undermine our national security and democracy. The FY 2022 budget invests in cybersecurity and cyberspace activities that build on the goals in DoD's Cyber Strategy. The Cyber Operations portion of the budget supports U.S. Cyber Command's operational element, the Cyber Mission Force, which performs cyberspace operations to defend the nation, support the joint force, and secure DoD infrastructure and networks.

The budget also enhances our cybersecurity by mitigating key cyber deficiencies and strengthening our defensive capabilities to counter malicious attempts to exploit U.S. technology. Ultimately, we seek to improve joint force offensive capabilities to stay ahead of foreign threats.

### **Taking Care of Our People**

The dedicated men and women who make up the Department of Defense are the greatest strength and asset we have. That is why I have prioritized growing our talent, building resilience and readiness in the force, and ensuring appropriately accountable leadership as we address tough workforce issues.

The FY 2022 budget request prioritizes improvements to recruiting, retention, training, and education, and support for military spouses, caregivers, survivors, and dependents. We are also intensely focused on ending sexual assault and harassment and identifying and addressing extremist behavior in the Department, two of my top priorities.

We have established the Deputy's Workforce Council, a senior-level governance forum co-chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which is dedicated to addressing the most pressing people management, personnel policy, and total force requirements. This includes issues such as diversity, equity, and inclusion; military healthcare and childcare; sexual assault prevention and response; and more. This forum will ensure that workforce issues remain a critical priority for Department leadership, including the Secretaries of the Military Departments and our commanders, and will help bring the same vision and disciplined execution to workforce issues that the Department devotes to weapons systems and budgeting.

### **Growing Our Talent**

We accomplish our mission far better when we look to the full range of talent that the United States has to offer. That means drawing on a diversity of experiences and backgrounds, which will help drive creative thinking and adaptation, innovation, and cultural understanding. These will be vital to meet the complex challenges of today and the future.

Longstanding, systemic barriers for historically marginalized and underrepresented communities persist today. We must do all we can to ensure that we recruit and retain talent from the broadest pool of qualified, eligible candidates.

This spring, we updated the Department's policy on the open service of transgender people in the military. We welcome the recruitment, retention, and care of all qualified transgender individuals, and we look forward to their continued service with honor and dignity. The new policy reinforces that principle and also allows for a short implementation period for the Military Departments and Services to update their policies.

We also must continually grow and develop our workforce and create new avenues for advancement to drive the promotion and retention of our outstanding next-generation leaders. That requires thinking about our critical skill sets with an eye to the future, in particular by recruiting and training individuals in Science, Technology, Engineering, Math, and advanced technologies.

### **Building Resilience and Readiness**

In building a resilient and ready force, we must recognize the key role that our military families play in supporting our personnel. The health and well-being of our service members and their families are inextricably linked to the readiness of our force, and we must do all we can to take care of them.

The effects of COVID-19 have been especially tough for our military families, putting a particular strain on those who have lost childcare or civilian employment. The FY 2022 budget expands our efforts to provide high-quality childcare to our military families, and we continue to provide virtual career support through Military OneSource.

The budget also addresses efforts related to our military electronic health records, through which the Department is working to implement needed modernization most effectively. We must get military healthcare right for our service members and their families.

We will also remain focused on addressing suicide and mental health issues in our joint force by enhancing services and support while seeking to reduce the stigma around seeking help.

#### **Ensuring Appropriately Accountable Leadership**

We must provide our workforce with a safe, secure, and welcoming environment that empowers them to do their best work and grow personally and professionally. At the most basic level, that means creating a workplace free of discrimination, hate, and harassment. It also means guaranteeing swift and clear accountability to anyone who does not live up to the highest standards of the Department.

Sexual assault and harassment have no place in our country and no place in the Department of Defense. For too long, the Department's leadership has tried to get a handle on this challenge, but we have not made significant progress. One case of sexual assault or harassment is too many, and we are losing the confidence of our junior enlisted personnel and officers because we have yet to make significant progress against this challenge.

That is why, at the direction of the President, I established a 90-day Independent Review Commission (IRC) on sexual assault in the military. The IRC is responsible for reviewing DoD policies and processes related to sexual assault and harassment to determine where we can improve as a Department.

The IRC will soon complete its work on all four lines of effort—accountability, prevention, climate and culture, and victim care and support. I recently received an initial set of recommendations from the IRC Chair and provided the Department the opportunity to review those recommendations. It is critically important that we get this right, and I am grateful for congressional partnership as we seek to do that.

The vast majority of those who serve in uniform and their civilian colleagues do so with great honor and integrity. But extremism in our ranks can have an outsized impact on the Department, which will not be tolerated. The Department is focused on rooting out extremist behavior, and this fight is about our values, the Constitution, and the obligations in the Oath of Office we swear to uphold.

Behavior that defies or degrades our core values erodes unit cohesion as well as good order and discipline. It can also damage the health, morale, and readiness of the workforce.

I have moved immediately to meet this problem head-on. On February 5, I directed that within 60 days, commanding officers and supervisors at all levels conduct a one-day extremism stand-down to emphasize the importance of the Oath of Office we take, and to give military members and civilian employees the opportunity to participate in and continue to have this important conversation.

On April 9, I further directed several immediate actions to combat extremism, including reviews of what constitutes extremist activity, training for transitioning service members who may be targeted by extremist groups, and establishing the Countering Extremism Working Group to develop long-term recommendations to ensure all those who serve do so with honor and fealty to our values and our democracy. This must be a sustained effort, embraced by Department leadership.

#### **Succeeding Through Teamwork**

To accomplish anything we set out to do, the Department must operate as a unified team. That requires that we build unity among our leadership and ensure the right balance of civilian and military inputs to our decision-making and Department processes. In the last four months, we have made significant progress in rebuilding normal order in the Department to safeguard civilian oversight of the military.

In particular, we have established several bodies aimed at supporting the efforts of our Deputy's Management Action Group, the Department's principal governance body for management actions, including resource management and planning, programming, budgeting, and execution.

We have also established the Deputy's Workforce Council to address the Department's people management, personnel policy, and total force requirements, and task forces and working groups on COVID-19, China, climate change, and extremism.

Protecting the United States requires teamwork at every level: state, local, tribal, territorial, and federal. It requires cooperation with all who have a stake in our national security, including Congress, private industry, civil society, and the American people.

Our work to combat COVID-19 is a prime example of our commitment to working with our fellow Americans. Across the Executive Branch, DoD has worked closely with the Department of Homeland Security, including FEMA, the Department of Health and Human Services, and the State Department in efforts to end the pandemic. We are also investing in the defense industrial base to produce more personal protective equipment and test kits. And across the nation, we continue to work closely with the Department of Health and Human Services and State, local, tribal and territorial authorities to bring life-saving vaccines to the American people. At all times, our support to the nation is reliant on our partnership with Congress, which plays an integral role in providing the authorities, appropriations, and leadership necessary to have the most effective Department of Defense.

As part of our efforts to build teamwork into all we do, and in line with the President's intent, we are also leading with diplomacy, our first national security tool of choice. I am committed to ensuring that the Department of Defense continues to field a credible force able to back up the hard work of our diplomats around the world. We are working in lock-step with the State Department and other departments and agencies, and I took my first trip as Secretary of Defense with Secretary Blinken to reassure our allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region that this Administration is committed to our relationships there. Secretary Blinken and I also traveled to Europe to assure our allies and partners of our commitment to the region.

When I traveled to NATO Headquarters earlier this spring, I shared a key message: we must consult together, decide together, and act together. Global crises, such as the pandemic, climate change, and



economic downturns, present significant dangers that span our borders. In many countries, internal strife, brought on by corruption, inequality and polarization, and transnational threats, such as violent extremism and criminal organizations, threaten stability around the alliance's rim. In Afghanistan, we went in together and we will leave together, after a substantial consultative effort. Meanwhile, aggressive and coercive behaviors from emboldened strategic competitors such as China and Russia reinforce the importance of collective security.

#### **Conclusion**

The challenges we face are many, but the Department stands ready to defend the United States against any enemy, foreign or domestic, just as we always have. We remain resolute in our commitment to protect the nation and will not shy away from any challenge.

The FY 2022 budget will help us fulfill that responsibility, and we are grateful for your support in working with us as we build the Department of the future. We need your help.

We also remain grateful for the tremendous trust that the United States places in our soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines, guardians, and DoD civilian employees, all of whom will continue to defend our democracy, our people, and our way of life. Thanks to them, we will always operate from a position of strength. Thank you.

**Lloyd J. Austin III**  
**Secretary of Defense**

Lloyd James Austin III was sworn in as the 28th Secretary of Defense on January 22, 2021. Mr. Austin is the principal assistant to the President in all matters relating to the Department of Defense and serves on the National Security Council.

Mr. Austin was born in Mobile, Alabama, and raised in Thomasville, Georgia. He graduated from the United States Military Academy with a Bachelor of Science degree and a commission in the Infantry. He holds a Master of Arts degree in counselor education from Auburn University, and a Master of Business Management from Webster University. He is a graduate of the Infantry Officer Basic and Advanced courses, the Army Command and General Staff College, and the Army War College.

His 41-year career in the Army included command at the corps, division, battalion, and brigade levels. Mr. Austin was awarded the Silver Star for his leadership of the Army's 3rd Infantry Division during the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Seven years later, he would assume the duties of Commanding General of United States Forces – Iraq, overseeing all combat operations in the country.

After a tour as the Army's Vice Chief of Staff, Mr. Austin concluded his uniformed service as the Commander of U.S. Central Command, responsible for all military operations in the Middle East and Afghanistan. In this assignment, he led U.S. and coalition efforts to battle ISIS in Iraq and Syria. He retired from the Army in April, 2016.

Since his retirement from military service, Mr. Austin served on the Boards of Directors for Raytheon Technologies, Nucor, and Tenet Healthcare.

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

STATEMENT OF  
GENERAL MARK A. MILLEY, USA  
20<sup>TH</sup> CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BUDGET HEARING  
JUNE 23, 2021

### **Introduction**

It remains my distinct honor and privilege to represent the Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines and Guardians of the United States Joint Forces-The most capable military in the world. Our troops are the best led, best equipped, and best trained force anywhere. Alongside our allies and partners, American Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines and Guardians are currently standing watch in 165 countries and conducting operations that keep Americans safe.

The United States Military is a critical component of national power which in concert with our diplomatic efforts, economic engine and overriding hope of the American message deters our adversaries and preserves peace. We are prepared to fight and win if those who seek to attack the United States and our allies and partners are undeterred.

The Joint Force appreciates the work that our elected representatives do to ensure that we have the resources needed to train, equip, and man the force in order to be ready. The days of the Budget Control Act of 2011 and repeated continuing resolutions which eroded readiness are hopefully behind us for good.

The Joint Force will deliver modernization of our armed forces and security to the people of the United States at the FY 2022 budget request of \$715 billion. While it is a modest increase from the enacted FY21 budget, it is a significant commitment of treasure that the people of the United States have entrusted to us and we will work diligently to ensure it is spent prudently in the best interest of the Nation. This FY 2022 budget is the result of hard choices in a year in which the nation has suffered economic hardship due to the COVID-19 pandemic. In alignment with the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance (INSSG) this budget delivers a ready, agile, and capable Joint Force that will compete, deter and win across all domains and which is postured for continued dominance in the future.

Consistent predictable budgets informed by the will of the American people are critical to our Nation's defense. The passage of timely budgets enables planning and prioritization.

### **Strategic Environment**

The current strategic landscape is witnessing rapid change and potential for increased threat to the peace and stability of various regions and for the world.

**China:** is our #1 geostrategic security challenge. History is not deterministic, war with China is not inevitable. China is clearly an increasingly capable strategic competitor and we need to keep our relationship at competition, not conflict. This is best done through integrated deterrence where the United States remains militarily strong relative to China and we retain military overmatch in all the various domains of war. If we remain militarily superior to our adversary, then conflict is less likely.

China is challenging the peaceful status quo in the Pacific, and is intent on revising the global international order by midcentury. China is conducting large-scale exercises in the region with an emphasis on amphibious landing, joint fires, and maritime strike scenarios. These actions threaten our allies and partners' autonomy, jeopardize freedom of navigation, overflight and other lawful uses of the sea, and compromise regional peace and stability. In short, China has and continues to develop significant nuclear, space, cyber, land, air, and maritime military capabilities.

**Russia:** retains a large nuclear capability to deter and threaten the United States and our allies and partners. Russia has also demonstrated the capability and will to conduct complex malicious cyber activities targeting American protected digital infrastructure, both military and commercial. Increasingly **Russia** uses irregular warfare and mercenary contract support, along with regular troops, to conduct aggressive operations, the most notable being illegal seizure of Ukraine's Crimean Peninsula and the ongoing conflict in eastern Ukraine. Its actions in Libya as well as Syria and elsewhere demonstrate Moscow's relative flexibility, resourcefulness, and opportunism.

**North Korea:** continues to enhance its ballistic missile capability and possesses the technical capacity to present a real danger to the US homeland as well as our allies and partners across the Indo-Pacific. They show no signs of moderation in their focus on military capability at the expense of their most vulnerable citizens and peace of the Korean Peninsula.

**Iran:** The current irregular warfare conflict between Iran and its neighbors threatens to push the Middle East into broader regional instability. Through its funding of terrorist activities, and a proxy army inside the borders of its neighbors, and through its ballistic missile programs, Iran seeks to revise the regional order and balance of power in Iran's favor.

**Violent extremist organizations** such as Al-Qaeda, ISIS, Al Shabaab, and others continue to export their terror, destruction, and destabilization. Until and unless the root causes of instability that give rise to these types of groups are resolved, we will continue to deal with their attacks to undermine legitimate governments worldwide. The root causes can only be effectively addressed by including governments of the region and we can best influence outcomes with diplomatic, economic, information and stability efforts along with train, advise, assist and intelligence sharing. Through coalition efforts and in concert with the local governments affected by these groups, we will continue to ensure they do not possess the capacity and capability to exert their will.

As we move into the middle of the twenty first century, it is imperative that we **maintain our technological advantage** over our competitors. As the diffusion of military technology permeates the globe, it will become increasingly difficult to maintain the advantage that we've enjoyed for last seven decades.

This year's budget will adequately fund our department priorities, with bias on the future while ensuring we continue to deter the adversaries of today. The character of warfare is changing in a fundamental way. How we fight, the weapons, doctrine, organizations and leader development

are all undergoing a transformation not seen in scale and scope since the decades between World War I and World War II. The current rapid and radical change in technology along with its diffusive nature will provide decisive advantage to those nation states that best master the convergence and capability in precision munitions, all domain sensors, all domain command and control, robotics, hypersonics and artificial intelligence. Our collective success or failure to adapt the United States military to this future as a Nation is an increasingly challenging security environment.

**Climate change** presents a growing threat to U.S. national security interests and defense objectives. The adverse impacts of climate change are already being felt across the Joint Force in terms of increased operational demands, adverse impacts on our installations and new requirements for equipment and formations able to operate in a world defined by climate change and as a contributing factor to regional instability.

As we enter the third quarter of this fiscal year, it is imperative that we **finish the fight against COVID-19**. The Joint Force has contributed planning and logistics expertise during all phases of the pandemic response and continues to assist with vaccination efforts. We will continue to be able to provide equipment, personnel, and vaccine deployment and development assistance when called upon to assist. We all should be very proud of the conduct of our Joint Force and our ability to continue to deploy and defend the interests of the United States during this unprecedented global event as the pandemic has only modestly impacted the Joint Force's readiness.

Our alliances and partnerships are key to maintaining the international rules-based order that offer the best opportunities for peace and prosperity for America and the globe. This budget allows us to build our partners and allies capabilities, foster interoperability, and strengthen relationships. Doing so allows us, our allies, and partners to counter the coercion of our strategic competitors, the malign activity of regional threats, and meet the varied security challenges state and non-state actors, terrorism, climate change, and pandemics or any other threat that may emerge. We are stronger when we operate closely with our allies and partners.

#### **Readiness and Modernization**

The Joint Force is in a position where modernization is an imperative. We must avoid the tyranny of the now at the expense of our future. The United States as a nation has always had the advantage and time to conduct a long build up prior to the beginning of hostilities. The operating environment of the future will likely not afford us the luxury of time to project force so having modernized forces in sufficient size and readiness will be the key to sustaining deterrence and maintaining the peace and if deterrence fails then fight and win.

The Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, National Defense Strategy, and National Military Strategy discuss the re-emergence of strategic competition and directs the Joint Force to develop the capabilities and capacity to counter near-peer threats. Strategic adversaries are accelerating military modernization; to maintain military advantage, the Joint Force must adapt to the future operating environment. It is imperative that we maintain US technological

advantage over our adversaries and improve the concepts and doctrine which organize our conduct of warfare. In the fall of 2019, the Secretary of Defense tasked the Joint Staff to develop a threat-informed **Joint Warfighting Concept** (JWC) to address strategic conflict. The Joint Warfighting Concept will guide and revitalize how we organize, train, and equip the Joint Force. It will constantly evolve to help us shape our strategic environment and future operations. The JWC is a multi-year effort to develop a comprehensive approach for joint operations against future threats and provide a guide for future force design and development. Supporting concepts to the JWC describe key warfighting functions. They are fires, logistics, C2, and information advantage. The **Joint All Domain Command and Control (JADC2)** framework enables the holistic development and realization of the JWC and Supporting Concepts. JADC2 today is beginning to deliver the capability to sense, and act at speeds greater than our adversaries. JADC2 uses data, artificial intelligence, machine learning and predictive analytics to create decisive information advantage at all echelons in the Joint Force.

Utilizing cloud-based networks and agile software development, our modular open sourced systems will deliver the necessary strategic operational advantage required within both competition and conflict. Our JADC2 architecture is increasingly providing the attributes and interfaces to transition to a data-centric force able to operate at scale within multiple security levels and across all-domains and the electro-magnetic spectrum.

We will also revise our leader development Joint Professional Military Education to support the JWC. Specifically, we are increasing the amount of JPME devoted to the study of the changing character of war and both China and Russia as potential adversaries.

In addition to adapting our concepts, doctrine, training, and military education, we must continue to invest in capabilities that close gaps or sustain our advantage. Key investments in this budget are **nuclear modernization, long range fires, hypersonic technology, shipbuilding, space and cyber.**

**Nuclear modernization:** The **nuclear triad** has been the bedrock of our strategic deterrent for decades. Together, the three legs of the Triad allow us to hedge against geopolitical, technological, operational and programmatic risks. Our Cold War era systems have been extended beyond their original service lives and we must recapitalize our nuclear enterprise. Modernization of our nuclear forces, weapons complex, and requisite nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) capabilities are a high priority. The Department projects the cost of modernization will peak at 7% of the DoD budget in 2029 before decreasing again. If these projections bear out, compared to past modernization efforts, the cost would be significantly less as a proportion of the overall DoD budget – the nuclear recapitalization in the 1980s cost 10.6% at its peak and 17% in the early-1960s.

**Long range fires:** provide key offensive capabilities that are both cost-effective and cost-imposing means of improving deterrence. By enabling power projection from standoff ranges, the risk to critical U.S. assets decreases while the defensive burden imposed upon the enemy increases. China has thousands of ground-launched theater-range missiles in its arsenal that

would be difficult for the U.S. to counter given its current inventories. Investments in long range missiles are a cost-effective strategy that improves our ability to compete with China. Recent budget requests have enhanced the lethality and resilience of the Joint Force by developing and expanding the long-range fires portfolio. PB22 funding is essential to mitigate offensive fires capacity shortcomings, enhance operational flexibility in multiple domains, and accelerate the transition of hypersonic weapons from development to procurement and fielding. PB22 balances long-range fires investments between both proven solutions and higher risk/high-payoff systems, such as hypersonic fires.

**Hypersonic technology:** Hypersonics are a suite of capabilities that provide transformational warfighting capability to our Joint Force. Our competitors are investing in this capability and in order to provide our Joint Force with the best possible technology we will need to invest to defend the nation, our allies and partners.

**Legacy platform divestment:** Continuing to purchase and maintain legacy equipment takes needed defense dollars away from the acquisition of systems that are needed for modernization. We need to divest select legacy platform to ensure that every defense dollar spent on programs and equipment that will be relevant in the next fight.

**Shipbuilding:** The industrial base continues to be the fundamental enabler for achieving and sustaining the Navy's future fleet. Our **shipbuilding** and supporting vendor base are a national security capability that needs support to grow and maintain a skilled workforce. The FY 2022 President's Budget reflects the Administration's strong commitment to continued American naval dominance, including a properly sized and well-positioned industrial base to meet the demands of our current and future defense needs. Commitment to the steady acquisition profiles underlying our budget is key to ensure the industrial base achieves the capability and capacity required to build and maintain the Navy's future fleet. The conclusions from past force structure analyses have been fully considered and simple ship count is an incomplete metric, as it fails to fully capture the capability, payload capacity, and employment of ship classes in the fleet. This budget specifically procures warships and submarines with credible combat power to deter China while continuing remotely operated ship development and investing in the industrial base to support fleet modernization and on time delivery of the Columbia class submarine.

**Space:** Space is essential to our way of life; space capabilities are essential to our economy, quality of life, our exploration initiatives, and our ability to wage war. Competitors are testing and fielding space weapons that threaten not just our National interests and advancements in space, but those of all nations that rely upon space. Russia has recently tested both a ground-based anti-satellite missile and an on-orbit anti-satellite weapon prototype which threatens our space capabilities. In 2007, China destroyed a satellite to demonstrate their anti-satellite capabilities and the resulting debris will remain in orbit, threatening commercial, civil, and national security satellites for more than a century. Left unsecured, our capabilities in space may become strategic vulnerabilities.



**Cyber:** Adversaries continue to use operations in the cyber domain as a means to compete with the U.S. and pursue a position of advantage in crisis and conflict. Malign cyberspace actors increasingly exploit supply chain vulnerabilities, such as commercial software, to gain network access and conduct cyber operations against U.S. citizens, organizations, and institutions. The low cost/barrier to entry and anonymity that cyberspace provides make this domain a priority focus for adversaries to asymmetrically compete without escalation. Therefore, we must increase our ability to compete in cyberspace and ensure all elements of informational power are integrated into operations, activities, and efforts to deter our adversaries and protect the U.S. homeland. This requires DoD to invest in partners and technology, building and maturing cyber operations and readiness, reducing risk to weapon systems and critical infrastructure, strengthening cybersecurity, and improving network resiliency.

#### **Advanced Capabilities**

The changing character of war necessitates that we continue to modernize and innovate. We must be able to have clear linkage from sensors to shooters in an advanced information environment with the technology present to protect our warfighters, critical assets, and homeland. Investment in ensuring reliable supplies of **microelectronics**, advanced network technology such as **5G**, and **artificial intelligence** will ensure that we maintain our technological edge over our adversaries. The current globally distributed supply chains present vulnerabilities to the Joint Forces' ability to acquire necessary parts and technology in the event of a crisis that either prevents the manufacture, or shipping of material to our units in the field.

Advanced **microelectronics** are the key element in all of the Department's modernization efforts, from **Artificial Intelligence** and **Hypersonic Weapon Systems** to **Fifth Generation Wireless Networks**. High-speed connectivity will transform the way militaries operate. Tomorrow's warfighters will use local and expeditionary **5G** networks to move massive amounts of data to connect distant sensors and weapons into a dense, resilient battlefield network. Communication networks are fundamental to how the United States trains, plans, and engages adversaries. The U.S. military must utilize the connectivity provided by 5G to operate with the speed, precision, and efficiency necessary to remain effective and survivable in the future.

**U.S. Army:** The Army faces an inflection point that requires innovation, creativity, and entrepreneurship in the application of combat power. The battlefield is increasingly faster, more lethal, and more distributed. Overmatch will belong to the side that can make better decisions faster. To meet emerging challenges, the Army is transforming to provide the Joint Force with the speed, range, and convergence of cutting edge technologies that will generate the decision dominance and overmatch required to win the next fight. The Army's materiel modernization transformation is based on the six modernization priorities announced in 2018: Long Range Precision Fires, Next Generation Combat Vehicle, Future Vertical Lift, the Army Network, Air and Missile Defense, and Soldier Lethality. By 2035, the Army will realize its vision of a multi-domain force. Decisive outcomes in war are ultimately achieved on land where people live and maintaining a capable land force in the United States Army is key to our overall deterrence capability and national security.

**U.S. Navy:** America is a maritime nation. Our security and prosperity are inextricably linked to the seas. To sustain America's advantage at sea, we must deliver combat-ready forces to deter aggression and keep the seas free and open. Deploying battle-ready ships, submarines, and squadrons around the world—from the South China Sea to the Arctic—deters aggression, reaffirms our commitment to allies and partners, and keeps the seas open and free. Readiness underpins our forward-engaged posture and touches all elements of the Navy, from our shipyards and aviation depots to the steaming and flying hours our Sailors use to hone their skills. This budget prioritizes a fleet that is ready for combat over a larger fleet that is not ready to fight.

**U.S. Marine Corps:** The Marine Corps is optimizing the force for competition in the vast littoral regions of the globe by modernizing the force for Strategic Competition. As codified in law, Marines serve in cooperation with the Navy in the conduct of naval campaigns. As international relations are defined more by periods of cooperation and competition, the Marine Corps will focus on the competition phase before conflict by generating a persistent reconnaissance force for the Joint Force that has organic long-range, precision fires with mobility. Thus far, they have fully invested in their modernization by divesting of capabilities and capacities that no longer offer the best value for a maritime force in the contact and blunt layer.

**U.S. Air Force:** Moving forward, the Air Force will prioritize its resources to transform our equipment, support our Airmen, and bolster our core missions. To deter and defeat today's competitors and tomorrow's adversaries, this budget continues to re-capitalize our Air Force. The Air Force is retiring legacy platforms with a bias toward the future, so that we can focus on aircraft that can penetrate high end defenses. A cutting edge Air Force that is without peer is fundamental to successful land or sea operations and is the key element to maintaining deterrence and sustaining the force.

**U.S. Space Force:** The Space Force investments accelerate modernization of the entire Joint Force. Space Force capabilities underwrite, enhance, and enable Joint Force operations. The Space Force protects U.S. capabilities and freedom of operation outpacing actions of our competitors.

Ongoing actions to fully resource the United States Space Force (USSF) including transfer of the Space Development Agency (SDA) and unit transfers from the Army and Navy, will enhance the USSF's ability to organize, train, equip and present forces who can compete, deter and if necessary prevail should war initiate in, or extend to space.

### **People First / People and Families**

People are our most important resource in the Joint Force. We must ensure that we are doing all that we can do to take care of and guard our most critical resource. Taking care of people is a critical readiness issue, it decisively impacts unit cohesion, recruitment, retention, and confidence in leadership. The Joint Force has been working to rid our military from the scourge of **sexual assault and sexual harassment** for years. We must do more to finally implement real and lasting change. Sexual assault undermines our military values and undercuts our ability to field a cohesive fighting force. **Sexual assault and harassment** prevention, response and accountability are leadership issues. We will hold DoD leaders at every level **responsible** for building a safe environment for our people, guaranteeing anyone who does not act within the highest standards of the Joint Force is held accountable.

We will not tolerate actions that go against the fundamental principles of the oath we share, including actions associated with **extremist** ideologies. Extremism also destroys readiness because it destroys cohesion. Extremism presents a complex and unique challenge to DoD. We must meet this head-on, and place the highest importance on treating all personnel with dignity and respect, in an environment free from discrimination, harassment, and maltreatment. We must be ever vigilant in our efforts to identify and counter extremist behavior within our ranks.

We continuously earn the trust of our service members and their families by ensuring that they continue to receive excellent quality of life benefits. Our premier all-volunteer force will continue to be the greatest in history only if we continuously affirm how much we value the service that our military and civilian members provide their country.

The Joint Force is committed to **growing our talent** and ensuring that all who meet the requirements to serve are able to serve. The Joint Force competes for the talent of America's youth along with every other business, and organization who seeks our Nation's best and brightest. Service to Nation is a worthwhile cause and we welcome all who are eligible to serve. Despite our inclusive approach only 29% of today's youth are eligible for military Service without a waiver. The Joint Force's objective is to field the most lethal and combat effective fighting force in the world. We will continue to support the accessions of all qualified people to all jobs and positions within the Joint Force.

The Nation's largest employer-sponsored child care program supports our Joint Force, with more than 27,000 staff members providing daily care for more than 160,000 children aged birth to 12 years in approximately 700 nationally-accredited child care centers. **Taking care of families** is a holistic approach that ensures that our troops are ready to fight because they know their families are well cared for.

**Housing** our forces is critical to ensure that our junior and most vulnerable families are able to live in a healthy environment wherever the Nation calls them to serve. Families don't raise their hand and join the service. We as a nation owe it to our troops to ensure they have what they need. The Military Housing Privatization Initiative (MHPI) reform efforts are actions that will improve the tenant experience, rebuilt tenant trust, and maintain MHPI housing project financial

viability. The MHPI Tenant Bill of Rights (BOR), issued in February 2020, is a visible and important commitment in DoD's larger effort to regain resident trust.

#### **Achieving Through Teamwork**

We in the Joint Force are a team of teams. Sworn to support and defend the constitution, teamwork is our watchword. There is no daylight between the services when it comes to ensuring the security of the American people. The Joint Force is a collective effort, and no services ever fights alone.

Joint exercises with all services, allies and partners participating are a key component to our warfighting readiness. Ensuring that exercises such as Defender Pacific and Defender Europe continue and that we fastidiously increase the number of participants and complexity in these exercises will guarantee the best preparation for war and a mechanism to demonstrate our commitment and resolve to those who wish to question our friends and our capabilities.

#### **Conclusion**

The United States Joint Force is a flexible and adaptable force ready to deter, fight, and win our Nation's wars. The PB22 budget request increases the readiness of the force by developing the Joint Force of the future, ensuring people are our number one priority, and positioning us to achieve through teamwork. America's network of allies and partners is a strategic source of strength. Many enemies have grossly underestimated the United States and the American people in the past. They've underestimated our national resolve. They've underestimated our capability, our skill and our combat power, and each made a fatal choice which ended with their enrollment in the dustbin of history. The same will be true of any enemy that makes that mistake today or tomorrow. We are ready now, and will remain so in the future, we are also facing tough strategic choices, and we are being increasingly challenged with very capable potential adversaries, clearly acting in opposition of our interests. Our job as your Joint Force, our contract with the American people is that we, the United States military will always be ready to deter our enemies and if deterrence fails then to fight and win.

**Mark A. Milley**  
**Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff**

General Mark A. Milley is the 20th Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the nation's highest-ranking military officer, and the principal military advisor to the President, Secretary of Defense, and National Security Council.

Prior to becoming Chairman on October 1, 2019, General Milley served as the 39th Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army.

A native of Massachusetts, General Milley graduated from Princeton University in 1980, where he received his commission from Army ROTC.

General Milley has had multiple command and staff positions in eight divisions and Special Forces throughout the last 39 years to include command of the 1st Battalion, 506th Infantry, 2nd Infantry Division; the 2nd Brigade, 10th Mountain Division; Deputy Commanding General, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault); Commanding General, 10th Mountain Division; Commanding General, III Corps; and Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces Command.

While serving as the Commanding General, III Corps, General Milley deployed as the Commanding General, International Security Assistance Force Joint Command and Deputy Commanding General, U.S. Forces Afghanistan. General Milley's joint assignments also include the Joint Staff operations directorate and as a Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense.

General Milley's operational deployments include the Multi-National Force and Observers, Sinai, Egypt; Operation Just Cause, Panama; Operation Uphold Democracy, Haiti; Operation Joint Endeavor, Bosnia-Herzegovina; Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraq; and three tours during Operation Enduring Freedom, Afghanistan. He also deployed to Somalia and Colombia.

In addition to his bachelor's degree in political science from Princeton University, General Milley has a master's degree in international relations from Columbia University and one from the U.S. Naval War College in national security and strategic studies. He is also a graduate of the MIT Seminar XXI National Security Studies Program.

General Milley and his wife, Hollyanne, have been married for more than 34 years and have two children.



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**DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD**

JUNE 23, 2021

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OFFICE OF THE VICE CHAIRMAN  
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

The Honorable Michael Turner  
2082 Rayburn House Office Building  
U.S. House of Representatives  
Washington, D.C. 20515

JUN 22 2021

Dear Representative Turner:

I sincerely appreciate your continued support of the Department of Defense (DoD) and Department of Energy's (DOE) shared commitment to prioritize the Nation's nuclear deterrent and I thank you for providing a recent opportunity for me to join my DoD and DOE colleagues to speak with you about this critical subject.

As our nuclear weapon stockpile ages, it is essential that we continue to modernize our aging DOE infrastructure. As I have testified previously, my greatest infrastructure concern is any delay that fails to meet the requirement for plutonium pit production at the following levels: 30 pits per year (ppy) in 2026, and 80 ppy in 2030. This production rate and timeline was confirmed by the DoD in 2014. Re-establishing this capacity for sustained pit production is essential to address the stockpile's aging components, support modernization, and improve safety and resiliency for an uncertain future.

I support the current National Nuclear Security Agency (NNSA) plan to achieve new pit production through a two-site approach: Los Alamos and Savannah River. This approach gives us the best chance for meeting the requirement.

<sup>VJ2</sup>

JOHN E. HYTEN  
General, U.S. Air Force

**USSPACECOM Remaining at Peterson AFB is Best for American Taxpayers**

by

General (Retired) Ed Eberhart, US Air Force

Lieutenant General (Retired) Ed Anderson, US Army

The Trump Administration's January 13<sup>th</sup>, 2021 decision to move U.S. Space Command from Colorado Springs, CO to Huntsville, AL lacked evidence that the cost was a priority. Issues with the process and criteria used during decision making have been exposed, leading the Department of Defense (DOD) Inspector General and the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to investigate the last-minute decision to base U.S. Space Command at Redstone Arsenal. Others have raised concerns about the move as a major distraction to mission readiness during this moment in time when our adversaries are moving forward quickly. Congress and the taxpayer are owed a complete assessment of cost during this pause for investigation and review.

A full assessment of the cost of the project should include the potential cost savings of keeping the headquarters in its current facility, Building 1 at Peterson AFB. Since the Air Force began the initial basing process for U.S. Space Command in 2019, there have been changes to the scope of the basing requirements. Since the stand-up of the provisional headquarters at Peterson AFB, the Air Force has reduced the number of needed personnel from 1,800 to 1,387, and they are considering a reduction to 1,100.

The establishment of a provisional headquarters at Peterson AFB offers the Air Force an opportunity to look at the benefits of keeping U.S. Space Command in Building 1 over the costs of

relocating the headquarters. This analysis was not done in the basing process, resulting in a highly competitive option being left off the table.

#### **Costs of Remaining at Peterson AFB**

Building 1 is currently meeting the needs of 1,600 personnel. Building 1 could serve as a permanent headquarters for U.S. Space Command, with current personnel projections between 1,100 and 1,400. The Air Force is investing over \$27 million at Peterson AFB now, to establish the provisional headquarters for the next six years. This includes investing in a newly completed joint operations center, additional classified facilities, and renovations to the leadership quarters.

Additional renovations would be required for U.S. Space Command to remain in Building 1 for the next 25 years; however, the costs of these renovations is lower than building new considering the investment that has already taken place at Peterson AFB. The additional improvements include uninterruptible power generation which would cost approximately \$5 million, and approximately \$20 million in HVAC, and other upgrades. Colorado Springs Utilities provides power to Peterson AFB. Conversations began in February 2019 to explore siting power generation on, or near, Peterson AFB to provide reliability and resiliency. The generation planning process is evolving, and Colorado Springs Utilities is committed to working with Peterson and U.S. Space Command to provide the appropriate service connections to meet their reliability and resiliency needs in a manner that is cost neutral for the project.

The U.S. Space Force's Space Operations Command (SPOC) currently shares Building 1 with U.S. Space Command provisional headquarters, and the Department of the Air Force plans for the SPOC to use Building 1 long term, so the re-location of its personnel must be considered in total cost of Space Command. A commercial building outside Peterson AFB perimeter has long been considered a possible addition to the installation. It has the necessary square footage for the SPOC at a purchase and

renovation price of \$35 million. The table below provides a summary of the costs needed to enable U.S.

Space Command to remain in Building 1. Table 1:

<b>Additional Costs for U.S. Space Command to Remain in Building 1, Peterson AFB</b>	
<b>Description</b>	<b>Cost</b>
Uninterruptible power generator	\$ 5,000,000.00
HVAC upgrades	\$ 20,000,000.00
Purchase building for SPOC	\$ 20,000,000.00
Renovations to SPOC building	\$ 15,000,000.00
<b>Total Costs</b>	<b>\$ 60,000,000.00</b>

#### **Additional Savings to remaining at Peterson AFB**

**Mission Readiness:** The most recent Combatant Command to complete a new headquarters facility was U.S. Strategic Command at Offutt AFB in Omaha, NE. Completed in 2019, the project was completed in 7 years and cost \$1.3 billion. Using this as an estimate for the potential cost of constructing a new U.S. Space Command headquarter in Huntsville, AL, allowing Space Command to remain in Building 1 saves taxpayers \$1.24 billion dollars. In addition to the cost savings, Space Command could reach full mission capability up to 7 years faster. Those seven years are vital for a critical national security mission.

**Communications Networks:** The saving estimates do not include the costs of replicating, in Huntsville, the survivable communication infrastructure already existing in the Pikes Peak region. If our nation's adversaries create a conflict in the space domain, U.S. Space Command requires HEMP (high altitude electromagnetic pulse) survivable communications. This infrastructure was not considered in the basing process, yet, GEN Dickinson, the Commander of U.S. Space Command, said in testimony to the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) on April 21, 2021, that a survivable communications system would have to be built in Alabama. A survivable fiber network already exists in Colorado, enabling all vital space assets to communicate through any conflict. Furthermore, retired commanders of AFSPC have stated if they were the commander of U.S. Space Command their preferred warfighting command

center would be either the National Space Defense Center at Schriever AFB or Cheyenne Mountain AFS, which are 15 and 30-minute drives from Peterson AFB, respectively. Reproducing the benefits provided by mission partners in Colorado Springs is impossible and building out the required communication infrastructure is a significant cost.

**Workforce Costs:** Loss of civilian and contractor personnel with a move to Huntsville degrades readiness and adds to the cost. Reports indicate 75-80% of personnel declined to move when the Missile Defense Agency moved from Virginia to Alabama. A report by the Government Accountability Office (GAO-21-279) on April 7, 2021, states that military readiness is degraded following years of high operations tempo supporting multiple contingency operations. The DOD should be looking at every opportunity to enhance readiness, rather than add risk to the mission thru personnel losses.

In testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee on April 20, 2021, and the HASC on April 21, 2021, GEN Dickinson expressed the vital importance of U.S. Space Command's workforce. He responded to a question from Senator Tuberville by saying that civilians "are absolutely the bedrock of the command today and in the future," and he responded to Senator Shaheen saying that "we will do everything we can to incentivize them to make the move." Despite the Combatant Commander's strong desire to maximize civilian retention during a potential move, Air Force personnel informed Colorado Lieutenant Governor Diana Primavera and Colorado Springs Mayor John Suthers on February 25, 2021, that the cost of moving civilians was not considered. This means that the true cost savings would exceed the estimated \$1.2 billion savings taxpayers achieve by keeping U.S. Space Command at Peterson AFB, as relocation incentives were not factored.

### **Conclusion**

Both Congress and the Biden Administration need to review the U.S. Space Command basing process to ensure it adequately accounted for all costs and options. Such a review will conclude that U.S.

Space Command is already renovating its current location and remaining there will save over \$1.2 billion, while achieving full mission capability up to seven years faster. Further savings will accrue from use of existing infrastructure and eliminating personnel moves, which have the added benefit of enhancing mission performance. U.S. Space Command was re-established due to the criticality of its mission. Making a location decision without fully evaluating cost and time to achieve full mission capability has resulted in a decision that makes America vulnerable. Ultimately, it is up to Congress and the Biden administration to place national security over politics and ensure that the final home for U.S. Space Command is one that makes America safe and saves taxpayers money.



OFFICE OF THE SUPERINTENDENT  
 UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY  
 WEST POINT, NEW YORK 10996-5000

The Honorable Michael Waltz  
 United States Representative  
 216 Cannon House Office Building  
 Washington, DC 20515

Dear Representative Waltz:

Thank you for your letter dated April 8, 2021 regarding recent diversity, equity, and inclusion efforts on-going here at the United States Military Academy (USMA). The mission of the United States Military Academy is to educate, train, and inspire the Corps of Cadets so that each graduate is a commissioned leader of character dedicated to the values of duty, honor, and country, and prepared for a career of professional excellence and service to the nation as an officer in the United States Army. Extremism in any form is antithetical to the values of our Army and Nation and has no place at West Point.

As a world-class institution of higher education, an overarching goal of our academic program is for graduates to integrate knowledge and skills from a variety of disciplines so that they can anticipate and respond appropriately to opportunities and challenges in a changing world. Achieving that goal requires us to expose our cadets, staff, and faculty to diverse thoughts and perspectives. Through this exposure, we aim to teach our cadets how to think, not what to think.

We conducted an Honorable Living Day and a follow-on Diversity and Leadership Conference on September 23-24, 2020. This event did not occur in February. This was the fourth Honorable Living Day that we have conducted, with previous days focused on combating sexual assault, establishing healthy relationships, and living honorably, going back to the spring of 2019. The curriculum included a cadet panel, a virtual guest lecture by Dr. Steve Robbins (a leading scholar in human behavior related to inclusion and diversity) regarding the neuroscience of inclusivity, and small unit-level discussions. Cadets were given the option to attend a follow-on seminar by Dr. Robbins who then spoke about unconscious bias from a neuroscience standpoint and offered great perspective on the subject. It was a powerful lecture, and his words focused not on race but rather human behavior. Although the Defamation Experience was originally scheduled as a second option for a follow-on cadet seminar, it was taken off the final agenda and no cadets participated in this event.

The slides referenced were not a part of the curriculum for activities in September. These slides were a part of a mandatory social media training session conducted by our Public Affairs Office as a part of Commandant's Time Training, a special session set aside for our Corps of Cadets' leadership to conduct military program training during the weekly schedule. This training was conducted to give cadets a broad understanding of the social media landscape and allow cadets a glimpse into how various social media posts may be interpreted. Our young cadets lack understanding of the impact of social media on themselves, others around them, and on organizational effectiveness. The slides in question were used to discuss potential racially charged interpretations of various social media posts and the appropriateness of racial commentary on social media. Please note that within the same slide deck there was a purposeful discussion about the emerging threat of China and its use of social media to sway public opinion.

We did host a lecture by Dr. Carol Anderson who is the Charles Howard Candler Professor of African American Studies at Emory University. This lecture was not mandatory for all cadets. She was invited as a guest lecturer for two courses: HI463 – Race, Ethnicity, and Nation and HI460 – Civil Rights Movements. These courses are upper-level electives with a total enrollment of approximately 40 cadets and are not part of the core curriculum nor are they required electives for any of our History majors. These courses are purely elective in nature. Approximately 100 additional personnel attended the guest lecture voluntarily in addition to the cadets enrolled in the courses. Dr. Anderson spoke extemporaneously with the audience virtually. She described the subtle ways by which black Americans have been disadvantaged through historical American

policy. She closed the session by encouraging the audience to consider 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> order effect of policies and for the audience to reconsider a zero-sum view of society that pits subgroups against each other. Rather, she reinforced the strength of the Nation in terms of our talents and values and that this is the correct narrative moving forward.

With regards to critical race theory, there is only one course that has this theory as part of the syllabus: SS392 – the Politics of Race, Gender, and Sexuality. There are two lessons on critical race theory and the book, *Critical Race Theory: An Introduction*, is one of several readings in the course. This course is an upper-level elective. Most of the cadets who take the course are Political Science majors. Typical enrollment for this elective course averages about 23 cadets annually.

I would also like to address concerns regarding two personal testimonials that occurred during our September 2020 Honorable Living Day to include a Colonel described as becoming “woke” to her white privilege and a description of police officers being described as murderers.

First to address the Colonel, I can confirm that one of our faculty members did describe her personal experiences and friendship with an African American classmate while attending the USMA Prep School in the early 1990s. She discussed her experiences visiting his family in the projects of Elizabeth, New Jersey, describing how this experience allowed her to better understand the different pathways some cadets face in achieving a place at the Academy. She closed by encouraging all cadets to get to know their classmates, build friendships, and create cohesive teams within the ranks of the corps of cadets. This encouragement is exactly aligned with the cohesive teams initiative championed by the Army. We are proud of her for sharing that story and for providing the Corps of Cadets with encouragement to create a personal connection with each other.

Second, with regard to describing police officers as murderers, I want to start by explaining that at no point during the discussion were police officers ever described as murderers. During that Honorable Living Day, a cadet described how the trajectory of his family’s life changed as a result of his father being beaten to death by police when he was six years old. The cadet did plainly state that his father was killed by police officers. He closed his account by having one simple request of the crowd... to listen to each other because everyone at West Point matters. This cadet showed tremendous courage and we applaud his willingness to contribute to a very powerful day of development for the entire West Point enterprise.

I trust that my explanation above indicates that although some controversial topics and guest lecturers are a part of the West Point educational experience, these opportunities are specific in nature and not a systemic part of the 47-month experience for every cadet. I understand well the requirement for cohesive teams to fight and win in the crucible of ground combat. At West Point, our job is to create those leaders of character necessary for our Nation to fight and win its wars. I remain confident in our ability to accomplish our mission and invite you to West Point so that you may see, first-hand, the incredible developmental experiences our cadets endure every day and the talent that they bring with them into our Army.

Sincerely,



Darryl A. Williams  
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army  
Superintendent





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**WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING  
THE HEARING**

JUNE 23, 2021

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## **RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WILSON**

Secretary AUSTIN. My staff, including the Missile Defense Agency and the Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation, is completing the examination of options for combat- and cost-effective, survivable, and technically executable Integrated Air and Missile Defenses for Guam. A summary of this analysis will be provided to Congress, to give an initial overview of the option space. These results will inform the Department's final decision on the Integrated Air and Missile Defense of Guam as part of the Fiscal Year 2023 budget cycle. [See page 18.]

Secretary AUSTIN. The Department of Defense remains deeply committed to working with Israel to ensure that the Iron Dome Defense System is capable of protecting Israeli civilians. The Department strongly supports Israel's request for additional support for its Iron Dome Defense System and continues to consult closely with the Israeli Ministry of Defense on the details of the request. [See page 18.]

## **RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LARSEN**

Secretary AUSTIN. U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) established a distinct line of effort, the Cognitive Performance Program, within the Preservation of the Force and Family (POTFF) program structure in FY 2020, and hopes to align the funding for this effort in FY 2022. The \$10.2 million referenced in the POTFF budget was not a request for a budget increase, but rather reflected a realignment of resources from two other POTFF Domains (Behavioral Health Domain (\$6.1 million) and Human Performance Domain (physical) (\$4.1 million)).

Although USSOCOM has had numerous cognitive performance initiatives underway for several years, the decision to create a distinct line of effort to address the cognitive domain within the POTFF program also resulted in the need to realign resources in order to place greater emphasis on brain health and cognitive performance. The goal of this dedicated line of effort, focused on cognitive performance, is to maximize cognitive functioning of SOF personnel by monitoring the impacts of exposure to explosive blasts, by assessing brain functioning and cognitive performance, and by training. USSOCOM has started several initiatives under the POTFF Cognitive Performance Program, including computer-based cognitive training programs, enhanced assessments, career-long preventative monitoring efforts, multiple research projects to better understand the impacts of blast exposures, and assessments of technologies intended to improve cognitive functioning and to monitor exposures to blasts. USSOCOM POTFF's cognitive enhancement efforts provide individual and collective training to proactively build cognitive resilience and ability. [See page 19.]

General MILLEY. DOD seeks a secure and stable region where U.S. national interests are safeguarded, the U.S. homeland is defended, and nations work cooperatively to address challenges. We currently assess the risk of conflict in the Arctic as minimal. However, the Arctic is a rapidly evolving security environment in which the Joint Force must present a credible deterrent to conflict, maintaining its flexibility to respond promptly and effectively to contingencies in the region. DOD recognizes that Russia and China are actively challenging the Arctic rules-based order. Russia views itself as a great polar power and regulates maritime operations in the Northern Sea Route in a manner contrary to international law. Although Russia has generally followed international law and procedure in establishing the limits of its extended continental shelf, DOD recognizes that Russia could choose to unilaterally establish those limits if the procedures prove unfavorable and, in doing so, could utilize its military capabilities in an effort to deny access to disputed Arctic waters or resources.

Meanwhile, while China is not an Arctic nation, it is attempting to gain a role in the Arctic in ways that may undermine international rules and norms, and there is a risk that its predatory economic behavior globally may be repeated in the Arctic. Moreover, China is increasing its presence through economic outreach, investments in Arctic states' strategic sectors, and scientific activities.

The 2019 DOD Arctic Strategy guides the Department's approach to the Arctic. The Strategy recognizes the existence of multiple competing global priorities and

emphasizes that Arctic resourcing needs to account for other global priorities. The Strategy generally takes the approach of focusing resources on Russia and China in other areas of the world in order to limit strategic spillover in the Arctic, particularly vis-a-vis the surface maritime domain. DOD strategy advocates for improved early warning systems, other domain awareness systems, and improved communications in the Arctic. [See page 19.]

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#### **RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. KELLY**

General MILLEY. The Joint Force is leveraging various, established bilateral and multilateral fora designed to maintain the confidence of our Allies and Partners in the Middle East, Europe, and Africa.

DOD leads the CT effort throughout the middle east effort. In Africa, DOD remains committed to Countering Violent Extremist Organizations (CVEO). We continue close collaboration with our Allies and Partners, sharing our future global force posture objectives and intentions. In West Africa, we continue to support French-led efforts, and consult regularly.

Finally, the Joint Force continues to build confidence among our Allies and Partners by leveraging numerous routine bilateral and multilateral fora to achieve mutual military objectives and desired strategic effects. [See page 37.]

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#### **RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BACON**

Secretary AUSTIN. There are classified reasons why the budget presentation exists in its current form. The Comptroller takes care to avoid inadvertently exposing classified information to the public and continues to provide the annual classified budget extract report along with the President's Budget submission to the committees in order to present a complete, classified picture to Congress. The Department was unable to provide the display requested by the Congress for the FY22 Budget Request without adversely affecting counterintelligence, but is considering several options to do so in the future. [See page 46.]

General MILLEY. Congressional support of current arms sales particular to air defense capabilities can strengthen deterrence for Taiwan. Current arms sales that support the air defense mission are the Stinger man-pad, sustaining their PATRIOT batteries, and the Harpoon Coastal Defense System. Improving Taiwan Armed Forces with small, highly maneuverable, cost-effective and highly lethal anti-aircraft and ship weapons is also beneficial. Building Taiwan's indigenous air defenses and asymmetric capabilities through co-development opportunities will further strengthen Taiwan's deterrence. [See page 47.]

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#### **RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. WALTZ**

Secretary AUSTIN. The interagency working group did not consult with the Navy regarding shipyard infrastructure, however, the Department of the Navy's Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization Program (SIOP) aligns with the American Jobs Plan in building world-class infrastructure; revitalizing manufacturing and small businesses; and training Americans for the jobs of the future. SIOP meets the President's infrastructure priorities; projects are scoped and "shovel ready" to provide a clear return on investment to the tax payer through immediate job creation and opportunities for economic dividends for the next generation of skilled trades maintaining the Nation's fleet. [See page 51.]

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#### **RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GOLDEN**

Secretary AUSTIN. The Navy has been using multi-year procurement (MYP) authority with the support of Congress to procure DDG 51 destroyers in quantities that support stable production and a healthy industrial base. MYP contracts generate substantial savings compared to the annual procurement cost estimates, provide a long-term commitment to the shipbuilding industrial base that stabilizes shipyard employment levels, and incentivize industry to make capital investment that improve productivity. The Navy plans to request authority for MYP of DDG 51 Flight III ships for FY 2023–2027. [See page 66.]

General MILLEY. PB22 procures warships and submarines with credible combat power to deter China, invests in the industrial base to support continued modernization, and on-time delivery of Columbia. The decision to procure only 1 DDG in FY22

was a hard choice. These hard choices are driven by budget constraints and reflect the Navy's assessment of where to take investment risk balanced across industrial base performance.

Reducing to one DDG in FY22 (final year of multi-year contract) is least impactful. While the department will face ~\$33M penalty, reducing to one DDG in FY22 will allow the industrial base to recover from production backlog and more reliably produce 2 Flight III DDGs per year in FY23 and beyond. [See page 66.]

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#### **RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MRS. LURIA**

General MILLEY. The FY 2022 President's Budget includes retirement of platforms and systems that cannot be affordably modernized to enable them to have credible combat power.

Prior to any programmed divestiture, the Department considers the system's efficacy against projected threats, sunset timeline of the system(s), whether there are alternative ways to execute the same missions, and the risks associated with divestment. DOD has conducted such an assessment of those systems slated for divestment in the President's Budget for Fiscal Year 2022.

The savings from these divestments have been re-invested in the development and procurement of key new technologies (e.g., hypersonics) to deter and, if necessary, defeat any adversary now and in the future. [See page 69.]

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#### **RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. LAMBORN**

General MILLEY. We are developing a counterterrorism over-the-horizon (OTH) capability in the region that will allow us to keep our eyes firmly on any direct threats to the United States and act quickly and decisively if needed. To that end, we have added more capability in the region, including intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets and combat aircraft in the Gulf. President Biden has directed the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan by September 10 and noted the withdrawal will be complete by the end of August. The withdrawal included the transfer of Bagram Airfield to Afghan National Defense and Security Forces. Only HKIA is needed to support the U.S. and allies diplomatic presence. U.S. and coalition forces do not have the number of personnel or capability in country to necessitate maintaining Bagram. [See page 24.]

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#### **RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY DR. GREEN**

Secretary AUSTIN. The Department of Defense prioritizes science and technology (S&T) investments that enable the Joint Force's success today and tomorrow. The Department's FY2022 budget request includes its largest ever Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation request at \$112.0 billion and \$14.7 billion in S&T investments. These University Research Initiative efforts represent a portion of the Department's total research and workforce development portfolio, which includes a number of initiatives specific to cybersecurity research and workforce development for which the budget request maintains full funding. While the services' subaccounts for the University Research Initiative were cut, these savings were invested in programs deemed to be of higher priority and better alignment to the National Defense Strategy. The Fiscal Year 2022 Cyberspace Activities budget includes around \$500 million for advanced cyber-related research and development activities, which includes programs to substantially enhance expertise and skills within the cyber operations, cybersecurity, and cyber S&T workforces. [See page 58.]

General MILLEY. The Army is not cutting CTC rotations for Fiscal Year 2022 (FY22). There is an increase of two programmed rotations from FY21; 20 programmed in FY22 and 18 programmed in FY21. CTCs are aligned with the Army's training strategy to meet readiness requirements which allows tailored CTC rotations to meet unit training requirements. This training strategy provides levers to allow for customizing the size and scope of a CTC rotation commensurate with readiness requirements. The Army Training Model relies on simultaneous Multi-Echelon training events at Company and below, allowing for additional repetitions for those formations to provide the time required for mastery of fundamentals.

The FY22 rotation breakdown is:

—National Training Center—8 rotations

—Joint Multi-National Training Center—4 rotations

—Joint Readiness Training Center—8 rotations

There are 20 CTC rotations planned for FY23 and 21 for FY24. [See page 57.]



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**QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING**

JUNE 23, 2021

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#### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LAMBORN

Mr. LAMBORN. Secretary Austin, Ebrahim Raisi is Iran's next president, he has firmly stated that ballistic missiles—the delivery system for a nuclear weapon—are off the negotiating table. Raisi says support to proxies attacking our soldiers and our allies will continue. Iran's proxies have accelerated attacks in Iraq and against Saudi Arabia and Israel—how does the Pentagon justify redeploying air defense assets that were put in place to protect our troops and our allies against Iranian proxy attacks?

Secretary AUSTIN. The Department of Defense redeployed certain forces, primarily air defense assets, from the Middle East this summer. The overextension of these assets threatened to undermine the overall readiness of our forces globally. We continue to maintain significant air defense assets deployed in the Middle East, with a focus on defending against the most likely regional rocket and UAV threats. We have also improved our array of passive defense measures. Our partners, from Israel to the Gulf region, also have significant air defense assets and have proven themselves increasingly adept at effectively operating these systems. We are constantly reassessing our posture in response to evolving global threats.

Mr. LAMBORN. General Milley, Admiral Davidson has expressed his support for a “360-degree, persistent, air and missile defense capability on Guam (Guam Defense System (GDS))” and testified about the groundwork which has been laid so far.

I agree with him on the need for the GDS, both because Guamanians are American citizens and worthy of protection from the growing Chinese and North Korean missile threat, but also because of the extremely important role Guam plays in our Pacific strategy.

Can you please elaborate for us as best you can in an open setting how a so-called “bloody-nose” or “decapitation” strike on Guam would impact our ability to conduct operations in the western Pacific?

General MILLEY. Any attack would cause great concern for the Joint Force and the civilian population of United States. INDOPACOM has numerous contingency plans in place to respond to such an attack and would be able to respond accordingly. We are constantly assessing the threat and reviewing our plans and options. Studies are underway to develop an effective approach for the missile defense of Guam in order to expand and modernize our regional missile defense posture against ballistic and hypersonic missile threats in the INDOPACOM theater.

#### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WITTMAN

Mr. WITTMAN. On December 3rd, 2020—just a few months ago—General Milley said: “We’re going to have to have a much larger fleet than we have today, if we’re serious about great power competition and deterring great power war, and if we’re serious about dominant capability over something like China or some other power that has significant capability.”

Secretary Austin, yes or no, do you agree with General Milley’s statement?

That same day Gen Milley also said: “I would advocate, and bias going forward, heavy investment” regarding sea, air and space-centric platforms.” He then went on to say: “We are, and the defense of the United States depends on air power and sea power primarily. People can say what they want and argue what they want, but that’s a reality.”

“... I love the Army ... but the fundamental defense of the United States, and the ability to project power forward [are] going to be naval and air and space power.”

Yes or no, do you agree with General Milley’s statement?

Secretary AUSTIN. I agree that naval, air, and space power are increasingly critical in maintaining the U.S. military edge and in deterring conflict. The size of the future Navy fleet is an important aspect of naval and air power. However, we need to focus on fleet capability, not just numbers of ships, and how the Navy operates jointly with other capabilities, including those of the Army, in the future threat environment. That is how the Department is approaching future war fighting chal-

allenges—from a Joint Force-wide and fleet-wide perspective, enabled by new operating concepts and investments in other advanced capabilities and modernized forces.

Mr. WITTMAN. Secretary Austin, On May 27th, I quote you as saying, “let me assure you, from my perspective our effort is not to make the Army be the bill payer for the Air Force or Navy.”

This was made abundantly clear by the shortsighted annual shipbuilding report delivered to Congress. The plan calls for smaller ships to support DDGs and CGs, fails to meet the redline on Amphibs for the Marines, and then proceeds to inactivate 7 CGs and only fund 1 DDG.

Gen. Milley has stated on record that all the systems in the Army’s big six priorities are being well funded. A second DDG was a priority for the Navy. The Marine Corps is on the verge of cutting end strength to be a billpayer for Force Design 2030.

Secretary Austin, would you say that our investment is properly biased? Has something happened since December that has changed reality and we are no longer dependent on sea power as Gen Milley has said?

Secretary AUSTIN. I agree with General Milley that the PRC is our pacing challenge in strategic competition and we need to develop advanced capabilities to remain dominant. The Fiscal Year 2022 budget prioritizes and invests in capabilities focused on the Indo-Pacific, and buys us the flexibility needed to go after the right capabilities that will ensure we remain relevant in any competition. We invest \$52 billion in buying a lethal Air Force, \$34 billion in buying combat effective naval forces, and \$12.3 billion for combat effective ground forces. And when you combine that with our investment in missile defeat and defense, \$6.5 billion in long range fires, and \$10.5 billion in cyber, it really does create a tremendous capability for us.

Mr. WITTMAN. I have strong concerns about the overuse of Requests for Forces (RFFs) by certain Combatant Commanders.

I worry that our ability to modernize the services for a future Great Powers competition and conflict will be undermined by the combatant command’s failure, unwillingness, or inability to make do with their approved GFMAP allocations. As I understand it, RFFs are mainly only to be submitted and approved if there is a significant change in the operational environment.

Last week, in this room, CNO Gilday said: “I think the process needs more rigor.”

In an unclassified format: What is your threshold for approving RFFs? What would qualify as a change in the operating environment that is significant enough to warrant a departure from the carefully planned GFMAP?

RFFs against the GFMAP is not a recent phenomenon. What steps are you taking to reset the balance between near-term crises driving RFFs and long-term readiness?

Are you communicating the expectation that the combatant commands will only request forces for tasks that are truly mission-critical?

And finally, does the GFMAP process itself need to be restructured?

Secretary AUSTIN. The threshold for approving RFFs cannot be specifically defined since the decision is dependent on multiple factors including intelligence assessments, priorities, emerging opportunities, the operational environment and the actions of our adversaries. Changes in the operational environment are driven by many unpredictable factors, e.g., the COVID pandemic, which trigger requests to the Secretary to reallocate forces around the world to support dynamic operations and emerging opportunities. New intelligence will also highlight changes in the operational environment that may necessitate a change in force allocation. Risks to mission and forces are always taken into consideration when considering allocation or reallocation of forces. Understanding we cannot avoid all risk, we mitigate risk where we can, relying on strength of deterrence and non-military means to pursue U.S. objectives in other areas.

The GFM allocation process begins with the development and approval of the Base Global Force Management Allocation Plan (GFMAP), a process that starts more than 18 months prior to force deployments in a given Fiscal Year. Although there are numerous touchpoints with various intelligence providers and civilian leaders throughout development of the Base GFMAP, DOD cannot predict with certainty what the future operational environment will look like and require in terms of force allocation. To account for changes in the environment, along with routine administrative refinements, Combatant Commanders submit Requests for Forces (RFFs) for modifications to the GFMAP. The Joint Staff receives these RFFs, reviews them for feasibility and supportability, and makes recommendations to the Secretary to modify the GFMAP. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the DOD components review the Joint Staff’s recommendations and provide their positions and opinions. My approval of modifications to the GFMAP does not imply

that the GFMAP was wrong, but rather that conditions, guidance, or risk have changed. Without the flexibility of RFFs, the Department would rely on a plan for force distribution that may not reflect the realities of the environment.

Commanders understand the impacts of every RFF and in general already submit only mission-critical demands. Each Combatant Commander has a wide variety of assigned responsibilities, tasks, and missions. These tasks often change with the global environment, and each of these changes warrants consideration of changing our Base GFMAP. As some of these situations may be unforeseen, we must remain flexible to adjust our plan and ensure we are meeting the Nation's security needs, both domestically and abroad.

We have taken steps to better balance GFMAP force demands with long-term readiness or crisis with peer competitors by providing guidance to Services to maintain a more expansive set of ready forces via the Directed Readiness Tables. These efforts ensure we have available forces to respond to crisis or to execute our most demanding operational plans.

While there is always room for improvement, I do not believe our allocation process needs a wholesale restructure. The process functions as designed, ensuring decisions involving risk to force versus risk to mission are presented to inform my decisions, with the appropriate Service Chief's or Combatant Commander's impact statements for my review. The ongoing Global Posture Review, directed by the President in February, is in the process of identifying opportunities to adjust DOD posture, including overseas deployments, to achieve better alignment with the President's Interim National Security Strategic Guidance. In addition, the National Defense Strategy process will examine how to align the Administration's priorities with resourcing, including tradeoffs across modernization, readiness, and force structure. The GFM process is flexible enough to receive this guidance and adjust both assignment and allocation of forces appropriately.

Mr. WITTMAN. In an unclassified format, which Global Combatant Command submits the most Requests for Forces outside of their GFMAP allocation?

Secretary AUSTIN. Historically, CENTCOM submits the most Requests for Forces. Factors that contribute to this status are a dynamic and rapidly changing security situation, limited assigned forces, and strategic guidance that initially limited base order commitments to the CENTCOM AOR, necessitating Requests for Forces when the security situation changed.

Over the last two years, we have received more than 200 Request For Forces per year, with CENTCOM accounting for over 30% of those requests. Historically, 80% of the originally approved annual GFMAP BASE ORDER allocation remains in place through that respective fiscal year.

Mr. WITTMAN. In Great Powers Competition, strategy and budgeting go hand-in-hand. Would you support briefing the congressional defense committees on the annual Global Force Management Allocation Plan (GFMAP)? If not, why not? Shouldn't the defense committees of congress have a greater understanding of how the O&M funds—that are being authorized and appropriated—are being used through an annual briefing on the GFMAP?

Secretary AUSTIN. Yes, I would support a briefing by the Department to the congressional defense committees on the overall prioritization of forces in the annual GFMAP. The GFMAP authorizes force allocations and deployment of forces in support of a Combatant Commander's force requirements. It provides details on how forces are applied in context to National strategies and demonstrates the efficient employment of forces based on those priorities.

Mr. WITTMAN. In an unclassified format, which Global Combatant Command submits the most Requests for Forces outside of their GFMAP allocation?

General MILLEY. Based on data for FY20 and FY21, U.S. Central Command submitted the most Request for Forces, accounting for 40–50% of emergent forces demand each FY. U.S. Northern Command was the next largest contributor in each FY, accounting for 30–40% of emergent forces demand, largely driven by Southwest Border and COVID response requirements

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#### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SPEIER

Ms. SPEIER. Secretary Austin, while I understand that it is impossible to perfectly predict future force allocation needs, I am concerned that the Global Force Management process is not adequately balancing OPTEMPO and providing a measure of predictability to our service members. Please describe what actions you are taking within the current process to ease the strain on overburdened forces?

Secretary AUSTIN. The annual GFMAP development cycle is a more than 18 months long process driven by the tasks within the strategic guidance documents,

including the President's Interim Strategic Security Guidance and the Department's National Defense Strategy, National Military Strategy, and Defense Planning Guidance. During the annual GFMAP process each Combatant Command and military Service has multiple opportunities to explain their current and future challenges. Each concern is captured and assessed for risk and impact. Where there is disagreement, the Department's senior leadership is gathered and a decision is made and captured in the annual GFMAP, to include Service Chief concerns on impacts to the health of the force. I take those concerns very seriously and only approve exceptions for priority requirements that justify the deployment of the Department's most valuable commodity—our service members.

Additionally, each Request for Forces is validated for legitimacy to ensure the request is necessary to accomplish the tasks within the guiding strategic documents and warrants the employment of forces and service members. This validation process reduces unnecessary Requests for Forces by applying specific criteria to question the authority, policy, legality, funding, and suitability of each request. Deployment to Dwell and Mobilization to Dwell remain indicators I use to measure the stress on the force and remain a factor in all decisions to employ the force.

Ms. SPEIER. Secretary Austin and General Milley, are there any studies currently underway to analyze and recommend modifications to the Global Force Management System?

Secretary AUSTIN. The Global Posture Review, directed by the President in February, is a process for identifying opportunities to adjust DOD posture—including overseas deployments—to achieve better alignment with the President's Interim National Security Strategic Guidance and DOD's focus on the PRC as the pacing threat. In addition, this year's National Defense Strategy review will examine how to align the Administration's priorities with resourcing, including tradeoffs across modernization, readiness, and force structure.

Additionally, since February 2021 the Joint Staff has been assessing the Global Force Management Annual Allocation process for possible improvements. The results of that study are currently being analyzed and will be briefed to the Services and Combatant Commands. The outcomes may result in modifications to the Global Force Management system in the coming months and years.

Ms. SPEIER. General Milley, you mentioned that while overall OPTEMPO is not trending higher, relative OPTEMPO has been increasing. Why are end-strength requests not shifting to balance out the relative increase?

General MILLEY. PB22 fund an overall Active Component military end strength of 1.346M personnel. This is a decrease of 4.6K (-0.3%) below the FY21 currently projected levels and is largely due to divestments across multiple platforms/structures to finance the future fight.

The Joint Force will be smaller and leaner, but more agile, flexible, ready to deploy, innovative and technologically advanced. With the U.S. military withdrawal from Afghanistan, the Army and Marine Corps will no longer need to be sized to support the large scale, long-term stability operations required over the past two decades. Force allocations will be structured and paced to allow forces to surge, regenerate, and mobilize capabilities needed for any contingency.

#### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BROOKS

Mr. BROOKS. The Fiscal Year 2022 budget request includes significant funding for offensive hypersonic weapon systems being developed by the services, including the Conventional Prompt Strike program, the Long Range Hypersonic Weapon, and the Air-launched Rapid Response Weapon, all of which are planned to be fielded in the near term. What value will these systems—which will have the capability to hit high value targets via unpredictable flight paths—have to the combatant commanders, especially compared to other conventional missile capabilities currently deployed?

Secretary AUSTIN. Hypersonic weapon systems provide a combination of speed, maneuverability and altitude that enables highly survivable, long range, rapid defeat of time-critical, heavily-defended and high value targets.

Our potential adversaries have rapidly developed highly capable systems to challenge our domain dominance on the tactical battlefield. These systems include anti-ship ballistic missiles, high-end integrated air and missile defense systems, anti-satellite capabilities, and land-attack cruise, ballistic and hypersonic missiles. These systems collectively create a tactical battlefield environment that is highly contested, presenting a significant challenge to our traditional weapon capabilities. Moreover, the adversary has increasingly focused on systems that dramatically compress the timelines on the tactical battlefield. These systems include ballistic mis-

siles, ballistic missiles with maneuvering reentry vehicles and, increasingly, hypersonic strike missiles. These systems provide the adversary an ability to hold our forces at risk hundreds, and even thousands, of miles out with flight times measured in minutes.

Our current portfolio of traditional tactical strike weapons consists of sea-launched subsonic cruise missiles and air-launched subsonic cruise missiles on subsonic or low supersonic aircraft delivery platforms. These systems will take on the order of 10 times longer to fly a long range strike mission when compared to the adversary high speed systems. This presents unfavorable battlefield asymmetry.

The Department's Hypersonics Modernization Strategy accelerates the development and delivery of transformational warfighting capabilities based on hypersonic systems. This strategy includes air, land, and sea launched conventionally armed hypersonic strike weapons for highly-survivable, long-range, time-critical defeat of maritime, coastal and inland targets of critical importance on the tactical battlefield. The Fiscal Year 2022 budget includes funding to accelerate the development and transition of hypersonic weapons to enable fielding of operational prototypes in quantity from land, sea and air by the mid-2020s.

Mr. BROOKS. The Department has made great progress towards fielding offensive hypersonic capabilities, but we haven't done enough with respect to hypersonic defensive capabilities. Hypersonic threats are here today, and we need to be able to defend against them. While this budget request did not include projected spending levels for the next five years at the program level, do you believe that there is opportunity to accelerate development and ultimately fielding of hypersonic defensive capabilities?

Secretary AUSTIN. Our potential adversaries have aggressively pursued, and are now fielding, a variety of hypersonic systems that challenge our air and missile defenses with a combination of range, speed, altitude and maneuverability. Defense against these systems will require a comprehensive layered defeat approach that includes a layered kinetic and non-kinetic defense in the terminal and glide phases of flight, as well as, left of launch kinetic and non-kinetic defeat of missile launch complexes and kill chain elements. Our current strategy for kinetic defense includes a layered capability with terminal defense by the mid-2020's and demonstration of a glide phase defense later in the decade. Offensive hypersonic capabilities provide left of launch kinetic strike capability in the mid-2020s. Concept development for the glide phase defense capability is under way and initial studies indicate that there is opportunity to accelerate development of glide phase defense capability. MDA is currently evaluating concepts proposed by industry to achieve that acceleration.

Mr. BROOKS. The Fiscal Year 2022 budget request includes significant funding for offensive hypersonic weapon systems being developed by the services, including the Conventional Prompt Strike program, the Long Range Hypersonic Weapon, and the Air-launched Rapid Response Weapon, all of which are planned to be fielded in the near term. What value will these systems—which will have the capability to hit high value targets via unpredictable flight paths—have to the combatant commanders, especially compared to other conventional missile capabilities currently deployed?

General MILLEY. The Department's investment strategy develops and procures multi-Service, multi-domain offensive weapons focused on the high-end fight that enable the Joint Force to hold adversary forces at risk at operationally relevant ranges. By enabling power projection from standoff ranges, the risk to critical U.S. assets decreases while the defensive burden imposed upon the enemy increases.

PB22 funding is essential to mitigate offensive fires capacity shortcomings, enhance operational flexibility in multiple domains, and accelerate the transition of hypersonic weapons from development to procurement and fielding.

Offensive hypersonic weapons play an important role in deterrence. We are investing heavily in offensive hypersonic weapon systems now because the Joint Force requires these capabilities to hold adversary targets at risk at operationally relevant ranges.

Mr. BROOKS. The Department has made great progress towards fielding offensive hypersonic capabilities, but we haven't done enough with respect to hypersonic defensive capabilities. Hypersonic threats are here today, and we need to be able to defend against them. While this budget request did not include projected spending levels for the next five years at the program level, do you believe that there is opportunity to accelerate development and ultimately fielding of hypersonic defensive capabilities?

General MILLEY. The DOD continually assesses technology advancement to ascertain opportunities for accelerated development or fielding of systems that enhance warfighter capability based on the evolving threat environment.

The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) Hypersonic Defense effort is funded at \$247.9M in PB22. This funding advances several technology enablers such as hypersonic threat sensor technology, architecture analysis, threat modeling, Command and Control, Battle Management and Communications (C2BMC) upgrades, and a Glide Phase Defeat Weapon System. The Hypersonic Defense effort also leverages investments in targets and the Hypersonic Ballistic Tracking Space Systems (HBTSS), which is funded at \$256.2M in PB22.

#### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BROWN

Mr. BROWN. Can you provide an accounting on how the Department is implementing the FY2021 NDAA provisions relating to L-band spectrum, when they will be complete, and any recommended changes to the law?

Secretary AUSTIN. The Department of Defense (DOD) is implementing Sections 1661 through 1664 of the FY2021 NDAA. DOD's progress to complete these requirements varies with the level of analysis and interagency coordination required for each provision. The mechanism to oversee and implement these provisions is the Council on Oversight of the DOD Positioning, Navigation, and Timing Enterprise. If there are legislative changes to be recommended from the Council's work as these provisions are implemented, the Department will seek to share them with the Congress through the appropriate channels as the recommendations are identified. Below is a short status update on each provision.

**Section 1661**—Prohibition on availability of funds for certain purposes relating to the Global Positioning System.

- The Council on Oversight of the DOD Positioning, Navigation, and Timing Enterprise is assessing and managing this effort to ensure compliance.
- Current DOD efforts to migrate to M-Code with the next generation of GPS user equipment are driven by adversary threats.

**Section 1662**—Limitation on awarding contracts to entities operating commercial terrestrial communication networks that cause harmful interference with the Global Positioning System.

- The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment will assess current and future contracts for compliance and is serving as the DOD lead in this area.
- The Council on Oversight of the DOD Positioning, Navigation, and Timing Enterprise will provide oversight on behalf of the Secretary.

**Section 1663**—Independent technical review of Federal Communications Commission Order 20–48

- A DOD Contract is in place with the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (NASEM); NASEM has chosen a study chair and is in the process of recruiting and vetting candidates to support the study.
- The Council on Oversight of the DOD Positioning, Navigation, and Timing Enterprise will provide oversight on behalf of the Secretary.

**Section 1664**—Estimate of damages from Federal Communications Commission Order 20–48.

- DOD is assessing potential expected costs associated with 20–48. Conclusions will depend on the NASEM Study referenced above.
- The Council on Oversight of the DOD Positioning, Navigation, and Timing Enterprise will provide oversight on behalf of the Secretary.

Mr. BROWN. Secretary Austin, In your responses to the Advanced Policy questions for your confirmation hearing, you stated, “Space is already an arena of great power competition” and “the strategic environment continues to evolve rapidly, especially as it applies to space.” Recognizing this, Congress created the U.S. Space Force (USSF), reestablished U.S. Space Command as a unified combatant command, and created the Space Development Agency. What additional space-based capabilities and capacities do you need to meet the demands of great power competition in space? And as the need for space launch services continues to grow, how will you ensure diversity within the industry?

Secretary AUSTIN. The Department seeks to develop capabilities that enhance Joint Force operations across all domains, such as space situational awareness and command and control systems. These capabilities are critical components of a modern, resilient architecture essential to maintaining our advantages in space and giving the United States the technological edge over our adversaries. With regard to launch capabilities, the Department has invested more than \$2 billion in the U.S. space launch industrial base to ensure competition and end reliance on foreign rocket engines. This strategy culminated successfully in August 2020 with the National Security Space Launch Phase 2 procurement contract award. The NSSL program

has established a research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) strategy to invest continuously in the industrial base, expand opportunities for industry, and provide further opportunities for commercial space launch. Finally, the NSSL Phase 3 procurement competition in fiscal years 2024–2025 will provide further opportunities to diversify the industry.

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#### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. KELLY

Mr. KELLY. How does the Department determine what is of greatest importance to service members, their families, and their broader support network? What means do you have to capture those insights at a national, state and local level? What level of confidence do you have in the information the Department is using to understand those concerns and does the Department have the means to directly engage those individual cohorts in a responsive way?

The Military Wellness Initiative (MWi) is the only resource available I am aware of that provides these insights and solutions. It continues to expand and be developed in support of the readiness of our troops and the mental and physical wellness of our veterans and their communities.

Secretary AUSTIN. The Department recognizes the importance of family support and the crucial role families play in supporting Service members deployed all over the world. The Department uses multiple methods to collect reliable and generalizable data to ensure that military leaders have the best information possible when making decisions regarding military families.

The Department conducts an extensive joint-Service survey program to assess issues of importance to Service members and their families through the Status of Forces (Active and Reserve) Surveys administered annually and the Active and Reserve Spouse Surveys (administered every 2 years). Data from these representative surveys provide baseline data and trends over time to assess issues and concerns related to quality of life, retention, satisfaction, family life, financial readiness, and importance of and satisfaction with DOD programs and policies including those that provide support to the member and family. The surveys capture these responses for overall DOD and the Services as well as at a national and regional level. The surveys use scientific sampling and weighting and so provide accurate estimates of these target populations.

In addition to survey data, the Department incorporates a robust research program to assess service member and family program uptake and understand where gaps in program coverage exist. For example, DOD conducts large-scale program evaluations to understand user experiences and outcomes. Administrative data from DOD and other government agencies (e.g., Census, Social Security Administration) are also utilized to better understand the impact military service has on families. Finally, the Department tracks program metrics across the portfolio of programs supporting service members and their families. Ongoing measures of program quality, utilization, and customer satisfaction provide the ability to adapt programs to address concerns with access, quality and/or content. Program metrics also help the Department identify opportunities to direct resources where they are most needed to support military families.

Mr. KELLY. There are a precious few Army modernization programs that are critical to military operations worldwide and domestic missions such as natural disaster response. Notably, the M917A3 Heavy Dump Truck does all of this and more for the Active Army, the Army National Guard, and the Army Reserve. I'm pleased to see the Army request some funding for the Heavy Dump Truck program in the FY 2022 request. What is the Army's plan to continue procurement of the M917A3 Heavy Dump Truck?

Secretary AUSTIN. The M917A3 Heavy Dump Truck is being executed under a five year contract, which was awarded in 2018. Low rate initial production was completed in the third quarter of FY20 with a full rate production decision in the first quarter of FY22. Full rate production and procurement is planned to begin in FY22 with completion projected for FY23.

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#### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GALLAGHER

Mr. GALLAGHER. Secretary Austin, in your prepared remarks, you call for accelerating "investments in cutting-edge capabilities that will define the future fight," including long-range fires. What would be some of the tangible consequences if Congress fails to fully fund programs like the Marine Corps' Long Range Fires and Ground-Based Anti-Ship Missiles, and the Army's Mobile Medium Range Missile in FY22?

Secretary AUSTIN. The DOD invests \$6.6B in Long Range Fires systems in PB22, an increase of \$1.4B over FY21. The Department's PB22 Long Range Fires (LRF) investment strategy develops and procures multi-Service, multi-domain offensive weapons focused on the high-end fight that enable the Joint Force to hold adversary forces at risk at operationally relevant ranges. By enabling power projection from standoff ranges, the risk to critical U.S. assets decreases while the defensive burden imposed upon the enemy increases.

PB22 funding is essential to mitigate offensive fires capacity shortcomings, enhance operational flexibility in multiple domains, and accelerate the transition of hypersonic weapons from development to procurement and fielding. The impact of not funding these LRF efforts is a delay in capability delivery to the warfighter, reducing the Combatant Commander's options to respond to threats from multiple domains.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Secretary Austin, I know we share a commitment to ensuring the Constellation-class frigate is a success. In light of both the proven nature of the design and the lessons of the LCS, can you commit to minimizing any changes to the existing hull and machinery to help ensure the program delivers on time and on budget?

Secretary AUSTIN. Recognizing that the Constellation-Class Frigate has requirements and some suppliers that differ from the parent design, the Navy is committed to deliberately completing a detail design that meets requirements with minimal change.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Chairman Milley, in the FY15 NDAA, Congress stood up the National Commission on the Future of the Army, which recommended an active duty end strength of 450,000 even after the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Can you talk a bit about what in the threat environment has changed so that the Army end strength in the FY22 budget is now at 485,000?

General MILLEY. The end strength recommendation by the 2016 National Commission on the Future of the Army represented a force deemed "minimally sufficient" to accomplish the statutory and regulatory requirements placed on the Army. Recent budget increases have helped implement the commission's recommendations to fund the Army at or above their recommended end strength.

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#### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. HOULAHAN

Ms. HOULAHAN. In May of this year I introduced the Military Moms Matter Act which, among other initiatives, proposes extending paid family leave to 12 weeks for service members, in line with our NDAA 2020 proposal for federal employees, which became law last year. One of the big topics of debate in this bill is the leave for "primary" and "secondary" caregivers. As the policy is currently written, the secondary caregiver is able to use very little leave following the birth or adoption of their child. We understand the need to maintain force readiness, but ensuring we take care of our troops and retain our forces is also vitally important to retention and morale, and as a matter of fairness to ensure no service member has to choose between being the best parent and serving their country. Secretary Austin and General Milley—I'd like to hear your thoughts on expanding secondary leave for service members or eliminating that designation entirely and offering equal leave to all members. With a record number of women entering our military, though still a fraction of our U.S. population, can you tell me what the Department is doing to ensure proper support mechanisms are in place, such as childcare, which will allow our Military Women to have an equitable service experience?

Secretary AUSTIN. As you have indicated, the Department must ensure we take care of our Service members and their families. Ensuring they have the time required to recover from the arduous nature of their duties and tend to the needs of their families should be part of service life. The birth or placement of a child is a circumstance where providing more leave than the 30 days every Service member accrues each year is certainly appropriate. That being said, the Department must establish policies that strike the right balance between providing additional leave to parents and maintaining operational readiness.

The Department recognizes the importance of providing military families with access to quality, affordable child development programs, and is committed to meeting the increased demand for child care. The Department operates the country's largest employer-sponsored child care program. It provides high standards of care in government-operated facilities and also offers a robust placement and fee assistance program to help military families obtain child care in the local civilian community. Recently, the Department launched a new initiative to help military families obtain



childcare and facilitate additional spouse employment opportunities by offering fee assistance to Service members who obtain care from in-home child care providers.

The Department is also working hard to ensure our talent management processes permit the opportunity for women to advance in their military careers without impediments caused by unnecessary policies or inflexible career paths. We are closely examining outdated or overly restrictive policies that detract from individual career progression, data concerning Service member quality of life, unit readiness, and the overall retention of highly trained professionals.

Ms. HOULAHAN. I understand that the DOD would like to explore a mid-career program that allows individuals to more easily move between government and industry and I am very happy to not just hear about this idea, but about the Department's support of it. I've been supportive of expanding the Career Intermission Program both for active duty members and incorporating one for DOD civilians.

Can you tell me a bit more about how you envision this program working in a way to support the defense critical supply chain? Would it be for certain career fields? I know we are still having a difficult time recruiting and retaining STEM talent, so how would this program effectively improve the current manning issues?

Secretary AUSTIN. The Career Intermission Program (CIP) for active duty military members is a helpful tool that allows the Department to retain its investment in highly skilled members of the military who would otherwise be prevented from completing an active duty career. A similar authority that permits a flexible career path for civilian employees could be useful in recruiting and retaining specialized talent in the civilian workforce. I would like to note that existing authorities under 10 U.S.C. 1599j facilitate mid-career mobility and learning opportunities between DOD civilian personnel and industry. The DOD will continue to ramp up its current Talent Exchange Program enabled through this authority by increasing the pool of participants. The program is still being refined—it is in its fourth year of existence—but meets many of the ends for civilian personnel that the Career intermission Program meets for active duty service members.

Ms. HOULAHAN. During my time in Congress, I have advocated vigorously for investment in STEM education and programming for children and young adults in my community to meet the needs of the future's workforce in all sectors of employment. Secretary Austin: As the needs of the Department of Defense adapt to demand new technical skills for recruits, soldiers, seamen, airmen, and guardians—how does the budget reflect meeting the needs for STEM recruitment from our high schools and colleges?

Have you looked at increasing the pool of ROTC applicants from Minority Serving Institutions to address a lack of diversity within the STEM fields?

Secretary AUSTIN. The budget request incorporates new and continuous efforts to select a talented and diverse cohort, contributing to improved graduation rates, low attrition, greater lethality, and improved retention. The general DOD model is to recruit and access a qualified field of applicants, place them on best fit occupational career trajectories, and provide the necessary technical training required to meet operational objectives. This process provides a stable pipeline of highly qualified individuals to educate and train in emerging fields. Both the Military Service Academies and our ROTC Programs are attracting the STEM talent needed to meet the emerging needs of the Military. However, it should also be noted we are collaborating with Historically Black Colleges and Universities and Minority Serving Institutions to attract diverse talent for STEM and other critical career fields.

Ms. HOULAHAN. Much of my “Armed Forces Digital Advantage Act” was included in the FY2020 NDAA which established a policy to recruit, retain and promote tech talent and digital expertise in the DOD workforce.

Secretary Austin, can you share what steps the DOD has taken to develop a policy on tech talent management, allowing us to recruit the right people and ensuring our talented work force stays within the Department?

Secretary AUSTIN. Developing a highly capable digital workforce is critical to achieve the broader digital transformation outlined in the DOD Digital Modernization Strategy to integrate digital technology into the full range of DOD operations, from personnel management to strategic planning to operations and battlefield management. In June, the Department delivered a Digital Talent Management implementation plan to Congress, as required by Section 230 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (FY2020). This plan addresses the recruitment, hiring practices, development, and retention of a civilian and military workforce with digital and software development expertise.

Implementation of this plan, led by the Offices of the Under Secretary for Acquisition and Sustainment and the Under Secretary for Research and Engineering, will be executed within a Digital Talent Management forum that is cross-functional with representation from the Military Departments, the Office of the Under Secretary of

Defense for Personnel and Readiness, the Office of the Chief Information Officer of the DOD, and the Defense Digital Service. Additionally, the Department has provided plans and reports in accordance with FY2020 NDAA Section 255 (Department-wide software science and technology strategy), Section 256 (Artificial Intelligence Education Strategy), and Section 862 (Software Development and Software Acquisition Training and Management Plans).

Ms. HOULAHAN. Secretary Austin, you have been vocal about the need to improve the diversity of our forces. Can you please provide an update on your recent efforts to recruit and retain a diverse force?

Secretary AUSTIN. As I stated in my Message to the Force, we will lead with our values, building diversity, equity, and inclusion into all aspects of our work and in everything we do.

To that end, we have established a DOD Equity Team (DET) to facilitate, inform, and advance our progress on all issues relating to diversity, equity, and inclusion. The DET is actively reviewing our policies, programs, and processes related to talent management. Additionally, we are evaluating recruiting strategies to reach a wider audience, including obtaining more interest from underrepresented communities. Developing and expanding key partnerships remains critical to generating interest in, and informing youth of, the benefits and importance of military service. Furthermore, we are presenting diverse recruiting imagery and targeted messaging to showcase that the military is a diverse, representative force and to garner increased interest among youth from all communities across our nation.

Regarding retention efforts, I want to assure you that we are working to retain the best and the brightest Service members and provide all Service members an opportunity to excel, regardless of race, gender or ethnicity. As such, one of my efforts focuses on building transparency in our selection processes. Greater transparency will help ensure that selection processes for promotion, nominative assignments, command, and schooling are fair, equal, and based on merit. In addition, the Department has removed all photographs from promotion selection processes.

These issues require sustained leadership attention. Both Deputy Secretary Hicks and I will continue to champion diversity, from top to bottom, across the entire Defense enterprise.

Ms. HOULAHAN. Secretary Austin, back in April, I sent a letter to you with several of my colleagues asking you to implement mandatory training on digital literacy and cyber citizenship within the DOD. The proposed defense budget would set aside \$30.8 million to help the Pentagon improve tools to identify and address extremism among troops, and enhance training at all levels. It also includes \$9.1 million to take initial steps to fight extremism and insider threats.

Can you share in a bit more detail what these tools and trainings will look like?

Secretary AUSTIN. The Department's Countering Extremist Activity Working Group is exploring multiple actions to enhance Insider Threat (InT) awareness training. This Working Group is examining Common Military Training and looking at ways to include InT awareness training and requirements for the services in an efficient and effective manner. The Cyber Awareness Challenge and InT trainings provided by the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency's (DCSA) Center for Development of Security Excellence are being reviewed for recommended updates to address extremist activities/behaviors of concern. Further, the Working Group has facilitated collaboration among Department stakeholders to produce additional training tools to assist with identifying and addressing extremist activities and other behaviors of concern.

The \$30.8 million is within DCSA's FY 2022 President's Budget request, and includes \$9.5M for User Activity Monitoring (UAM). UAM provides a technical capability to monitor activity on select Non-Secure Internet Protocol Router (NIPR) devices accessing U.S. Government information in order to detect insider threats. The NIPR UAM capability provides the Department with the ability to detect early indicators of concern on the unclassified IT system.

Additionally, the Budget request includes \$12.5M for DCSA's Vetting Risk Operations Center to build a capability to incorporate Publicly Available Electronic Information (PAEI), including social media, into background investigations in accordance with Security Executive Agent Directive 5 (SEAD-5) and aligned to the Trusted Workforce 2.0 personnel vetting reform initiative. This will fund screening, analysis, and reporting of PAEI, including social media, in support of national security eligibility determinations. The PAEI investment will deliver a capability to support DOD requirements for enhanced personnel security as directed in P.L. 114-113 and will aid in the execution of continuous vetting in accordance with direction from the Security and Suitability Executive Agents.

Ms. HOULAHAN. In May of this year I introduced the Military Moms Matter Act which, among other initiatives, proposes extending paid family leave to 12 weeks

for service members, in line with our NDAA 2020 proposal for federal employees, which became law last year. One of the big topics of debate in this bill is the leave for “primary” and “secondary” caregivers. As the policy is currently written, the secondary caregiver is able to use very little leave following the birth or adoption of their child. We understand the need to maintain force readiness, but ensuring we take care of our troops and retain our forces is also vitally important to retention and morale, and as a matter of fairness to ensure no service member has to choose between being the best parent and serving their country.

Secretary Austin and General Milley, I’d like to hear your thoughts on expanding secondary leave for service members or eliminating that designation entirely and offering equal leave to all members. With a record number of women entering our military, though still a fraction of our U.S. population, can you tell me what the Department is doing to ensure proper support mechanisms are in place, such as childcare, which will allow our Military Women to have an equitable service experience?

General MILLEY. Taking care of troops and their families is a key readiness issue. We continue to expand programs that increase availability and improve affordability of childcare. Last Fall, the Department initiated a comprehensive review to update policies to enable pregnant Service members to safely continue their duties, attend training, and perform critical assignments, including appropriate assignments in deployed environments. This continues to be an ongoing effort to improve our policies.

Ms. HOULAHAN. I understand that the DOD would like to explore a mid-career program that allows individuals to more easily move between government and industry and I am very happy to not just hear about this idea, but about the Department’s support of it. I’ve been supportive of expanding the Career Intermission Program both for active duty members and incorporating one for DOD civilians.

Can you tell me a bit more about how you envision this program working in a way to support the defense critical supply chain? Would it be for certain career fields? I know we are still having a difficult time recruiting and retaining STEM talent, so how would this program effectively improve the current manning issues?

General MILLEY. I am encouraged that the Career Intermission Program permits service members to pursue personal goals or professional growth while providing a mechanism for a seamless return to Active Duty. The VA extended education benefits for veteran students seeking science, technology, engineering, and math (STEM) degrees through The Edith Nourse Rogers STEM Scholarship GI Bill STEM Extension in 2019. The DOD SkillBridge program is a means that allows Servicemembers to transition from government to industry. Through the SkillBridge program industry partners benefit from gaining early access to the extensive experience, skills, and unmatched work ethos Service members bring to the workforce. Employers craft SkillBridge programs to meet their specific workforce needs, matching those needs to the skills and abilities of highly motivated Service members. The U.S. Department of Defense pays Service member salary and benefits while the Service member participates in SkillBridge. This opportunity may last up to the final 180-days of service. Military installation Commanders can make on-base facilities available to industry partners for use in their SkillBridge programs, or members may be authorized to train at the industry partner’s location off installation at minimal to no cost.

#### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BERGMAN

Mr. BERGMAN. Earlier this week, Secretary of the Army Christine Wormuth stated that the Army National Guard may not be able to fund training for the remainder of the fiscal year if supplemental funding is not provided to offset the cost of the Capitol security response. The Air National Guard is also in a similar position. Secretary Austin and General Milley, what would be the impact on readiness for Army and Air National Guard units around the country if supplemental funding isn’t provided?

Secretary AUSTIN. Supplemental funding has since been appropriated by Congress.

Mr. BERGMAN. Earlier this week, Secretary of the Army Christine Wormuth stated that the Army National Guard may not be able to fund training for the remainder of the fiscal year if supplemental funding is not provided to offset the cost of the Capitol security response. The Air National Guard is also in a similar position. Secretary Austin and General Milley, what would be the impact on readiness for Army and Air National Guard units around the country if supplemental funding isn’t provided?

General MILLEY. Since supplemental funding has not been provided in July, the Army National Guard will begin notifying the 54 States and territories to cancel

some August and September training events due to budget constraints. We can realistically expect cancelled training events will adversely impact affected ARNG and ANG units' readiness due to cancelled training, exercises, maintenance, and logistics.

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**QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. WALTZ**

Mr. WALTZ. The Chinese are at 1,000 shipyards, and we're at less than 20. The Navy has its shipyard infrastructure improvement plans, so they clearly defined shipyard infrastructure as a priority. There is no mention, not one, in the President's \$1.9 trillion infrastructure plan. Were you consulted by the interagency group that submitted the infrastructure plan? Whether it is grids, ports, and especially shipyards, was the Defense Department consulted for its priorities a part of the administration's plan?

Secretary AUSTIN. The interagency working group did not consult with the Navy regarding shipyard infrastructure, however, the Department of the Navy's Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization Program (SIOP) aligns with the American Jobs Plan in building world-class infrastructure; revitalizing manufacturing and small businesses; and training Americans for the jobs of the future. SIOP meets the President's infrastructure priorities; projects are scoped and "shovel ready" to provide a clear return on investment to the tax payer through immediate job creation and opportunities for economic dividends for the next generation of skilled trades maintaining the Nation's fleet.

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**QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. ESCOBAR**

Ms. ESCOBAR. Secretary Austin, in your testimony, you also mentioned how protecting the United States requires teamwork at every level: state, local, tribal, territorial, and federal. This necessary collaboration often happens when resources are equitably shared throughout communities. One program in particular that echoes the spirit of this is the Defense Community Infrastructure Program or DCIP, which makes grants to assist State and local governments to address deficiencies in community infrastructure supportive of military installations.

Currently, assets that are on lands leased from the Department of Defense are ineligible for funds, even if these assets support military value. As you may be aware, there are numerous local government entities, public utilities, and public cooperatives that support the missions of military installations with infrastructure and facilities on lands leased from DOD.

Can you speak on DOD's position as it pertains to the expansion of eligibility to the program and removing this obstacle to ensure these assets are eligible under DCIP?

Secretary AUSTIN. The Department would support considering expanding eligibility for projects located on property that may be leased from a military department or another component of the Department of Defense. I want to note that standard real estate improvement leases are for a period of not less than 30 years.

Ms. ESCOBAR. In the FY20 National Defense Authorization Act, this committee requested the U.S. Army to review the military service record of our World War I hero, Private Marcelina Serna, a migrant from Mexico who volunteered for duty even though his immigrant status granted him an exemption and the most decorated WWI soldier from Texas, for an eligibility to be awarded the Medal of Honor. Not much progress has been made to recognize the honorable and heroic service of Pvt. Serna. In honor of Memorial Day, I introduced a bill to correct the bigotry that denied a Mexican American World War I hero the nation's highest military honor, and authorize the President to posthumously award Pvt. Serna the Congressional Medal of Honor.

Minority heroes and women and men of color like Pvt. Serna who have served on behalf of the military have long faced a history of discrimination that has kept them from being honored for their extraordinary heroism. How is the Department of Defense working with our military services on ensuring we don't leave these heroes behind?

Secretary AUSTIN. The Military Departments' respective World War I (WWI) valor medal reviews directed by Section 584 of Public Law 116-92 (FY20 NDAA) are ongoing. The reviews are examining the valorous actions of African American, Asian American, Hispanic American, Jewish American, and Native American war Veterans who were nominated for the Medal of Honor, or awarded a Service Cross and/or a French Croix de Guerre with Palm (at the Army level or above) for actions during WWI to determine if the respective Veteran's actions warrant upgrade to the

Medal of Honor. The Military Departments anticipate completing their reviews by December 20, 2025 as required by Section 561 of Public Law 116-283 (FY21 NDAA). The Army confirmed that its respective WWI valor medal review includes the Distinguished Service Cross awarded to Private Marcelina Serna for this valorous actions during WWI.

Additionally, I am reviewing the Department's current and past valor medal reviews that focused on specific minority war Veterans (i.e., African Americans; Asian Americans; Hispanic Americans; Jewish Americans; Native Americans; Native American Pacific Islanders) during specific wars/conflicts to ensure each such group is provided the same opportunity for review as their respective counterparts.

Ms. ESCOBAR. The climate crisis is an imminent threat and as a member of both the Armed Services Committee and the Select Committee on the Climate Crisis, I have been raising the alarm for what it will mean for our national security and installation readiness. That is also why I introduced the DOD Climate Resiliency and Readiness Act along with Senator Warren, which I look forward to reintroducing soon. I am a firm believer that if DOD can begin to plan for climate mitigation and be proactive on climate that there is no excuse for civilians to do the same. That is why I am so encouraged by the Department's request of \$617 million to combat the climate crisis. The four categories you have laid out provide a clear guide for where this funding would go. In particular, I'd like to focus in on the \$263 million put into Strengthening Installation Mission Resilience investments. I think this represents a great opportunity for our installations to move towards net-zero emissions. For example, Fort Bliss is located in a region that experiences almost 365 days of sunshine a year, which presents a great opportunity to invest in solar panels as an alternative, and soon main, power source for the base.

However, I am concerned that this funding may not reach installations like Fort Bliss within the first year. Could please you describe how DOD would be making decisions for this funding and how installations can put themselves in the best position possible to receive it?

Secretary AUSTIN. Strengthening installation resilience to hazards associated with the effects of climate change ensures that the DOD can successfully execute critical missions. A key component of installation resilience is energy resilience. Energy resilience is essential to ensuring installations remain effective power projection and sustainment platforms in the face of escalating cyber, climate, and kinetic risks. The Department uses all existing authorities, to include appropriated funds and third party financing, necessary to ensure energy resilience and improve mission readiness. An example is DOD's Energy Resilience and Conservation Program (ERCIP), a defense-wide military construction program used to make investments necessary to close the Department's critical energy gaps through projects submitted by each military service. A competitive process is used to select projects to ensure ERCIP funding is directed to the Department's high-priority, high-value resilience projects. ERCIP projects may include on-site renewable energy, microgrids, and energy efficiency technologies that ensure access to reliable, resilient and cyber-secure energy critical to DOD mission execution.

Ms. ESCOBAR. Secretary Austin, I want to thank you and the Department for putting together a plan for canceling and reprogramming DOD funds that were allocated by the previous administration for a border wall. However, as a member representing both the southern border and a military installation in need of funds for critical infrastructure on base, it was alarming to see just how easy it was for the Department to take funds allocated by Congress for certain programs and redirect them towards something as ineffective as a border wall.

My main concern is that a future administration may use the same playbook laid out by the previous one and pillage critical programs within DOD for wall funding. What can Congress do to ensure funding we have appropriated actually makes it to their designated accounts? This is something I'd like to continue the conversation on and look forward to working with you and your staff to find a solution suitable for both DOD and Congress.

Secretary AUSTIN. I am committed to transparency regarding resourcing decisions of the Department and look forward to continued congressional support. The Department relies on existing authorities to provide the flexibility required to manage the Department's resources in the most efficient and effective manner possible, and we will do so within the legal boundaries Congress provides.

Ms. ESCOBAR. General Milley, this morning my colleagues in the House, joined by Rep. Speier of this committee, and I, introduced the Vanessa Guillén Military Justice Improvement and Increasing Prevention Act to modernize the military justice system by transferring responsibility for making prosecutorial determinations for the most serious crimes to military attorneys with significant trial experience and training than the existing chain of command. As you may be aware, this the com-

panion bill of Sen. Gillibrand's military justice bill, which you have voiced opposition to. Sadly, your recent opposition in communication with the Senate Armed Service Committee has caused Senate leaders to block efforts to secure a vote on the bill. This bill is now a bicameral, bipartisan bill with wide support, even from Members who've served and speak to the dire issues in our military justice system. Though more limited in comparison to our bill, the recent recommendations of the task force that Sec. Austin set up to conduct a 90-day review of sexual harassment and assault in the military, included a recommendation to hand decisions to prosecute sex crimes to military lawyers.

General, do you support the recommendation of the task force to remove the chain of command from sexual harassment and assault crimes?

General MILLEY. I support fundamental change in the area of sexual assault and sexual harassment, including removal of Commanders from preferral and referral decisions. However, we need to stay narrowly focused on the issue of sexual assault and directly related crimes in order to drive meaningful change. Any additional change requires deliberate, empirically-based study and analysis to ensure proposed changes will yield the desired results.

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#### QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MRS. LURIA

Mrs. LURIA. General, at last week's budget hearing for the Air Force, I asked General Brown—twice—if he thought we might actually conduct a large scale land invasion in any conflict with China. He mentioned the joint warfighting concept and said it's "hard to predict what would happen" and to have "options in the future." General, China has a population of 1.4 billion people. The People's Liberation Army has about 2.2 million active duty soldiers and about half a million reserve soldiers. Do you envision the U.S. and its allies mounting a large scale land invasion of the PRC? If not would it be more advantageous to redirect some funding for the Army to the Navy and Air Force to deter and counter, if necessary, China?

General MILLEY. Both the National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy recognize the PRC as a strategic competitor vying for economic, diplomatic, and military advantages globally. The United States has responded to the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP's) direct challenge by acknowledging that the U.S. and PRC are in a strategic competition. The United States and its allies will protect our interests appropriately, but competition does not mean conflict. Even as the United States competes with the PRC, we welcome cooperation where our interests align.

Addressing your second question, the Department is currently conducting a Global Posture Review to assess whether our current force is allocated and positioned to meet our pacing threat and competitors. This review includes participation from the services. Following completion of the Global Posture Review and the National Defense Strategy, we will be better positioned to make recommendations regarding force posture and funding allocation to deter and defend our interests, as well as compete with China.

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#### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MORELLE

Mr. MORELLE. The nature of conflict has increasingly become a global engagement verses regional engagements. Does department have the domain awareness needed to be successful in global engagements? Does the FY22 budget support those needs?

Secretary AUSTIN. The Department has identified and is investing in a range of key capability needs, including: improved domain awareness systems; more robust communications capabilities; increased intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; and improved environmental modelling. For example, the Department is continuing to advance the development of the Joint All Domain Command and Control capability, a construct and modernization framework for command and control of the Joint Force, allies, and partners that will provide the ability to connect distributed sensors, information, data, and effects from all domains in a resilient manner.

Mr. MORELLE. Secretary Austin, DOD intelligence assessments have consistently chronicled the increasing proliferation and sophistication of hypersonic vehicles, unmanned aerial vehicles, and sea-skimming missiles, of all types and ranges, being developed by potential adversaries. These threats will be difficult to defend against with conventional weapons, including our current interceptor-based defenses, leading to an unacceptable vulnerability to "swarm" attacks. In addition, the relative cost of one interceptor to one hypersonic vehicle is comparable, or greater, creating a situation where the defense costs as much as or more than the offense. Short-pulse laser (SPL) directed energy weapons (DEW) systems can produce extremely high-peak-power on target, offering near instantaneous destruction of targets, ad-

vantageous magazine-depth, low-cost per shot, and significant advantages in size, weight and power (SWaP). Despite the advantages of this game-changing technology, recent DOD budget requests have disinvested in DEW development. For example, the request for the Missile Defense Agency did not include funding for directed energy research for the second straight year. Can you comment on this funding imbalance for DEW systems and what is needed to accelerate the research and development of SPL based systems to ensure we are able to counter and deter the likely threats of the next several decades?

Secretary AUSTIN. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) recently funded a research effort to investigate the efficacy of ultrashort pulsed lasers against hypersonic missiles. While the basic physics were successfully demonstrated, the military utility was not successfully demonstrated. The Department recognizes the potential of pulse lasers as one of several possible counters to hypersonic weapons, but realizes that more research and development is needed in the area. The Fiscal Year 2022 budget includes funding for a number of directed energy programs throughout the Department and reflects the Department's top priorities in directed energy.

Mr. MORELLE. The nature of conflict has increasingly become a global engagement verses regional engagements. Does department have the domain awareness needed to be successful in global engagements? Does the FY22 budget support those needs?

General MILLEY. Through the delivery of Joint All Domain Command & Control (JADC2), as demonstrated in globally integrated exercises, wargames, and experiments, the Department of Defense is continuously improving the domain awareness needed to be successful in global engagements. JADC2 is the warfighting capability to sense, make sense, and act at all levels and phases of war, across all domains, and with partners, to deliver information advantage at the speed of relevance. The JADC2 Cross Functional Team (CFT), aligned under the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), is responsible for accelerating the development and delivery of JADC2 capabilities. The CFT is also responsible for implementation of the JADC2 Strategy and making fiscal recommendations to the JROC and DMAG concerning resourcing for JADC2 moving forward.

FY22 invests in warfighting capability to deliver information advantage & domain awareness at the speed of relevance. Investments into JADC2 will help build a more lethal force, strengthen allies and attract new partners as an all-domain construct and modernization framework for command and control of the joint force and mission partners. PB22 invests \$204M for JADC2 efforts to continue development, integration, and test of digital infrastructure, cloud maturation, and tactical edge networks.

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#### QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. KAHELE

Mr. KAHELE. Secretary Austin, a recent study commissioned by the U.S. Space Force, the Defense Innovation Unit, and the Air Force Research Laboratory found that, "The United States must also develop new market-enhancing tools to increase U.S. commercial space activities, grow viable U.S. space companies, and finance their growth." What market-enhancing tools would you like to see developed in the area of space launch to grow the amount of viable options for future warfighter capabilities in the space domain?

Secretary AUSTIN. DOD procures all launch service requirements from the U.S. commercial space sector. In addition to the National Security Space Launch (NSSL) program, DOD has already developed a variety of contracts to identify and on-ramp new launch providers to pair DOD research and development satellites with innovative U.S. space launch providers. The U.S. space launch industrial base has been strengthened with recent launch development and procurement contracts. DOD continues to work with industry to grow new viable options.

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#### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. STRICKLAND

Ms. STRICKLAND. One of the issues I have heard extensively about in my district is the cost of housing. I've had many military spouses reach out and saying how hard it is for them to find a home. The South Sound is one of the fastest growing markets in the United States for civilians and service members alike. Between 2010 and 2019 over 180,000 households moved into my district compared to almost 54,000 households the decade prior. Housing affordability and increasing housing stock is a major focus of mine in both of the committees that I serve on. The Department assumes nationally, that E5s will spend between \$84-\$95 out of pocket for housing off post. I have heard very clearly that this is not the case. Additionally, DOD's own guidance regarding calculating BAH says that a military member should

not be put into a situation in which a spouse is required to work. However, many spouses are required to work not just to cover housing costs but to put food on the table. It is clear to me that BAH is not sufficient to cover the sharp rise of housing costs—especially in areas like JBLM. On post, there are currently 776 households on the waiting list at JBLM and, while Lincoln Military Housing and JBLM are working on an extensive renovation project, there is more work that needs to be done. We need to seek creative solutions both in addressing housing stock on post to provide families options and off post to ensure that service members can afford to live in our communities. Will you work with me to find creative solutions to resolve the housing affordability crisis that is currently affecting our service members?

Secretary AUSTIN. Yes. Basic Allowance for Housing (BAH) is an essential component of a Service member's compensation package. The Department strives to provide equitable housing allowances to help members procure suitable, adequate, and available housing near their duty stations. BAH rates are calculated based on median rental housing costs in each of approximately 300 military housing areas. Because members receive BAH as a nontaxable cash allowance, they have the freedom, based on personal housing needs and desires, to obtain housing that may cost more or less than the published BAH rates. Additionally, BAH rates do incorporate a fixed out-of-pocket amount (\$84/month for an E-5 without dependents; \$95/month for an E-5 with dependents), which members are expected to absorb. The BAH program is designed to capture rising rental housing costs in each military housing area, and data collection occurs during the spring and summer months, when housing markets are most active. As the country experiences the COVID-19 pandemic, one of the lingering nationwide effects is a housing shortage. In some areas, members find rental housing costs have increased to above the current BAH rates and need more time to find adequate and available housing. The Department is aware of these concerns and is considering options to alleviate some of the hardships members are experiencing. I look forward to working with Congress, and remain open and committed to discovering opportunities that create positive, effective solutions for our Service members and their families.

Ms. STRICKLAND. I understand that all of the services are performing data reviews and will have their own metrics for improving outcomes, but can you expand on how you are tracking data across the joint force? How does the Department plan to measure "success"? Are you focused on improving equity in recruiting, retention, promotion, and discipline? Or are you looking at other factors? How are you going to keep members accountable for improving outcomes—from the Services from the Secretaries and Chiefs down to the enlisted service member entering basic training?

Secretary AUSTIN. Data, metrics, and information are critical in evaluating all of our efforts, from warfighting to diversity, equity, and inclusion. In improving equity, especially in retaining and promoting a diverse military, the DOD Equity Team (DET) is actively reviewing our existing data collection capabilities to better determine how we can improve our metrics and evaluation tools so that we can appropriately measure against our strategic DEI goals. Our data is critical to our evaluations tools, creating necessary changes, ensuring appropriate accountability, and supporting inclusive environments that foster healthy and respectful command climates.

All these issues and factors are intertwined. Retaining a diverse force, promoting an inclusive culture, eliminating barriers, ensuring appropriate military justice dispositions—these all help ensure our Service members are resilient and focused on mission readiness and accomplishment. We cannot forget that our most valuable asset is our people. Understanding their perspective and experiences is vital to our shared success.

Ms. STRICKLAND. It is all well and good to do a one-time report to get a snapshot of the problem in recruiting, retention, promotion, and discipline regarding service members from underrepresented groups. However, addressing diversity, equity, and inclusion will require regular assessment. Can you tell me how the Department will continue to collect data? Will questions be added to the annual command climate survey? Are the specific metrics that the Department is tracking regarding recruiting, retention, promotion, and discipline regarding service members from underrepresented groups?

Secretary AUSTIN. The Department maintains a robust collection of administrative and survey data that can be leveraged on an ongoing basis to assess and track progress in DEI over time. As recommended by the DOD Board on Diversity & Inclusion in 2020, the Department has established a new centralized data enclave to facilitate the aggregation and reporting of DEI data at the DOD level. This new enclave will house all the key metrics and enable automated reporting and tracking using standardized data elements.



Additionally, the centralization of data into this enclave allows us to more easily identify gaps in DEI metrics and develop plans to ingest and/or collect additional data, including from survey data sources, to continuously evaluate and improve DEI efforts. We will also continue to leverage survey data sources to provide qualitative context to what we see in the administrative data findings related to recruiting, retention, promotion, and discipline issues. The command climate survey (Defense Organizational Climate Survey [DEOCS]) will continue to play a role in understanding DEI. It was recently redesigned to elicit information on 19 risk and protective factors that are associated with a variety of outcomes we are tracking, such as readiness, retention, sexual harassment, sexual assault, suicide, and racial/ethnic harassment.

As new information needs and priorities are identified, survey questions will be updated using best practices in measurement of key constructs of interest. A list of the DEI metrics that will be tracked annually is in the new Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 1020.05, "DOD Diversity and Inclusion Management Program," September 9, 2020. We also track a variety of other metrics in statutorily required surveys, including sexual harassment, sexual assault, and racial/ethnic harassment. Finally, with regard to recruiting metrics, the Department continuously fields surveys with recruitment-aged youth to stay abreast of motivators and barriers to military service by underrepresented groups.

Ms. STRICKLAND. The military is a pipeline program, and unlike in the private sector, it is very rare for someone to come from the outside and join at a relatively senior position. Can you tell me how the Department is examining recruitment from underrepresented communities?

Secretary AUSTIN. The Military Services consistently evaluate their recruiting strategies to recruit a force representative of the nation it serves. The Military Services are working closely with their professional marketing agencies to establish and analyze performance metrics on the effectiveness of their marketing plans to reach potential Service members across all communities. We have broadened our reach by ensuring recruiting imagery reflects a diverse, representative force and shifting to technology-focused recruiting including both virtual recruiting and digital marketing, which has resulted in greater interest in the military by potential Service members across the nation. Collectively, through these ongoing efforts, the Department, and the Military Services, are better informed and able to apply more effective recruiting approaches and tools to reach underrepresented communities.

#### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MOORE

Mr. MOORE. I was pleased to see the MILCON budget increase 1.7% over FY21. However, the significant backlog of MILCON requirements means that many projects may never receive funding due to competing needs. I have seen first-hand the impact of deferred funding in facility and infrastructure investments at Hill Air Force Base.

Hill currently has a grouping of 66 buildings, known as the 1200 series buildings, that aren't fit to house the 4,000 DOD personnel found working in them. They were constructed over 80 years ago, initially built as ammunition warehouse space during WWII. Over the years, these buildings have been modified to house administrative functions and are in disrepair. The nature of these buildings not only leads to poor working conditions but has contributed to recruiting challenges for programs at Hill, like GBSD. The DOD urgently needs to find a way to replace these facilities. A recent economic analysis indicated a potential savings of \$400M over 20 years if these facilities were demolished and replaced. The replacement of these facilities through MILCON would cost nearly \$750M but realistically cannot compete with limited MILCON funding.

I am proposing a provision in this year's NDAA that would expand the definition of installation support services in Title 10, Section 2679 that allows a local government to construct, manage, and operate a facility on or near a military installation for a period of up to 10 years. Unfortunately, we have run into scoring implications that have stymied this simple solution.

Mr. Secretary, can you commit to examining innovative financing options and working with OMB to facilitate local communities' desire to assist bases with their infrastructure and military construction needs? Additionally, aside from CBO scoring challenges, can you foresee why the DOD might be opposed to surrounding communities assisting with DOD projects at a cheaper cost, on an accelerated timeline?

Secretary AUSTIN. The DOD works with local communities on many initiatives and is willing to consider innovative financing options to facilitate local communities' desire to assist bases with infrastructure. However, as your proposal dem-

onstrates, there are challenges that limit these options, including scoring rules for budgetary treatment of lease-purchases and capital leases (shared by OMB, CBO, and the House and Senate Budget Committees, as explained in OMB Circular No. A-11 Appendix B) and a legal limitation on the Department's commitment of payments to leaseback facilities from enhanced-use-lease developers (see 10 U.S.C. 2667 (b)(7), \$500K limit).

Mr. MOORE. Can you please provide an update on congressionally directed depot optimization plans expected from the Department?

Secretary AUSTIN. The congressionally-directed optimization plans are part of the overall report required by Section 359(a) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (Public Law 116-92), which requires the Department to submit a comprehensive strategy for improving the depot infrastructure of the Military Departments. The objective of this strategy is to ensure that all covered depots have the capacity and capability to support the readiness and material availability goals of current and future weapon systems of the Department of Defense. This strategy is currently in development with each of the Military Departments, and we anticipate that depot optimizations plans and the corresponding strategy will be completed by the end of October 2021.

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#### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FALLON

Mr. FALLON. Secretary Austin and General Milley, thank you for your service to our great country and for testifying today.

1. Secretary Austin, given the fact that any realistic future conflict will be fought not off the coast of California but nearly a half a world away in the South China Sea, our adversary's backyard, wouldn't you agree that it would stand to reason that we would need to maintain a significant advantage in manpower, material and combat readiness and projection?

2. Are you at all concerned with China's dramatic increase in their spending while our own is reduced? That is this policy were to continue that we would be helping the Chinese Communist achieve their goal of military parity or even eventual military superiority?

3. General Milley, you stated that if the great power competition between the U.S. and the Communist Chinese were to devolve into conflict that it would be incredibly costly and have an uncertain outcome. And that's now with us spending significantly more. As our military budget shrinks and China's grows, at what point does it become impossible to project military power and in so doing, won't this inevitably lead to the end of any realistic deterrent capability on our behalf?

4. Secretary Austin our office asked each branch of the service to provide us with the number of personnel who were separated in the last year data was available for extremist activity. Two branches still, months later, have yet to respond. Two provided data.

5. Mr. Secretary, do you have any idea what those numbers were?

Secretary AUSTIN. #1 Response: I agree that in order to strengthen deterrence against aggressive action, the U.S. Joint Force must maintain a military edge over the PRC in key capability areas. In line with the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, the President's fiscal year 2022 budget submission reflects an increased emphasis on modernization, force readiness, and the development of new operational concepts. Concurrently, the Department must seek to shift resources away from platforms and weapons that are ill-suited to advanced threats, and toward investments in cutting-edge technologies and capabilities that will determine our military advantage in the future.

#2 Response: The Department recognizes that the PRC's ambitious military modernization, sustained by consistent and sizable growth in its defense budget, presents an increasingly concerning challenge to the United States' military advantage in the Indo-Pacific region. I view the PRC as our pacing challenge, and the speed of its military advancements highlight the importance of the investments that the Department is making to maintain a favorable balance of power, including: more lethal and survivable capabilities, a more resilient and distributed force posture, and strengthened allied and partner capabilities.

# 4 and 5 Response: Determining the exact number of actions related to extremist activity is challenging as there is no UCMJ article or specific separation program designator (SPD) reason code in place. Commanders have the authority to employ the full range of administrative and disciplinary actions, including administrative separation or appropriate criminal action, against military personnel who engage in prohibited extremist activity. This is an issue the Department's Extremist Activity Working Group is examining.

Mr. FALLON. Secretary Austin and General Milley, thank you for your service to our great country and for testifying today.

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General MILLEY. I am satisfied that the current budget meets our requirements to bolster our deterrent capabilities now to prevent a conflict from occurring. My previous comments reflected the significant national commitment that would be required should a conflict occur, which is a conflict we aim to deter. To clarify, deterring China from precipitating a crisis now, while costly, is less expensive than failing to deter China and engaging in conflict. We should recognize that China is a very different potential adversary than we have had in the past; they have enormous national resources at their disposal. However, we have many advantages at our disposal, particularly in terms of deterrence, that our budget requests aim to sustain.

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#### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. HORSFORD

Mr. HORSFORD. First, Secretary Austin, I want to congratulate you on your historic confirmation as our nation's first African American Secretary of Defense. I respect your life's work and need to get you out to my district soon. Last week I asked General Brown about the Air Force's plans to end procurement of the MQ-9 Reaper. As I'm sure you know, the MQ-9 plays a critical role in my district. Creech Air Force Base is the hub for global ISR and unmanned hunter-killer operations in support of combatant commanders. The airmen of Creech Air Force Base will play an increasingly important role in protecting the homeland as we shift to exclusively over-the-horizon operations in Afghanistan. I expressed my concern last week that ending procurement of the MQ-9 would leave our deployed forces to make do with already insufficient ISR resources. The day after the Air Force budget hearing, Central Command released their unfunded priority list. For a second year in a row, General McKenzie's number one request was for an additional \$53 million in funding for the MQ-9. He said that the planned Air Force MQ-9 reductions, quote, "greatly increases risk to deployed and redeploying forces." He went on to say that combined with our much smaller ground force presence in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, MQ-9 reductions would "substantially reduce" CENTCOM's ability to combat ISIS, Al Qaeda, and other terrorist groups. I am concerned by this clear disconnect between the clearly articulated needs of the combatant commander and the Air Force's planned reductions.

Do you support General McKenzie's request for additional MQ-9 funding, and do you believe that continued MQ-9 procurement is necessary to meet CENTCOM's near to mid-term over-the-horizon requirements?

Secretary AUSTIN. The Department of the Air Force is committed to providing MQ-9 intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and strike capability to Combatant Commands. The Air Force will continue to offer MQ-9 capability to CENTCOM for the foreseeable future, to include Gorgon Stare Wide Area Motion Imagery and strike capability.

In FY22 the Air Force is requesting a reduction in combat lines. This reduction is less than 10% of the current force presentation (4 of 60) and does not equate to reduction in aircraft inventory; while lines (24/7 coverage) are being reduced, the Air Force is not choosing to divest of any platforms at this time. By keeping 60 combat

lines, and not modifying the way the MQ-9 fleet is utilized, the platform will become more vulnerable and irrelevant, even in low-end conflicts.

While the MQ-9 provides utility today, it was not designed for operation in a future highly-contested environment. Modifying the MQ-9 force presentation is about balancing near and long-term risk. Continued modernization efforts seek to provide future warfighters the ability to access data and information at a moment's notice. Our systems must be able to penetrate contested areas and survive.

Mr. HORSFORD. I'd like to move on now to the issue of sexual assault and specifically how the Department plans to hold commanders and senior leaders accountable for their performance in reducing sexual harassment and sexual assault. Following the Fort Hood Independent Review, the Fort Hood senior commander was reassigned and lost his command of 1st Armored Division and Fort Bliss. I'm curious how the Department plans to hold senior leaders and general officers accountable in a more deliberate and systematic way. While I fully support efforts to move sexual assault prosecutions outside of the chain of command; there is a clear and urgent need to improve accountability amongst senior leaders for their effectiveness in combatting sexual harassment and assault within their formations. How does the Department intend to collect metrics that track the performance of senior leaders at implementing effective SHARP programs and then hold them accountable for their performance during promotion and command selection decisions?

Secretary AUSTIN. A key finding of the Fort Hood Independent Review Committee was that some Army leaders were not fully executing Army and Department of Defense policy on sexual assault prevention and response. As a result, the Department has focused its oversight authority on ensuring the Military Departments and Services execute DOD policy and programs effectively.

On my first full day as Secretary of Defense, I committed that we must do more as a Department to counter the scourge of sexual assault and sexual harassment in the military. As I stated then, this is a leadership issue—and we will lead.

Since that day, we have undertaken a set of immediate actions and the 90-day Independent Review Commission (IRC) on Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment has completed its work on four lines of effort, including accountability.

We also have a redesigned command climate survey, with specific metrics to gauge risk and predictive factors aligned with healthy and unhealthy climates. In turn, results can at times be used as a 'flag' to identify where leaders need to focus greater attention and ask critical questions to assess the source of issues, and how or whether our commanders are taking appropriate actions to address command climate issues. And we anticipate that at times this data can help us identify what works as well as where we need to bolster resources. This data will be used to inform quarterly command climate updates to leadership and biennial On-Site Installation Evaluations (OSIEs) at select installations.

It's also important to note that concerning results from a survey are only a 'flag' that merit additional investigation. There are times when we ask a good commander to fix difficult issues. While data has the potential to help us identify some issues that could reflect a commander performance issue, at the very same time it is also plausible, for example, that a good commander might be newly installed at a unit and working in a genuinely positive manner to make much needed improvements.

Mr. HORSFORD. Last week I asked General Brown about the Air Force's plans to end procurement of the MQ-9 Reaper. As I'm sure you know, the MQ-9 plays a critical role in my district. Creech Air Force Base is the hub for global ISR and unmanned hunter-killer operations in support of combatant commanders. The airmen of Creech Air Force Base will play an increasingly important role in protecting the homeland as we shift to exclusively over-the-horizon operations in Afghanistan. I expressed my concern last week that ending procurement of the MQ-9 would leave our deployed forces to make do with already insufficient ISR resources. The day after the Air Force budget hearing, Central Command released their unfunded priority list. For a second year in a row, General McKenzie's number one request was for an additional \$53 million in funding for the MQ-9. He said that the planned Air Force MQ-9 reductions, quote, "greatly increases risk to deployed and redeploying forces." He went on to say that combined with our much smaller ground force presence in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, MQ-9 reductions would "substantially reduce" CENTCOM's ability to combat ISIS, Al Qaeda, and other terrorist groups. I am concerned by this clear disconnect between the clearly articulated needs of the combatant commander and the Air Force's planned reductions.

Do you support General McKenzie's request for additional MQ-9 funding, and do you believe that continued MQ-9 procurement is necessary to meet CENTCOM's need to mid-term over-the-horizon requirements?

General MILLEY. The PB22 budget request adequately funds ISR priorities. The DOD prioritized programs in the budget that are survivable and resilient against

a near peer threat and had to take risks in other areas. With regard to China, we are looking to shift from traditional manned ISR platforms to a space-based and networked approach that is more survivable. ISR is a commodity that is in high demand from Combatant Commanders all the time, and the requirement often exceeds the capabilities provided. Every commander wants perfect knowledge, and ISR provides those commanders with knowledge to make decisions. Therefore, the DOD is continually balancing the ability to fill current ISR demands while modernizing to address the demands of the future. We must focus on the right mix of capabilities for the future. The demand signal of today for ISR is not the demand signal of tomorrow, so we need to balance today's challenges with tomorrow's.

